In the Islamic calendar, Ramadan in the years 1393 and 1445 AH corresponds to 1973 and 2024 AD in the Gregorian calendar. The span between these two years is 52 and 51 years respectively. As a Muslim, Ramadan holds great significance for me. It is a pious month dedicated to worship, contemplation, and reflection on major issues pertaining to the greater good and ideals of my faith.
This year, however, my attention is on monitoring and analyzing Israel’s ongoing brutal and inhumane assault in Gaza. I am also contemplating the potential geopolitical ramifications of decisions made during this holy month. In fact, actions taken as we approach Ramadan and throughout the month may be as consequential and transformative as those pivotal moments half a century ago in 1973. It was during that time, on the 10th of Ramadan, that the October 1973 war broke out, aiming to liberate Israeli-occupieda territories, with the aspiration of creating a political paradigm conducive to negotiating a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace plan.
The subsequent peace agreements between Egypt, Jordan, and Israel alongside disengagement efforts with Syria, as well as the Oslo process, which granted some jurisdiction to the Palestinian Authority over certain territories, seemed to offer promise. However, ironically, after decades of inconclusive peacemaking efforts in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we now bear witness to unprecedented indiscriminate violence.
Numerous voices, including mine, have already discussed the root causes of the ongoing violence. It is important to reiterate that occupation and oppression breed frustration and resentment, which in turn perpetuate a cycle of violence. It is crucial to address these core reasons in order to resolve the current crisis. This requires a radical shift in the prevailing political paradigm in the Middle East and globally.
Consequently, in this article, I will delve into the key regional and global ramifications of two immediate short-term scenarios, with each scenario holding varying degrees of relative pessimism. The trajectory of these scenarios will be determined by developments occurring immediately before and unfolding during Ramadan. Israel has set this as the latest deadline for withholding its full-fledged military onslaught on Rafah. The gravity of the situation, and thus its implications, is potentially wide-ranging and game-changing for numerous parties. This is evident in the intense multiparty negotiations concerning the hostage deal and truce deal in Paris, Cairo, and Doha. It is also highlighted by the high-level diplomatic exchanges across airwaves by the different parties, including the US President Joe Biden.
The less pessimistic scenario would involve a temporary ceasefire agreement, accompanied by partial reciprocal releases of hostages and incarcerated individuals. This would allow the Israeli government to justify refraining from expanding its military operation to Rafah and instead choose to suspend, though not completely terminate, military operations in Gaza. Meanwhile, Palestinians and Hamas would experience some relief, temporarily averting the dire scenario of further massive casualties in Rafah and the potential displacement of Palestinians across the Egyptian borders.
The use of the term "partial" in this context indicates that the hostage deal will not immediately include active Israeli military personnel, while "temporary" signifies that a ceasefire will only be throughout Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, or as long as negotiations are ongoing. This arrangement serves the interests of Israel, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the United States, a host of Arab parties, and the international community. Progressive elements can use this to show their constituents that some progress has been made while reassuring hardliners that the "cause" has not been foregone.
Conversely, in the absence of a partial hostage exchange and a temporary ceasefire deal, a more pessimistic scenario could unfold. This would involve increased forceful Israeli involvement in Rafah, worsening humanitarian suffering, and more Palestinians being displaced. There is also the potential for the situation to spill over into Egypt, leading to unforeseen consequences, including the destabilization of peaceful relations between states. Additionally, tensions could escalate along the Lebanese and Syrian borders, and volatility could increase in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean areas due to the growing disruptive influence of non-state actors.
Ironically, both scenarios will directly impact the formation and future of current Israeli and Palestinian leadership. Partial hostage exchanges and temporary ceasefires benefit not only the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, but also Hamas and the PA’s leadership. However, both scnearios can also bring them closer to a threshold of accountability and scrutiny, prompting assessments of whether they are the most appropriate to lead their people forward.
All Palestinian factions are likely to support a partial hostage exchange and temporary ceasefire. However, each faction's approach will be influenced by their political interests and considerations. Hamas, in particular, will face the challenge of being part of a future non-violent Palestine-Israel relationship. Therefore, it is not entirely indifferent to the more pessimistic option of a non-partial agreement.
Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is under significant pressure to demonstrate new leadership in the context of reaching a deal. However, the absence of a partial agreement poses more challenges as it raises questions about the PA's relevance in the current circumstances.
