Recent developments in Iranian policies towards Syria have provoked the ire of the Russian government. Russia sees these policies as an attempt to upset the current understanding established as a result of the Moscow Declaration. 

Since December 20, 2016, when the declaration was signed, and the subsequent ceasefire agreement on December 30, there have been indications that Iran and the Assad regime have strengthened bilateral relations in order to avoid any potential ramifications from the Astana negotiations, held on January 23 and 24 of this year. 

The negotiations will be followed by secondary negotiations in Geneva on February 8. There is a growing perception among the Iranian and Syrian regimes that the outcome of the Geneva negotiations may be incompatible with Iranian-Syrian interests, and may affect their vision for the future of the Syrian civil war.   

In response, Russia has sent warning messages to Iran, emphasizing their power and influence in the conflict. Russia is cognizant of the fact that, despite Iran’s influence in Syria, their military involvement is limited.

Moscow considers Iran’s role on the ground to be secondary to its own in terms of impact and significance. Whether Iran exerts its power through the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force or its sectarian militias, it cannot affect the situation on the ground without Russian approval. Russia has utilized its veto power in the Security Council several times to prevent resolutions condemning the Syrian regime, and has openly provided updated weaponry to turn the tide of the conflict against the Syrian opposition. These are tools unavailable to Iran.

Three Messages

Russia’s position was made obvious in statements made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in an interview conducted on January 17, 2017, mere days before the Astana conference. The interview focused on Lavrov’s assessment of Russia’s foreign policy in 2016. Lavrov stated that Russia had intervened in the Syrian conflict at a decisive moment and had saved Damascus which, according to him, was two weeks away from being captured. He added that after the liberation of Aleppo, Russia helped preserve a secular sovereign Syria as dictated by Security Council Resolution 2254. 

Lavrov’s statements contain three important messages directed at Iran and the Assad regime. The first states that it was Russia, not Iran, that rescued the Syrian regime from the onslaught of the opposition forces. Russia emphasized that their military support to Assad over the last 6 years, particularly in 2016, was the ultimate deciding factor. 

According to Russia, their preeminent role in Syria provides affords them the right to shape the political and security arrangements that will settle the Syrian conflict, or at least to participate in the settlement negotiations alongside other regional players with significant influence. 

Russia’s pressure on Iran and the Assad regime is aimed at preventing an early military and political withdrawal that would affect Russia’s interests in Syria. On the other hand, extending the timeframe of Russian intervention could have significant negative consequences in the medium to long-term. 

Secularization of the Regime

Russia’s second message stated that it seeks to maintain the secular nature of the Syrian regime after the crisis settles. This is significant as it indicates that Russia does not approve of the sectarian militias formed by Iran to confront the armed Syrian factions. Regardless of the conflict’s outcome, Iran aims for these militias to remain in Syria in order to maintain Iran’s power and influence.

Iran’s goals were stated by the adviser to the Supreme Guide on Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati. On January 3, 2017, he confirmed that Hezbollah would not leave Syria despite the ceasefire agreement. There are indications that Iran is forming a “popular liberation army” made up of the sectarian militias it had formed to prop up the Assad regime. There is also evidence that Iran signed five deals with the Syrian government during the Syrian Prime Minister Imad Khamis’ visit to Tehran on January 18, 2017. The deals grant licenses for the establishment of cell phone networks and an oil refinery.   

The head of the Iranian delegation in the Astana negotiations, Hussein Gaber Ansari, reaffirmed that Iran would not consider proposals by the Syrian opposition to withdraw forces from Syria, and described the opposition as “weak and lowly”.

The third message relayed to Iran relates to Russia’s inclination to reach agreements with some of the armed factions in Syria. This indicates a relative change of heart given that Russia had previously attempted to expand the list of terrorist organizations excluded from the ceasefire, in order to classify more organizations as terror groups alongside the Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front). This may lead to disputes with Iran, as they have sought to exclude the largest possible number of armed factions from the scope of negotiations between the Syrian regime and the opposition in Astana and Geneva. 

Russia confirmed that the main goal of the Astana negotiations was to ensure the maintenance of the ceasefire, and to transition into a political process that includes active and effective players on the ground in Syria. These “players” are, in essence, the armed factions warring against the Assad government.

Russia’s new course has received support from the armed Syrian factions, as expressed by Mohammed Alloush, a leading figure in the militant group Jaysh al-Islam and the head of its delegation in the Astana negotiations. Alloush stated that Russia had evolved from a patron of the Syrian regime to a party attempting to remove obstacles to peace.  

Integrating the Militias

What is most striking here are Russian efforts to establish the importance of participation among armed factions in political and security arrangements. This could cause factions in Iran to call for inclusion into these agreements, considering the significant role they play on the ground in Syria. Iran may seek to promote this idea during its talks with Turkey and Russia, as they are the sponsors of the Astana negotiations.

Iran and the Syrian regime may take steps to integrate the militias socially and economically, in order to avoid withdrawing them from Syria in the near future. 

The Limits of Russia’s Role

In spite of Russia’s warning messages to Iran and the Syrian regime, this does not change the fact that Moscow still needs the militias on the ground in order to carry out their aerial operations. 

In short, Russia’s insistence on emphasizing its status as a main player in Syria, does not mean that it is in a position to end its “flexible” alliance with Iran and the Assad regime, at least in the coming phase.