The head of Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF or the the Hashed al-Shaabi), Faleh al-Fayyad, at a meeting on August 8 in Tehran with commander-in-chief of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hossein Salami stated that the paramilitary group is “proud of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Islamic Revolution example, and today we consider it our duty to use the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' experience within the laws and specificities of Iraq”. He was alluding to the possibility of replicating the IRGC in Iraq and create an Iraqi replica of the Iranian force.
Salami, on his part, Salami said that the “final word” is always said on the battlefield” and that “the real political capabilities are the field capabilities.” He added that the performance of the PMF is great on the field and its capabilities as a defense and jihadi force with big goals will be further be expanded.”
These statements expose, not only Iran’s desire to create an army that is parallel to the Iraqi national army and that is similar to Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi group, but also its attempt to unify all groups operating under the PMF into one regulatory framework.
Variable regional and international dynamics
The call for establishing an Iraqi version of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps comes within a regional and international context witnessing two major variables:
1- The US withdrawal from Iraq: there is no doubt that the withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq by the end of this year 2021, as part of the outcome of the fourth round of strategic dialogue between the US and Iraq, may very well lead to increasing Iran’s influence in Iraq.
To achieve this, Iran has been sending officials in on announced and unannounced vists to fill the void resulting from the US withdrawal at all levels. For example, former president Hassan Rouhani, in May, plans to build a cross-border railroad to connect Iran to Iraq and Syria.
On July 14, Iran’s minister of Ministry of Intelligence and Security Sayyid Mahmoud Alavi visited Baghdad and met Iraqi President Barham Saleh to discuss security collaboration between the two countries. The movements show the Iranian government’s keenness on bolstering relations with Iraq at all levels.
2- Raisi’s ascent to presidency: the new Iranian president Ibrahim Raisi to power in Tehran is not expected to cause a new shift in Iran’s role in Iraq because Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC are running the policy on Iraq. That is why Raisi’s policies will certainly continue a tradition of supporting Khamenei’s policy that is based on attempting to force out the U.S. troops out of Iraq.
To avoid retaliation from Washington, unknown Shiite militia groups declared responsibility for attacks on US troops, but in fact they were front groups for militias that are part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), such as the Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah and other armed groups. So announcing the desire to create an Iraqi version of the IRGC is continuation of Tehran’s strategy for taking control of Iraq using ideological militia groups that operate under the umbrella of the IRGC and have allegiance to Tehran.
Implications of calling for an Iraqi IRGC
Al-Fayyad’s visit to Tehran at this time, his meeting with Salami as well as statements made by both officials reveal the following implications:
1- An attempt to perpetuate Iran’s Influence on Baghdad: Iran seeks to emphasize and perpetuate its influence in Iraq, especially militarily. Tehran recognizes the fact that such influence is facing no easy challenges. These include the angry protests by Iraqi Shiite population against Iran over the past two years, where one of the most recognizable slogans chanted by protestors was “Iran get out”. The anti-Iranian protestors also torched Iran’s consulates in Iraq. The anger shows the extent of popular anger at Iran’s negative role as well as Iraqi politicians loyal to Iran.
That is why al-Fayyad reassured Salami that the real political forces are those active on the field, meaning those that have armed militia groups. His statements imply that political forces, protestors and youth forces that are against Iran’s influence on Baghdad are all worthless and powerless.
The statements also serve as a negative indication. That is to say if the political forces affiliated with the PMF receive a low number of votes in the early Iraqi elections to be held in October, due to intimidation and bribes, Tehran will be prepared to rely on armed force to guarantee its continued influence in Baghdad.
2- Frustrating al-Kadhimi’s regional policies: Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi seeks to embrace a policy that spares Iraq from being transformed to an arena for settling the scores between Iran and the United States. He also seeks to build balanced economic relations with Arab countries.
His effort was evidenced in al-Kadhimi’s call to hold a summit for regional neighboring countries and his effort to bolster economic cooperation with Egypt and Jordan through an Arab alliance now known as the new Mashreq, and discuss electricity imports from the Arab Gulf countries instead of reliance power supplies from Iran.
Iran is worried by these concerns that are also opposed by its militia groups because they can potentially weaken Iran’s economic influence in Iraq. That is why, the call to create an Iraqi replica of the IRGC came to emphasize Iran’s military domination on Baghdad and create tools to threaten any Iraqi government that opposes Iran’s moves.
3- Potential Iranian concerns over Egypt’s role: Iraqi Defense Minister Juma Inad Saadoun visited Cairo on August 7 and delivered a letter from Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi about countering common challenges, namely fighting terrorism, achieving security, stability and development.
The meeting also dealt with talks on bilateral military cooperation, including joint training programs, exchange of expertise and enhancing capabilities. The development coincided with Washington’s plans to shrink its role in Iraq by shifting its troops from a combat to an advisory role.
Baghdad feared that failure of the Iraqi forces to protect the security of US troops from attacks by the PMF would prompt the US army to leave Iraq.
He seeks to benefit from military cooperation with Egypt to enhance the Iraqi forces’ capabilities and strengthen the army against the PMG. This development may have raised Iran’s concerns and prompted it to respond on the next day by sending al-Fayyad to Tehran to meet Salami.
4- Rejection of negotiating regional influence: Tehran is working on establishing the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard Corps to reiterate that it is bolstering its influence in Iraq in the coming period and that its regional influence is non-negotiable. Washington reiterated that it will work on adding new terms to the current nuclear deal, being negotiated in Vienna, that provides for holding talks, in a later stage, about Iran’s missile program and regional influence. Therefore, the call to form an Iraqi revolutionary guard aims to preempt these US attempts and impose a new fait accompli.
Challenges of the Replication of IRGC
Iran’s endeavor to create an Iraqi replica of the IRGC is facing a number of challenges that can be outlined as follows:
1- Opposition from Pro-Sistani militant groups:
Iran’s attempt to create an Iraqi IRGC is facing the issue of divisions hitting the Shiite militant groups loyal to Tehran and those loyal to Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shiite authority in Iraq. Most recently, the Hashd al-Maarji, affiliated with Sistani, refused to participate in a military parade held by the Iran-affiliated PMF in late June 2021.
2- Multiplicity of leaders of the PMF: Iran faces the issue of multiple commands for the PMF, as well as the issue of opposition from some of the commanders to Iran’s attempts to create a consistent organizational framework and impose a new commander building on the model of its IRGC.
3- Disagreement between Iranian influential forces about Iraq: Qasem Soleimani, the slain commander of the IRGC's Quds Force, was in full control of Iran’s policy on Iraq. After he was killed, the Iraq dossier became to be run by several officials, the most prominent of which is the new commander of the Quds Force Esmail Qaani who has visited Iraq six times during this year, commander-in-chief of the IRGC Hossein Salami, as well as the head of intelligence of the Quds Force, Hossein Taa’ee. It is not clear yet whether these institutions and forces embrace the same consistent policy on Iraq or are divided in a way that impact Iran’s Iraq policy.
In conclusion, it is safe to say that Iran’s efforts to create and Iraqi version of the IRGC will face challenges, from militant groups, especially the Hashd al-Maarji, affiliated with Sistani, as well as political forces opposing Iran’s plans, such as the Sadrist Movement. Other challenges include a difficulty in bringing all groups of the PMF together under control and into one regulatory framework.
