On October 18, 2021, Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of the Lebanese Hezbollah, announced that his party has 100,000 trained and equipped fighters. This statement came during a televised appearance that was dedicated to commenting on the armed confrontations that took place in the Tayouneh region, on October 14, known as "Black Thursday". This area separates the Chiyah area, which supports the Shi’ite duo (Hezbollah and the Amal movement), and Ain El Remmaneh which is mostly supportive of the Lebanese Forces party. These events coincide with the exacerbation of the investigation process into the Beirut port blast. Various questions arise, including questions about the motives behind Nasrallah's disclosure of the number of 100,000 fighters? What are the possible developments following the armed violence incident? Could a civil war erupt in Lebanon? 

Several confrontations

After the Tayouneh events, Lebanon entered into a state of political stagnation, where the Lebanese government suspended its meetings for fear of its break-up in less than a month after it gained confidence. This comes in addition to multiple repercussions at the political, media, judicial and other levels, which can be illustrated as follows:

1- A debate between two contradictory narratives: 

With the end of the recent armed confrontations, the Lebanese Forces Party succeeded in making progress within the Christian street, as it was able to present its account about the reasons for the outbreak of these confrontations. The incident was portrayed as demonstrators affiliated with the Shiite duo storming into some Christian neighborhoods in Ain El Remmaneh, attacking private property and raising provocative slogans, which prompted the people to defend themselves. This comes to refute the opposite narrative which was promoted by the media of the "Eighth of March", and which mentioned an armed ambush and sniping operations against the peaceful demonstrators.

2- Media escalation: 

In order to prevent the attempt of the leader of the Lebanese Forces party, Samir Geagea, to exploit these events to portray himself as a protector of the Christian street, successive media appearances were by the head of the Free Patriotic Movement, Gebran Bassil, and the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, focusing on one point, that Mar Mikhael Agreement (which paved the way for the alliance between the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah) was what protected the Christians in Lebanon. On October 15, 2021, Bassil gave the Christians the choice between two scenes; The first scene is Nasrallah and Michel Aoun meeting at Mar Mikhael Church in 2006, and the scene of the armed Tayouneh confrontations, where one of the parties involved included the supporters of the Lebanese Forces Party. He emphasized that expressing one's opinion does not justify responding with violence. Then, on October 18, 2021, Nasrallah confirmed that Hezbollah participated in the combat in Syria in order to preserve the Christian presence there. They also protected the Christian areas after the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000, given that the greatest threat to the security of the Christian community is the Lebanese Forces party which seeks to drag Lebanon into a civil war in order to serve one leader, as described by Nasrallah. 

3- Legal confrontation: 

Judge Fadi Akiki, the Lebanese government commissioner to the military court, submitted a request to hear the testimony of Samir Geagea, the head of the Lebanese Forces Party, regarding the Tayouneh events. This was followed by the media circulating news about freezing this decision by the Discriminatory Public Prosecutor, Judge Ghassan Oueidat, who clarified that hearing Geagea is a subject under follow-up by the relevant authorities to determine the authority to listen to him without restricting the implementation of the request by a time limit. Geagea later conditioned his appearance before the courts to the appearance of Nasrallah first. In a tweet on October 22, 2021, he said that "the main party in the Ain El Remmaneh events considers itself above the law, and unfortunately, the military court has so far kept up with this belief".

4- Fears of fabrication: 

Some include the request for hearing Geagea under the attempts to deliberately embarrass him, particularly since he was one of the strongest defenders of Judge Tariq Al-Bitar's steps in his summons of front row personalities, which were revolving in Hezbollah's orbit around the issue of the Beirut port blast. Meanwhile, Geagea now refrains from going to court. This judicial clash seems to be prone to further escalations, particularly with this evoking similar old scenarios that led to banning the activities of the Lebanese Forces Party in 1994 following the bombing of the “Our Lady of Deliverance” Church. Furthermore, a remarkable intervention was made by Patriarch Bechara al-Rahi, who declared his "objection to turning those who defended his dignity and the security of his setting into a weak target that is up for grabs.

