The US-Iraqi plan to wage war on the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in Mosul has driven ISIS militants towards Syria. According to several reports, Mosul has been besieged from three directions, whereas Iraqi-Syrian borders towards the city of Raqqa remained open. Accordingly, Raqqa currently constitutes ISIS’ main stronghold.
There are various indicators revealing that this strategy seeks to isolate ISIS forces within Raqqa, in order to impose a blockade on them in preparation for the most significant battle, after the liberation of Mosul. This is compatible with what different US newspapers, such as the Washington Post, have reported arguing that the US strategy towards dealing with Raqqa is based on cutting it off through targeting its bridges over the Euphrates river, then besieging the city from all sides in collaboration with the Syrian Democratic Forces.
Parallel Trajectories
After the inauguration of US President Donald Trump on January 20, 2017, his administration declared that it would not pursue this strategy. President Trump requested the adoption of a new and viable plan to defeat ISIS without revealing its details. From this point, and until the details of the new US strategy become clear, it can be stated that the previous plan is still being executed on the ground. In fact, it has entered its third phase with the arrival of the Syrian Democratic Forces in Deir ez-Zor on February 22, 2017.
Within this context, ISIS’ capacity to control Raqqa has diminished, according to John Dorian, the official spokesperson for the international coalition against ISIS. Furthermore, the Syrian Democratic Forces are moving in parallel both on the eastern axis and on western axis of the city, and they have in fact managed to liberate dozens of villages from ISIS.
Alternative Scenarios
Despite the continued implementation of the plan to besiege Raqqa, this does not negate the fact that there are still avenues that might allow ISIS to escape Raqqa. According to reports from Arab and non-Arab states, the restrictions on movement have hampered the movement of civilians, more so than ISIS militants. ISIS actually sought to plant explosives on bridges, with the launch of a military operation to liberate Mosul. Given this situation, there are five possible scenarios for the eviction of ISIS from Raqqa, in conformity with numerous recent analysts’ speculations, according to the following:
First Scenario: ISIS may reverse its movements, by crossing over Raqqa towards Mosul through the porous Syrian-Iraqi borders. This is possible, in light of many reports stating that ISIS has the capacity to flee from Raqqa into Mosul despite coalition forces bombing both the old and new Raqqa bridges on the Euphrates. ISIS militants can use boats and canoes in their evacuation process. Such process cannot be hindered with barriers to restrict movements.
The Iraqi-Syrian border extends for nearly 600 kilometers, making it very difficult to implement strict border control. It is likely that the lion’s share of ISIS fighters will flee Raqqa using this border. In the last week of October 2016, CNN reported that hundreds of militants reached Mosul from Raqqa. Eyewitness accounts stated that most of them were foreign fighters, wearing distinct uniforms and explosive belts and carrying light arms, indicating that they were ISIS’ Special Forces. The testimonies went against the prevailing expectation that ISIS would cluster its forces in Raqqa. Other reports, published on the official ISIS websites, stated that ISIS did not allow any of its fighters to leave Mosul for Raqqa, with the exception of injured fighters.
Second Scenario: Similar to previous battles in Iraq and Syria, especially the battles of al-Bab and Manbij, ISIS fighters would resort to hide themselves among civilians by changing their appearance by shaving their beards, abandoning their military uniforms or even wearing women’s attire. Such actions are often limited to those in leadership positions. Abu Omar al-Asafi, the ISIS commander in the Iraqi province of al-Shirqat, has used disguise tactics in an attempt to flee al-Sharqat according to Iraqi security sources in September 2016. Fighters may also flee battles either in forms of individuals or small cells, similar to what occurred in Manbij in July 2016.
ISIS fighters may integrate with the displaced, in case the safe zone plans were implemented, similar to what took place in Iraq before the launch of the battle for Mosul. A number of ISIS fighters from local Iraqi municipalities were able to hide among their families, and reports stated that others were able to falsify their identities and hide among the displaced, though this is not feasible for foreign fighters. One must note that the current battle for Raqqa is still taking place in the surrounding countryside, and once it reaches the densely populated city, the situation will be far more complicated.
Third Scenario: Escaping into relatively more stable areas whose residents are not inspected. During the operations to recapture a number of villages in Raqqa’s countryside, residents were not properly vetted and categorized to ensure there were no terrorists among them. This was due to how quickly the villages were liberated, especially given that the operations mostly concentrated on ISIS fighters who were in the front lines of the battle. It can be said that these areas are a haven for ISIS members individually, or even in small groups, which have managed to create ties with elements of the local populations. ISIS members who use this tactic will probably view it as a transitional phase aimed at an exit from the battlefield, as dictated by courses of action, which may be feasible later.
Fourth Scenario: The “early returners” scenario has occurred frequently after major battles against terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda after the war in Afghanistan. This scenario is tied to the phase after the conclusion of a battle and the fall of the terrorist organization. In light of the consistent defeats suffered by ISIS, there are many indicators that such a scenario could well occur. Many ISIS members may attempt to return to their countries of origin. Along these lines, Tunisia has witnessed an intense debate over the return of Tunisian citizens who joined terrorist organizations abroad.
Fifth Scenario: Sleeper cells course of action would be implemented in response to the ferocious military attacks against ISIS from various factions, with the purpose of carrying out rapid terror attacks. ISIS declared in its periodic publication published on the website ‘Amaq, that simultaneous with the launch of the operation to liberate Mosul ISIS managed to carry out 157 suicide bombings in Baghdad. This would mean that options for attacks outside ISIS controlled territory are still feasible.
What is striking in this context is that some of the speeches given by ISIS leadership have pointed out the possibility of the collapse of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, stating that the priority is to preserve its ideals rather than controlling territory. This might drive the organization, in contrast to what it claims, to allow some important elements of it to splinter off, and become sleeper cells capable of carrying out rapid terror attacks, with a view of implementing ISIS ideology on the ground at a later date.
Despite all of this, it can be stated that these scenarios all pose numerous dilemmas, which reduce the likelihood of their occurring, especially if the factors behind the spread of terrorism in Iraq and Syria are overlooked. Such factors include the rising and spreading power of the armed militias loyal to Iran in Syria, excluding and marginalizing of some social elements, and the continued abuses by the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. The factors further include the reduced capacity of the police to enforce border controls over the Iraqi-Syrian border, which has been a vital instrument for ISIS in coping with the recent military assaults against it.
