Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a surprise visit to Russia on August 23, 2017, his fourth in some 16 months. He met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Israel’s security demands regarding current arrangements in Syria. 

Sources of Concern
Netanyahu's visit came amid Israel’s increasing concern over the current developments in the Syrian crisis. These concerns can be summarized as follows: 

1- Israel is concerned that Iran and its ally, Hezbollah, are working towards expanding a long-standing presence on the ground in south Syria in particular. The Jewish state is also concerned over the Shiite expansion, not only in Syria, but also within Lebanon where it would support the position of Hezbollah, which is still considered as a major source of danger for Israel’s security.
 
2- Israel is also concerned that Iran is focused on securing significant presence in Syria’s territory, including in the Syrian sea port of Tartus, a bid that Israel considers as a serious development regarding Iran’s future influence in the Syrian crisis.
 
3- Israel is apprehensive about Iran’s growing regional role driven by its ongoing coordination with Russia about several regional and international issues. Significantly, Moscow recently backed Tehran with the strategic S-300 air defense missile systems. Of note, the Israelis are trying to urge Russia to support an international movement to impose new sanctions on Iran.
 
4- Iran is concerned over the nature of the United States’ role in this region in general, and in Syria in particular. Its concern is fueled by the current crises facing the US Administration, including its unstable structure. It is also fueled by Israel’s belief that Washington is not helping Tel Aviv to arrange its options for responding to the Syrian crisis, and that United States’ inaction would allow Iran’s influence to expand further in Syria.
 
5- Israel is still irritated by restrictions imposed on its planes in Syrian airspace after Moscow provided the Syrian regime with S-300 surface-to-air missile defense systems, deployed in Syria. The deployment of the missiles restricted the free movement of Israeli aircraft. 

Complimentary Path
Israel’s movement towards Russia compliments its recent approach to the US. A high-profile delegation of senior political and security figures led by Mossad chief Yossi Cohen and Deputy National Security Advisor Eitan Ben David, visited Washington recently to present the following demands:
 
1- Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps should be driven out of south Syria.
 
2- Iranian and internationally-backed security personnel should be driven out of Syria while the presence of forces of diverse ideologies should also be eliminated from Syria in general.
 
3- Incorporating some Israeli security checkpoints inside Syria in any possible final agreements between Russia and the United States. 

Israeli Convictions
Israel’s recent movement towards Moscow revealed its convictions, which can be summarized as follows:
 
1- The Israeli prime minister is convinced that Russia will seriously assess Israel’s fears over the situation in Syria, especially because of previous cooperation between Israel and Russia through a working mechanism that achieved success in the past. In addition, Israel currently seeks to capitalize on coordination between Jordan and Russia in south Syria to present itself as a partner to the two states and secure its interests.
 
2- Israel believes that Russia, and no other states including the United States, has gained the upper hand in Syria as well as the largest influence in Syrian territory. That is why Israel bets on promoting its relations with Russia based on the view that this would guarantee protection for its own security interests.
 
3- Israel recognizes that Russia is interested in formulating strategic cooperation with it. It also recognizes that Russia understands that Israeli military intervention in Syria, through frequent airstrikes against the positions of Iranian and Hezbollah troops, is primarily aimed at protecting Israeli national security and not establishing a larger role for itself in Syria. Moreover, Tel Aviv recognizes that Moscow possess sufficient capabilities to put pressure on Iran to restrict its movement in Syria and push it towards paths seen as safe for Israel’s national security.
 
4-  Russia wants to stop any Israeli unilateral action in Syria in the coming period. This view is supported by the fact that Russia previously objected to Israeli airstrikes on selected military targets in Syria, which means Russia now implicitly rejects Israeli free movement in Syria’s airspace. 

Counter Movement
Israel’s movement towards Russia is associated with a Russian position towards Israel that was demonstrated during Netanyahu’s recent visit to Moscow. This position can be summarized as follows:
 
1-  Moscow demanded that joint coordination mechanism with Tel Aviv should be restored in the coming period. It also demanded Israel not to take any unilateral actions that can block efforts to restore calm, in south Syria in particular.
 
2- Moscow attempts to make Tel Aviv pledge not to launch strikes against the positions of Hezbollah and Iranian forces deployed in Syria, at least currently and until pacification agreements are firmly established in south Syria in particular.
 
3- Russia insists that it can contribute towards imposing pacification in the Golan Heights. Moscow seeks to prove its goodwill to Tel Aviv through proving that it understands Israel’s fears about the movements of both Iran and Hezbollah troops in the Golan Heights. 

Multiple Views
It can possibly be argued that Netanyahu’s recent visit to Moscow reveals Israel’s willingness to pursue several paths to protect its security and interests on the Syrian front. This goes contrary to some views that the visit reflects Israel’s failure to deal with crises in its surroundings and even a decline in its presence in the region.
 
Hence, Israel’s movement, towards both Russia and the United States, hinges on its ability to receive real guarantees for protecting its borders, preventing Iran and its Shiite militias from expanding towards these borders, as well as featuring this issue in any future agreements about the conflict in Syria.
 
It is obvious that Russia now recognizes that failure to fulfill Israel’s security demands can push Israel towards engaging in unilateral action, an option that Moscow considers as a "bad" call because it would force Tel Aviv to get involved directly in confrontations to block Iranian forces and Shiite militias from advancing towards Israeli border.
 
Within this context, it is possible that Russia would respond, in the coming period, to some Israeli security demands for stopping Iranian expansion in border areas, while postponing any written guarantees or pledges until relative stability is restored to Syria and an effort to reach comprehensive agreement is initiated to end the war in Syria.