The Somali “Shabab al-Mujahedin” movement has recently sought to increase its operations by carrying out a number of qualitative terrorist attacks. These attacks have targeted not only the military and policy but also state institutions such as parliament. Another attack targeted an African Union army base in Amisom, which houses Kenyan, Burundian, and Ugandan soldiers and is considered by the movement to be a symbol of the foreign occupation of the country, placing it at the top of the list of targets for the movement to attack.

Without a doubt, this noticeable increase in terrorist attacks is closely related to its goal of counter-attacking the interests of countries involved in the war on terror, especially after the former movement leader Ahmed Ghawdan was killed in a US drone strike in September 2014. It is also closely linked to the increase attacks by these powers against terrorist organizations across the Middle East, starting with the war on ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the war on AQAP and Boko Haram in West Africa, and finally the Shabab al-Mujahedin movement in Somalia.

Important Indicators:

The ongoing terrorist attacks by Shabab- al-Mujahedin inside Somalia over the past few months – after a noticeable decline in the group’s strength and local activity over the past year – raises two main points. First, it shows the kind of terrorist attacks carried out by the group recently, in which they have strongly depended on explosives whether through car bombs or suicide bombers.

By adopting this kind of attacks, the group is aiming to increase the number of victims, showing that it’s sending a message to the powers engaged in the war against the group that increasing internal and regional pressures will lead to an increase in attacks. These attacks are also no longer focused on security targets but also target civilians in order to push back against the powers engaged in the war on terror to stop them from increasing the pressure on the group.

Second, the increasing attacks show shifting priorities. While the group is increasing attacks locally, particularly against the army and vital state institutions such as parliament and African army posts, there is a noticeable decline in its foreign activity. The group has not carried out any major terrorist attacks on foreign land over the past few months, except for one attack that targeted a residential building in North-East Kenya on October 6, 2016, which many have accused the group of carrying out but for which it has not announced responsibility. In the past, the group had placed foreign attacks at the top of its list of priorities, evidenced by the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in September 2013 and the attack on Garicia University in Kenya in April 2015, the fifth-largest attack by the group on Kenyan soil in the 18 months leading up to it.

Although these two indicators may signal the group’s increasing interest in strengthening its local influence for the time being, the group’s declining foreign attacks – particularly in Kenya – may also be attributed to its declining ability in light of the war it is undergoing with African forces in Somalia, as well as with American forces, which have been successful in targeting about 10 of the group’s leaders through special operations or drone strikes.

Multiple Goals:

In light of the above, the movement’s main goals in increasing attacks recently can be summed up as follows:

1- Regaining influence and scope: Recently, the group has been working on increasing its influence once again, especially in the coastal areas spreading from Mombasa, Kenya, to Mogadishu. This region has vast strategic importance, especially that it is home to a number of crucial Indian Ocean ports and is near to the Mandeb strait.

Along with that, in March 2016 the group took control of a small port in the semi-autonomous Bunt governorate, with the aim of creating a new nucleus for it in this region as a safe alternative to the mountainous northern regions. The aim of that is to secure its leadership against air strikes in the south and middle of the country, which are open areas.

2- Searching for new funding sources: The group may be aiming to use the new regions it has under its control to carry out pirate attacks against some countries’ commercial vessels. This is especially true in light of the pressures the group is under, leading to shrinking funding resources recently. This move, however, may face numerous obstacles, especially with the rising international and regional focus on securing commercial vessels passing through the region by providing military presence nearby, especially in Djibouti.

3- Filling a void: Shabab al-Mujahedin, through its latest increase in attacks, is aiming to fill the void created by the withdrawal of government and Ethiopian peacekeeping forces from some regions, such as the strategically-important city of Halghan in the Hiran region in the middle of Somalia, controlled by the group since October 2016 after government forces withdrew from it.

What is interesting about this is that it’s the third time Somali and Ethiopian forces withdraw from certain areas, paving the way for the movement to spread in those regions, as were the case in the city of Mokokori and the town of Al-Ali in October of 2016.

4- Limiting ISIS control in Somalia: Shabab al-Mujahedin has expressed clear concern about the rise of ISIS in Somalia, especially after a splinter group of 600 people, led by Abdelkader Mo’men, declared allegiance to ISIS.

With that, the group is aiming to increase its local activities in order to maintain its status as Somalia’s most influential terrorist group. This is especially true with the rising military strikes by some regional and international powers against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

All of this does not negate the fact that, in spite of the clear competition between the movement and ISIS, eradicating the latter would not fit the movement’s interests, especially that it would mean that the powers engaged in the war on terror would refocus on the movement and decreasing its influence, maybe even wiping it out completely.

Finally, it can be said that these ongoing attacks do not negate the fact that the movement is still unable to regain its former influence, whether because of continued human and resource losses in light of strikes by peacekeeping and American forces or because of increasing internal conflicts between the leadership. This conflict has become evident with the splintering of one of the groups, which has declared allegiance to ISIS, indicating that the movement may be undergoing difficult challenges going forward should the powers tasked with maintaining stability in Somalia increase strikes military against it once more.