On January 24, 2022, an Algerian delegation arrived in Bamako, the capital of Mali, led by the Algeria’s special envoy for the Sahel and Africa Boudjemaa Delmi. The visit was part of the initiative proposed by Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to mediate between Mali and the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to resolve the tension which has escalated between the two parties following the strict sanctions imposed by the ECOWAS on Bamako. The sanctions were imposed in response to the decision of Mali's junta to extend the transition period for five more years.
A Bitter Conflict concerning Mali:
Mali witnessed two military coups, the first in August 2020 and the second in May 2021. The transitional military council sought closer relations with Russia, relying on the services of Russia's Wagner Group as part of Mali's endeavor to combat terrorist groups. The crisis in Mali has escalated due to various developments, which can be summed up as follows:
1. The strict sanctions imposed by the ECOWAS:
Participants in the National Refoundation Conference, which was held in Mali last December, recommended extending the transition for five more years (instead of six months). The transitional authority, led by Assimi Goita, obviously reneged on its previous pledge to hand power over to a civilian government after the presidential and parliamentary elections are held (i.e., by the end of February 2022).
Abdoulaye Diop, Mali's Foreign Minister, handed over Bamako's proposal concerning the extension of the transition period to the ECOWAS members. As a result, ECOWAS convened an extraordinary session on January 9 in which sanctions were imposed on Mali, including border closure and a trade embargo. The ECOWAS members also decided to cut financial aid to Mali, freeze Mali’s assets at the Central Bank of West African States, and recall their ambassadors to Bamako.
In addition, ECOWAS members deployed their forces to address any possible violence breakout in Mali.
Mali's authorities condemned the sanctions and recalled its ambassadors to the ECOWAS countries, deciding to close its borders with these countries. Furthermore, Mali's transitional government urged Malians to hold protests against the ECOWAS's decisions.
2. The Algerian initiative of mediation:
Before ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Bamako, Mali's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop visited Algeria on January 6, in the hope that Algeria would be able to mediate between Mali and the ECOWAS. On January 11, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune announced that Algeria was willing to act as an intermediary between the two parties, warning that ECOWAS' severe sanctions, as well as any measures taken against Mali's authorities, would have serious consequences. Tebboune urged the two parties to adhere to self-restraint and resume dialogue.
Algeria proposed that the transition period be extended to a range of 12 to 18 months, instead of six months, and that Mali's authorities establish a constitutional, conciliatory system of government during 2022. The Algerian president also urged the conflicting parties to revive the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, resulting from the Algiers Process (2015).
In this respect, Boudjemaa Delmi, the Algerian Special Envoy for the Sahel and Chairman of the Monitoring Committee of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, arrived in Mali on January 24, to deliver a message from the Algerian President to Mali's military leader Assimi Goita with the aim of reaching a resolution for the current crisis.
3. African support of the Algerian proposal:
On January 21st, African Peace and Security Council announced that it supports the Algerian initiative to extend the transitional period and reach a mutual understanding. The Council also urged the conflicting parties to adhere to the Algerian initiative and do their best to reach an understanding concerning the current disputes.
European anticipation
The aforementioned Algerian initiative has significant implications, as per the following:
1. The possibility that the Algerian initiative may be successful:
It is noticeable that the Algerian initiative is likely to succeed in achieving its objectives. The reason is that Algeria is on good terms with Mali as well as with other African countries, including some ECOWAS members. Algeria can make use of its close relations with African countries, eventually managing to convince ECOWAS to make the sanctions imposed on Bamako less severe. Furthermore, Algeria can capitalize on its previous experience as far as Mali is concerned, especially as it succeeded in 2015 in bringing about an agreement between Mali's government and several terrorist groups.
Algeria also increased its humanitarian aid to Mali. Recently, it has “sent 108 tons of foodstuff and about 400000 doses of anti-Covid-19 vaccine to Bamako,” as part of Algeria's endeavor to enhance its relationship with Mali. In addition, the Algerian aid is meant to reduce the effect of the economic blockade imposed by ECOWAS on Mali, and therefore to push the organization to resume negotiations with the transitional authority in Bamako.
2. Enhancing the role of the African Union:
Algeria supports the idea that African conflicts should be resolved by African countries. Besides, Algeria always endeavors to stress that the African Union should not be ignored in favor of other subsidiary African organizations, as it is the African Union that should play the main role in managing crises in African countries.
Apparently, Algeria is seeking to ensure Egypt's support for its aforementioned initiative before the upcoming AU Summit. According to estimates, one of the reasons why Tebboune visited Cairo on January 24 was to coordinate with Egypt regarding Algerian policies in the Sahel and Western Africa, including Algerian mediation efforts in Mali.
Certain analyses refer to the likelihood that Algeria and Russia are currently coordinating mediation between Mali and the ECOWAS, on the grounds of the strong relationship between Algiers and Moscow, and in the light of the significance of Bamako to Algeria.
3. Algeria's endeavor to play a more active role in the region:
Algeria's proposal for mediation in Mali's crisis is one of the steps which Algeria is currently taking with a view to re-assuming its previous regional role. Algeria has always been actively engaged in solving crises in neighboring countries, but the past decade witnessed a noticeable decline of the Algerian role in Africa. Algeria believes that it is time to make its regional presence felt again. This is why the past few months have witnessed attempts on Tebboune's part to restore Algerian diplomacy to its previous, active role. The fact that the experienced Algerian politician Ramtane Lamamra resumed his former post as Foreign Minister bears witness to Tebboune's efforts to make Algeria more regionally active again.
4. French challenges currently facing the Algerian initiative:
The Algerian initiative is facing several challenges. One of these challenges is the influence France has on the ECOWAS. On January 16, Mali's interim Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga accused France of using ECOWAS to settle a score with Mali, in a reference to the pressure Paris is putting on Bamako for establishing relations with Moscow.
In return, Mali has been taking escalatory steps against France. The latest of these steps was that Bamako demanded that its bilateral defense accords with Paris be reviewed. Mali's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop even insinuated that these accords may be abrogated, and on January 31, 2022, French Ambassador to Mali Joel Meyer was expelled.
5. European anticipation for the Algerian mediation:
The past few weeks have witnessed rapid escalation of the tension between Mali and the European forces, which are part of Takuba Task Force in the Sahel region, especially after Bamako announced that the Danish troops “are no longer welcome in Mali.” As a result, on January 27 Denmark announced that it would withdraw its troops from Mali (about 100 military personnel from Special Forces). Copenhagen took this step only a few weeks after Sweden announced, at the beginning of January, that it would withdraw its troops from Mali in March 2022.
It seems that the European forces are avoiding making a final decision about the future of their presence in Mali till the outcomes of the Algerian mediation are known. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that on January 28, defense ministers from 15 European countries held a consultation, announcing afterwards that they agreed on drawing up a plan defining the nature of future European involvement in the Sahel region within two weeks.
It is noteworthy that there are disagreements among European countries regarding the optimal way of dealing with Mali. On the one hand, some European countries support adopting a hard stance against Mali's authorities by refusing to work with Mali's military leaders. On the other hand, other European countries believe that such a tough stance would give Russia the opportunity to gain the upper hand in the Sahel region.
In the final analysis, Algeria's recent endeavor to mediate between Mali and ECOWAS indicate that Algeria regards enhancing its regional presence as a top priority. It can be said that the success of the Algerian mediation depends on Paris's response to Algeria's efforts, as well as on Algeria's ability to mobilize support for its mediation during the upcoming AU Summit (which will be held early in February 2022).