5- Political reconsiderations: 

After the Tayouneh confrontations, the Lebanese political forces entered into a comprehensive and accurate revisiting of their accounts. Hezbollah, which depends a lot on mobilizing its surrounding environment in order to achieve its political goals, began to discover that this mobilization has unpleasant side effects, as the lofty slogans which Hamas supporters raise often lead to confrontations with new elements in the Lebanese society, which Hezbollah considered to be neutral or insensitive to their weapons. These uncalculated confrontations may disrupt their ability to take advantage of the excess power they own. Meanwhile, the Free Patriotic Movement, which is an ally of Hezbollah and which fears losing possession of the largest number of Christian representatives, is attempting to delay the upcoming parliamentary elections. 

Escalation messages

Although Hassan Nasrallah placed the 100,000 fighters in the context of preventing the outbreak of a civil war in Lebanon and not as a threatening means, his disclosure of this number has other dimensions, which are as follows:

1- Covering up the failures of Hezbollah: 

Nasrallah's goal in choosing this particular time to disclose the 100,000 fighters may be, at the local level, out of the need to address Hezbollah's circles in order to raise their morale, particularly after the party suffered several internal setbacks recently. These setbacks included the events of the Khaldeh area in August 2021, where a military confrontation took place between elements of Hezbollah and some residents of the area. Also, later in the incident in Chouaya last August, a Hezbollah rocket launcher was intercepted and confiscated, on its way back from a bombing operation on the town’s borders towards Israel. The people's anger erupted against the lack of responsibility of Hezbollah's leadership in terms of endangering the town's residents in order to defend purely Iranian interests. Then, in the recent Tayouneh events, Hezbollah suffered the loss of several victims, in addition to the failure of its judicial and political endeavors to remove the judicial investigator, Tariq Al-Bitar. Therefore, along these setbacks, it is important for Hezbollah to portray itself to its people as a movement that is comparable to the largest of armies, and not as a small resistance movement.

2- A message to the forces that are betting on the upcoming parliamentary majority: 

The upcoming legislative elections in Lebanon in 2022 has a wide range of external attention, particularly among US and European circles, to the extent that ‏‏‏‏‏‏‏‏‏‏‏EU Arabic Spokesperson for the Middle East and North Africa, Luis Miguel Bueno, recently stated that Brussels is ready to impose sanctions on any Lebanese figure that attempts to obstruct the electoral process in Lebanon. It has become commonly known that the results of these elections will change the shape of the current majority in Lebanon in support of Hezbollah, as the current President of the Republic is suffering from a wide decline in popularity in the Christian street, along with the advance of the forces of the October 17 revolution and the Lebanese Forces Party.

Thus, by mentioning the large number of his fighters, Nasrallah seems to be sending a preemptive message to those who bet that changing the shape of the majority would lead to disarming Hezbollah. He is trying to inform them indirectly that their assumptions will not prevail, particularly since Hezbollah was trapped between 2005 and 2018 by an opposing majority, which did not succeed in accomplishing the very same mission. 

3- A show of power before the world: 

It seems that Hezbollah is well aware of the unwillingness of any external party to intervene militarily in order to prevent its expansion or its seizing control over Lebanon. It also knows perfectly well that the goals of the ongoing US support for the Lebanese army since 2005 come in the context of finding an alternative to confront Hezbollah's expansion without entering into a direct clash with it. Hezbollah is also conscious of the discussions that were taking place between the forces of change and civil society in Lebanon with some officials in the previous and current US administrations regarding the nature of the mission of the Lebanese army as stated by the US, which is to protect peaceful demonstrators and opposition forces in case they are attacked by Hezbollah supporters, which happened in several past incidents during the October 17 revolution.

Thus, the message Nasrallah may have desired to send to the world, and to the US in particular, is that despite all the US support for the Lebanese army, the number of Hezbollah fighters is greater than the estimated 85,000 members of the Lebanese army. This message may also be intended, in some respects, to distract the Israeli interior regarding the accuracy of the number mentioned by Nasrallah, which leads to the existence of a constant source of concern for Tel Aviv on the part of Hezbollah. 