The majority of the Israeli right wing is expected to reluctantly support a temporary ceasefire in order to facilitate a hostage exchange and alleviate international pressure on the government. However, both the right wing and Prime Minister Netanyahu are likely to delay the implementation of the deal due to their opposition to the two-state solution. Instead, they prefer to maintain a state of sustained or intermittent controlled conflict, which serves to unite most Israelis and postpone accountability. This is particularly significant given Netanyahu's ongoing court cases. Consequently, they will be willing to engage in a partial hostage exchange and temporary ceasefire under certain conditions. However, they will not hesitate to resort to force again. This is because their preferred option is a more pessimistic scenario involving controlled violence. This option serves as justification for their continued use of force against Palestinians and as a means to obstruct any progress towards a two-state solution.
Many global and regional leaders are also leaning towards the proposal of a partial hostage exchange temporary ceasefire. For example, President Biden cannot overlook his declining popularity among Arab Americans in states that hold pivotal delegates in the electoral college for the upcoming 2024 Presidential elections. This was evident in the recent Michigan Democratic presidential primary.
On the other side of the globe, the developments in Gaza may not significantly influence the Russian Presidential elections. However, Russia, eager to maintain a prominent presence on the world stage, has taken proactive steps to secure its role. This includes hosting different Palestinian factions in an effort towards Palestinian reconciliation.
Arab countries have strongly condemned the violence and provided significant humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, and it is worth noting that these countries are also inclined towards reaching a peaceful resolution. Leaders of Egypt and Jordan, in particular, are at the forefront of these efforts due to their proximity to the conflict. They view a more optimistic outcome as crucial not only for achieving a two-state solution but also for maintaining the credibility of their own peace agreements with Israel. Additionally, they are deeply concerned about the potential consequences of forced mass displacement of people across their borders if a full-scale military assault were to extend to Rafah. Qatar's role is becoming increasingly important as negotiations progress. Thus, it is in its favor that the mediation efforts result in a ceasefire deal. Additionally, the Arab countries involved in the Abraham Accords would greatly appreciate any steps taken to end violence and promote reconciliation. Furthermore, amidst unconfirmed rumors about potential benefits for Saudi Arabia from peace with Israel, the current circumstances have effectively put these speculations on hold indefinitely, regardless of the outcome.
The international community is increasingly repulsed by the appalling bloodshed and inhumane conditions witnessed in the Gaza Strip. However, many Western governments are out of touch with the sentiments of their people on this issue. Additionally, international institutions are failing to meet the minimum requirements of humanitarian missions. This has led to a challenge to the very principles of international order and civility, as highlighted by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. In light of these circumstances, there is overwhelming support within the international community for the conclusion and faithful implementation of a partial hostage temporary ceasefire agreement. This option is seen as the preferable choice among two difficult alternatives.
Yet, it is important to note that neither of the two scenarios is conclusive or provides a definitive resolution. Both inevitably involve recurring outbreaks of violence, which can only be quelled if the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is brought to an end. This will most likely also extend to the West Bank, which has been experiencing increased restrictive security measures, agitated and aggressive Israeli settlement activity, and extensive incarcerations surpassing the number of Palestinians released as part of hostage release agreements. The Al Aqsa Mosque, especially during Ramadan, will also be a highly charged area. For the partial hostage exchange and temporary ceasefire option to be sustainable, it must serve as a pathway towards the ultimate resolution of this longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as we are all in dire straits.
In that respect, in recent exchanges of violence, it has become glaringly evident that the two-state solution is the only viable option for providing separate states to Palestinians and Israelis. The international community has repeatedly emphasized the importance of this solution. However, supporters of Israel are hesitant to take principled actions to promote purposeful negotiations. Additionally, the Israeli political right is gaining influence, further undermining the prospects for a two-state solution. Meanwhile, Palestinian factions are losing support among their constituents. It is also worth noting that there is a growing sentiment among Arab populations, particularly among the youth, that Israel prioritizes supremacy and hegemony over peace efforts.
Most alarming is the fact that the prospects in our region today are considerably dimmer and more threatening than they were over fifty years ago. Sentiments of revenge and retribution are on the rise in the Middle East. Moreover, the international order has also been significantly discredited. Similar to the situation during Ramadan in 1973, our actions and decisions in the lead-up to and during Ramadan 2024 will have wide-ranging consequences for the region and beyond. The coming weeks are poised to be pivotal in many regards.
