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Iran's Renewed Policy of Escalation

12 أكتوبر، 2016


Iran has once again begun sending a variety of messages to regional and international powers regarding regional crises in order to assert that the nation is a major party to those crises. This took place in conjunction with the military parades conducted by the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard in Tehran and Bandar Abbas on 21 September 2016 on the anniversary of the Iran-Iraq war, which extended from 1980-1988; Iran showed off Emad ballistics missiles with a range of up to 1650 kilometers along with S300 missiles purchased from Russia. Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guard’s high-speed boats deliberately approached US Navy patrols USS Firebolt on 4 September. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Major General Mohamed Bagheri indicated Iran’s influence on five Arab countries, where Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander General Mohamed Ali Jafari called for US troops to leave the Arabian Gulf and go to the “Bay of Pigs to demonstrate their power and daring.” 

Although this type of escalation is not new - Iran always employs threats against some forces, especially if the country is subject to regional and international pressure – it cannot be interpreted in isolation from the escalating controversy within Iran surrounding relations with Western countries, and the US in particular. The phenomenon has also come in conjunction with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani participating in meetings of the UN General Assembly. Iran also currently fears the potential transformations in the Syrian conflict which could directly threaten the nation’s interests due to their declining ability to impact those transitions thanks to Russia.

New York Visit:

It was clear that the leadership of Iran’s military institution hope to send a message regarding the efforts made by the Rouhani government and nuclear negotiation team to improve relations with Western countries by quickly implementing the nuclear deal. The General Assembly meetings of the UN provided an opportunity to hold a joint ministerial committee to create a mutual work plan between Iran and the P5+1 countries to discuss Iran’s demand to lift restrictions on transactions between Iran and Western companies and banks due to preliminary fears of the penalties that could be imposed by the US. A meeting was also organized between Iranian Foreign Minister Mohamed Javad Zarif and his American counterpart John Kerry to discuss how to strengthen efforts to lift the sanctions on Iran in conjunction with continuing adherence to the nuclear agreement.

Statements made by Iranian military officials were designed to emphasize that the efforts made by the Rouhani government would not impact Iran’s policy for addressing regional crises nor efforts to support their influence within states suffering such crises. This is because the tenets of this policy are not part of the President or government’s jurisdiction, instead representing one of the most important powers of Supreme leader Ali Khamenei. According to one perspective, the Supreme Leader relies on the military not only to protect Iran’s security and interests at home and abroad, but also to implement policies, the main features of which are determined by him.

However, another perspective indicates that military commanders deliberately escalated their criticisms of the US in part due to the statements made by Rouhani during his return from New York. Through these statements, Rouhani attempted to amplify the results of his participation in the meetings of the General Assembly and with Western leaders, particularly regarding the indication that that Iran benefitted from the P5+1 countries lacking a unified position. Some international forces within the group supported Iran’s demands and emphasized a need for each party to adhere to their commitments, referencing the United States in particular.

Counter-pressures:

In this context, it was important to note that these criticisms made by the military coincided with a campaign launched by media loyal to conservative fundamentalists against Rouhani’s visit to New York, at the forefront of which was the conservative Kayhan newspaper. Editor-in-Chief Hossein Shariatmadari not only pointed out that Rouhani’s government failed to learn from past lessons which demonstrated Washington’s failure to adhere to its obligations toward Iran, but also called for implementation of the nuclear agreement to be undone and for work to resume on developing Iran’s nuclear program. The newspaper argued that Iran had made many concessions to international forces but had yet to receive economic and technological privileges in return.

Without a doubt, this call was regarded with interest within Iran, as Hussein Shariatmadari is a close confidant of Supreme Leader Khamenei and the conservative fundamentalists. Kayhan in particular is considered one of Iran’s largest media outlets which expresses the position of the Supreme Leader on various domestic and foreign issues.

In other words, it can be stated that by sending indirect messages through the media, Iran hopes to send implicit threats to Western countries that the agreement will be abrogated if the policies adopted by those countries toward Iran continued. This includes Iranian monies being utilized to compensate families of the victims of terror attacks where Iran was accused of being involved as well as continuing pressure on Western companies and banks to reduce their dealings with Iran, arguing that they may be involved in signing agreements with economic institutions under the control of the Revolutionary Guard.

Division of Roles:

A third perspective does not rule out the fact that the escalation employed by Iranian military figures has helped strengthen the Rouhani government’s position on the international sphere. The phenomenon may help expand the government’s freedom to convince international forces to adhere to their obligations as per the nuclear agreement in order to avoid any obstacles presented by the military establishment and the conservative fundamentalists in Tehran.

In other words, this view purports that this escalation was the result of coordination between the government and their political rivals to respond to the pressures imposed by international forces on Iran surrounding accusations of state-supported terrorism and threatening foreign companies and banks who had hoped to conduct more transactions with Iran with potential US sanctions.

Latent Fears:

Additionally, this phenomenon is not isolated from Iran’s fears of potential paths for the conflict in Syria, a matter of utmost concern within the country, especially in light of Russia’s continuing keenness to reach agreements with the US on both in political terms and on the field. These fears were expressed by former Senior Military Advisor to the Supreme Leaders Yahya Rahim Safavi on 22 September 2016 when he stated that such agreements may ignore Iran’s interests in Syria.

Thus, it can be stated that Iran’s keenness to once again point out its influence within nations plagued by crisis is oriented at sending a message that Iran is a major party, which cannot be ignored when formulating political and security arrangements in these countries. This message clearly indicates that Iran no longer views Russia as a strategic ally and instead forms an international force whose interests match with those of Iran, perhaps temporarily, pending the emergence of new data on the ground which contradicts this.