Ongoing attacks by armed factions against the Syrian army in the north and center of the country are reminiscent of Mosul's fall to the ISIS terrorist organization in 2014 due to two main reasons. Firstly, ongoing developments in Syria could lead to the resurgence of ISIS, either from outside or within Iraqi borders. Secondly, Iraq fears further chaos if it becomes drawn into a wider regional escalation, especially if Israel were to place it on its list of future targets.

In light of these concerns, Iraq is taking numerous proactive precautions, including security measures such as tightening its shared border with Syria. Iraq is also engaging with regional and international actors, particularly coordinating with Iran and Syria.

Iraq's Security Approach

Iraq's approach to the ongoing developments in Syria is primarily security-oriented. This can be summarized as follows:

1. War on Terrorism

According to an analysis of security and military discourse and Iraq's actions, the primary focus of the latter's approach is the war on terrorism, specifically against ISIS. Iraq has claimed to have eliminated the so-called "Governor of Iraq" in ISIS and other senior leaders of the organization in a joint operation with the Global Coalition against ISIS, just a month before the current developments in Syria. Consequently, Iraq is not addressing other security dimensions, such as the military supplies that Iran is transporting to Syria through Iraq. However, it is believed that Israel and the United States are closely monitoring Iran's movements in the period following the October 2023 attacks, and Israel has intensified its strikes in this regard.

The Iraqi army is currently leading the security scene, without disregarding the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which is participating in securing the border. The army has thus reinforced its border forces with three military divisions, in addition to two divisions from the Popular Mobilization Forces. The process of securing the border with Syria also included the construction of a concrete wall over the past two years, extending approximately 360 kilometers (nearly half of the 610-kilometer shared border) from Sinjar to al-Qa'im. It is equipped with thermal surveillance cameras, a trench along the border, in addition to fortified watchtowers and drones to monitor the area.

2. Multi-Party Security Coordination:

The Iraqi government is currently coordinating with various parties, even those with conflicting interests. Communication between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani was among the first actions taken by Assad after the armed factions took control of Aleppo. Iraqi observers believe the focus on the border remains a precautionary, partial measure in the face of numerous security issues and is not sufficient to prevent the threat of the situation in Syria from spilling over into Iraq. Thus, the statement of the military meeting in Iraq included an important reference to intelligence operations on the borders with neighboring countries, implying coordination with Syria, Iran, and Jordan, although it is unclear how efficient the management of such an intelligence system would be. In other words, it is unclear whose priorities this cooperation will serve.

Additionally, Iranian and US interests are conflicting – a phase which requires the Iraqi government to play the role of a balancer and not merely a "messenger" between the multiple parties. The White House statement on the ongoing developments in Syria indicates that Iran's role is a major reason for what is happening in Syria.

Another weakness relates to the positions of the Iraqi militias, which do not necessarily align with the official Iraqi position, even if the headline is the same, which is to support the Syrian government. However, the Iraqi government may not seek direct involvement in Syria, nor does it want Baghdad to be dragged into a battle due to the involvement of parties beyond its control. While the Iraqi government can control the "Hashd al-Atabat" (which is already contributing alongside the army), it cannot control the "Hashd al-Wilai" and especially the "Asaib Ahl al-Haq" militia, which will remain at Iran's disposal to operate in Syria. This militia specifically will act from the standpoint that it is Iran's spearhead after the losses suffered by the Lebanese Hezbollah.

The Iraqi government may have divided its role between the two parties; meaning that it will deal with the Syrian file from a security perspective, cooperating with the US and the international coalition on the terrorism file, while at the same time supporting Iranian movements in the Syrian file to secure the position of the Syrian regime there. Another challenge related to sectarian balances, which is an important factor from the Iranian perspective and its allies: The large Sunni presence in Syria in favor of "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham" will undermine the sectarian balance that Iran and its agents have established in the neighboring country for nearly a decade. And even if it does not change those balances, it may at least encourage the ISIS organization inside Iraq to once again target these Shia militias.

The Specter of Regional Escalation

Israel is closely monitoring Iraq in the post-October 7, 2023 period, which it considers as one of Iran's allied arenas, in addition to being a significant logistical factor in Tehran's military infrastructure in the region. According to local reports, there has been a recurring question in Iraq recently about the possibility of entering a direct confrontation with Israel. In this context, several indicators can be considered, including the following:

1. Syria as a Link:

Syria has been the main link between Iraqi militias and Iran since the 2014 crisis, which predates the war on Gaza. There are numerous Iraqi militias in Syria, operating outside the control of the Iraqi state but remaining under its responsibility. They sometimes also operate against the government's direction. In this regard, the Iraqi religious authority, Ali al-Sistani, issued a fatwa calling for the restriction of weapons under the state’s control, but this has not been met with a real response from these sectarian factions.

2. Israeli and US Positions:

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in his political speeches, has stated that Israel is engaged in confrontations in Iraq and that the latter constitutes a threat to Tel Aviv. The US administration also announced last November that it had sought to prevent Israel from conducting military operations in Iraq in response to attacks launched by what are called "Islamic resistance factions." This could be considered an implicit indication that Washington may not intervene if Israel takes such a step, but if Tel Aviv currently believes that there are other parties that may engage in this confrontation with the Iraqi factions, it may let them "fight it out."

The Threat of Militias

Militias operating outside state control will remain a major issue for Iraq, especially regarding their role outside the country's borders. It will be difficult to contain them as long as there is Iranian demand for them, particularly in light of the existence of a strong sectarian bond. For example, the leaders of the "loyal factions" could engage in the Syrian arena if the "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham" threatens the shrines in Syria, after a statement by the leader of "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham," Abu Muhammad al-Julani, in which he allegedly said "we will not stop until Damascus."

In conclusion, the current situation in Syria may temporarily deter Tel Aviv from engaging in a direct confrontation in Iraq. If, however, Iraqi militias increase the level of threat against Israel, this may change the situation, in addition to Israel potentially targeting them in Syria.

Terrorism may be the main threat facing Iraq, considering that terrorist organizations are in a state of competition, and they may find what is happening in Syria as another opportunity to return to the arenas they previously occupied, including the Iraqi arena.