The past months have witnessed a number of developments unfolding in the Red Sea as Yemen’s Houthi group continues to carry out attacks on ships since November 2023 in response to Israel’s war on Gaza. The subsequent American and British strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen since January 12, 2024, have raised numerous questions about the role of global powers and their competitors in this strategic region.
Among these questions is whether the United States has utilized and seized the opportunity of the Houthi attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea? And if so, what are Washington's objectives in what can be perceived as a "new militarization" policy of the Red Sea? Are these objectives only related to sending a deterrence message to Iran's allies in the region? Is it part of the US's repositioning in the region and blocking what is referred to as "China’s acceptability," which has been increasing steadily in the region since Beijing mediated the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran on March 10, 2023? To what extent does Washington aim to shape the alliance of Operation Prosperity Guardian established on December 19 last year? What does it intend to accomplish vis-a-vis the EU’s s defensive maritime security operation Eunavfor Aspides, which was set up on February 19, 2023? Is the aim to bring Chinese trade with Europe under Western dominance and control? If so, what are Beijing's options for responding to this American move?
US Objectives
Perhaps the United States has exploited the Houthi attacks on maritime navigation in the Red Sea to achieve a set of unrelated objectives, including the following:
1. Consolidating its control over the maritime domain of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF):
CMF, the largest multinational naval partnership in the world covering 3.2 million square nautical miles of international waters, was established by the United States in 2002 under the Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility and involves 39 countries. The scope of this naval force's work extends from India’s western coast to the Red Sea. Currently, this naval force operates under
The establishment of Washington's Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) – operating outside the waters of the Arabian Gulf in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and near the east coast of Africa, comprising about 15 ships.
This was followed by the establishment of the United States Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), which operates in a wide regional area and has played a major role in drying up the sources of piracy near the Somali coast.
Later, in 2004, the Pentagon established Combined Task Force 152 (CTF 152), whose main area of operation is the Arabian Gulf, making significant contributions in maritime security, training, and capacity-building.
All these forces give the US fleet an opportunity to monitor any Chinese, Russian, and Iranian activities in the region. These new Western military assets enhance US presence in the Indian Ocean, in the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia, and as far as the east coast of Africa, an area of intense competition between the United States and its Western and Asian allies on one hand, and China on the other.
2. Strengthening the military aspects of CMF 153:
The Combined Task Force 153 (CTF 153) was established on April 17, 2022, consisting of 39 member nations, with the aim of maintaining maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Yet, this force only retained light military equipment to combat piracy and smuggling. Houthi attacks on commercial vessels coming and going to Israel during the period from November 19, 2023, until the announcement of Operation Prosperity Guardian on December 19, 2023, offered an opportunity to the United States to strengthen and enhance the capabilities of the CTF 153. This was achieved using giant military ships, as well as deploying air and naval defense systems — all displays of force and deterrence in the Red Sea, that Washington could not have undertaken without the justification of addressing the Houthi attacks. All these objectives were therefore achieved through Operation Prosperity Guardian alliance operating within the scope of CTF 153 — a military alliance that includes ships and frigates with air defense systems.
3. Narrowing the space for the Chinese naval base in Djibouti:
The operational scope of the US Combined Maritime Forces now includes both the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the international waters surrounding the Arabian Gulf, and a large part of the Indian Ocean west of the Indian coast, and up to Somalia and East Africa. Thus, this leaves no breathing room for the Chinese military base in Djibouti, established in August 2017. The United States had previously expressed concerns about this base, considering it a threat to its own presence in neighboring Camp Lemonnier. Adding more US and Western military assets near China’s only base in the region exerts additional pressure and leads to significant downsizing of the capabilities of the latter’s base.
4. Blocking joint Chinese maneuvers with Russia and Iran:
Western powers’ new military assets, including Operation Prosperity Guardian and Eunavfor Aspides, are set to provide a firewall against the growing joint maneuvers involving China, Russia, and Iran in the region, especially as the three countries already conducted joint operations on March 20, 2024.
5. US dominance over Chinese cargo routes:
Washington believes that its military dominance over the Red Sea is impacting its Chinese rival in four key areas:
A- Preventing China from exploiting the sanctions on Russia: US assessments concluded that China is behind the inefficiency of sanctions imposed by the West on Moscow since February 2022. Furthermore, Beijing has become the biggest beneficiary of cheap Russian oil and gas passing through the Red Sea. Washington considers its complete dominance over maritime routes transporting Russian energy to China to be a double blow to both Moscow and Beijing.
B- 60% of China's exports to Europe use the Red Sea, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Thus, military control over this strategic passage places that trade under US surveillance.
C- Sending a message to Middle Eastern countries: Namely, that Washington is the primary security and strategic actor in the region. This is key as there have been calls urging a shift in alliances from the West in favor of the East, particularly China.
D- Undermining China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The US and its Western allies' response to Houthi attacks alone directly indicates that China will not be able to protect the BRI in the future. Beijing imports more than 46% of its oil from the Middle East, and its exports to Europe outperform those of the United States. Washington's complete control over maritime routes in the Middle East, however, confirms that it still holds the strings of global leadership established after the Cold War. This may hinder Chinese calls for a multipolar world.
Beijing's Options
Although the military balance in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea heavily favors the United States and its Western allies, China has a range of options, including:
1. Military competition:
China not only strengthened its military presence in Djibouti in proximity to US military assets but also sent its 46th Fleet to the Red Sea on February 24, 2023. The latter, which set sail from a military port in the coastal city of Zhanjiang in the Southern Guangdong Province, includes the guided-missile destroyer Jiatsuhu, the missile frigate Xuchang(which carries 150 surface-to-surface missiles), in addition to anti-drone and anti-missile defense systems. It is also equipped with guided-missile destroyer Jiaozuo, missile frigate Xuchang, two helicopters, and the comprehensive replenishment vessel Honghu. Fleet 46 is also staffed with over 700 officers and soldiers, including dozens of special forces personnel.
2. Soft diplomacy
Chinese diplomacy has succeeded in establishing solid footholds during the current crisis in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. This diplomacy operates on several tracks, including affirming freedom of navigation without condemning the Houthis, thus allowing Beijing space to maneuver with the Yemenis and Iran. This approach resulted in the Houthis not attacking any ship that identified itself as Chinese. Moreover, no Houthi attack has been recorded on ships heading to Asia. This diplomatic success prompted US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to request Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's intervention with Tehran to persuade the Houthis to stop targeting Israeli, American, and Western ships during a meeting in Bangkok on January 26-27 last year.
Despite China's objections to the rising costs of transporting and insuring its goods, it insists that everything happening in the Red Sea is a result of the war on Gaza and that once Israeli hostilities come to an end, the Houthis will stop their attacks on ships. Beijing consistently emphasizes the necessity of respecting collective security in the Red Sea, as well as the sovereignty of countries overlooking their strategic waterway, their territorial integrity, and non-interference in their internal affairs. This implies that China implicitly rejects US and British attacks on the Houthis that began on January 12, 2024.
In conclusion, the militarization of the Red Sea seems to be a deliberate operation by the United States, which may have found an opportunity in the Houthi attacks to prevent the possibility of China increasing its military presence around the Red and Arabian Seas.