4- Anticipating the results of the investigations into the Beirut port blast: 

Successive events reflect Hezbollah's fear of the results of the investigation into the Beirut port blast. The initial signs of this concern began to unfold last August. In his televised appearance last August, Hassan Nasrallah considered that Judge Al-Bitar "is leading the investigation towards politicization". This was followed by a threat to Al-Bitar by Wafiq Safa, Head of Hezbollah's Liaison and Coordination Unit, on September 22nd, during a visit he made to the Palace of Justice. On October 12, 2021, the representative of the Shiite duo at the cabinet table also threatened that the implementation of the arrest warrant against MP Ali Hassan Khalil, which was written by Al-Bitar, would lead to sedition. 

Nasrallah’s announcement of the number of their fighters may be coming in the context of a pre-emptive warning against proceeding with holding Hezbollah responsible for the port explosion, specifically since there are several views which consider that the party has managed to breach the port’s investigations. Therefore, according to this view, Nasrallah may be attempting to set the investigations into the Tayouneh events in exchange for the investigations into the Beirut port blast.

Possibilities of a civil war

The idea of a civil war is frequently invoked in Nasrallah’s speeches. However, the invocation was lately preceded by actual military confrontations on the ground. The possibilities of slipping into a new civil war in Lebanon may be determined based on the following scenarios:

1- The possibility of a civil war: 

There is a view in Lebanon that Hezbollah is behaving in Lebanon as an Iranian community that exists on its land. Thus, it is likely that it would rush to fight at a time that suits Iran's aspirations in defense of its interests. Some views also assert that getting into civil war does not happen all at once, but rather through multiple and successive skirmishes, where after several rounds of fighting, parties suddenly find themselves at the heart of a civil war.

The symbolism of the place where the events of “Black Thursday” took place on October 14, 2021, may point to the fact the spark of the civil war in 1975 started from the same place, where it was never taken into account then that things were moving in the direction of a civil war that would last for about 15 years. Furthermore, the justification which Hassan Nasrallah gave for possessing 100,000 fighters in order to prevent a civil war, will give justification to other opposing parties to arm themselves as well in order to deter the idea of attacking them. 

2- Ruling out the outbreak of a civil war: 

Another view is that a civil war is unlikely to take place. This is for several reasons, namely that there is only one armed group in Lebanon, which is Hezbollah, and that the parties to the conflict have decided not to engage in a violent confrontation at the present time, despite the existence of significant differences between them. The advocates of this view also believe that in order for a civil war to erupt in a particular country, three sharp divisions (internally, regionally, and internationally) must be realized over the role and function of this country. In the Lebanese case, internal and regional divisions may exist, but internationally, there is a Russian-US-European consensus on the need for security in Lebanon to remain stable, and the need to keep this country away from the region's conflagrations.

3- Targeting with exclusivity: 

There is also a view that tends to believe that Hezbollah aims to target the Lebanese Forces party unilaterally by employing its penetration into the state’s judicial, administrative and security apparatus. However, this singling out will not lead to what Hezbollah aspires due to several reasons, including the absence of the Syrian guardianship that was previously imposed on Lebanon, in addition to the developments in the investigation into the Beirut port blast, which showed that there are elements within the state that are still difficult to be tamed by Hezbollah.

4- The appeasement scenario: 

An appeasement scenario may crystallize, and some mediators, led by the Lebanese Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, are working on it, in order to bridge the rift between the parties to the conflict. This may be attained by attempts such as finding a practical formula to implement a legal proposal to establish a judicial indictment body to look into Al-Bitar’s decisions, specifically regarding revoking or confirming the immunity enjoyed by deputies and ministers, or regarding voting in the government to withdraw the investigation file into the port blast from the Judicial Council. This solution may be an entry point for the return of the Shiite duo's ministers to attend government meetings, thus reviving them once more.