In the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran, three major events took place in April. The first event occurred at the beginning of the month, when an Israeli air strike targeted the building attached to the Iranian consulate in Damascus. This attack resulted in the death of 16 individuals, including Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander in the city's IRGC Quds Force, and seven other IRGC officers. The second event took place on the 14th of April, when Iran launched a drone and ballistic missile attack against Israel. However, it only caused minor damage to an Israeli air base in the Negev. The third event was on the 19th of April, when an attack on Iranian territory targeted military sites in the city of Isfahan. Israel did not claim responsibility for this attack, and the effects are still not precisely known.
Aside from the web of messages that were conveyed through the confrontations between the two nations, a pivotal question emerges: Could these confrontations reignite in the future? Furthermore, if they do escalate in terms of the scale and capabilities deployed, would they still remain confined to reciprocal measures, or could they spiral into a full-blown war between the two countries, potentially triggering a vast regional conflict?
The answer to this pressing question hinges on three fundamental factors that will determine the likelihood and nature of any future confrontations between these nations, across all conceivable intensities. These factors are:
1- The Impact of the April Confrontations on Both Sides.
2- The level of control Israel has over its ongoing shadow war against Iran, which has been ongoing since the early 2000s.
3- The developments in the current war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, and how it affects Iran's "axis of resistance" and the stance of its affiliated parties towards Israel.
Limited Effectiveness of Confrontations
The retaliatory response carried out by Iran against Israel on April 13 did not achieve the desired results. The attack was considered a failure due to the minimal losses inflicted on the Israeli side. Additionally, it raised questions about the true extent of Iran's strength and weapons capabilities. To add, the impact of the attack on Iranian public opinion remains uncertain, but it is evident that there is a significant amount of disappointment in light of the false promises made by the regime regarding the country's military capabilities over the years.
In the aftermath of the attack on the Iranian city of Isfahan, there were discernible negative perceptions from the Israeli side. Israel's stance remained ambiguous as it did not officially acknowledge its involvement in the incident. This approach seemed to be a continuation of its strategy, mirroring past operations against Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon and Syria. Despite these recurring assaults, Iran's military capabilities, although impaired, have not ceased their antagonistic endeavors. This raises a critical question: What strategic value did the recent Isfahan operation hold in deterring Iran and safeguarding Israel from future direct aggressions?
Furthermore, the decision by Prime Minister Netanyahu to opt for a seemingly restrained or "weak" response, as characterized by National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, comes into question. This is particularly intriguing given Netanyahu's prior declarations that Israel's retaliatory actions against Iran would be uninfluenced by external pressures. However, the subdued nature of the attack and Israel's reluctance to claim responsibility publicly seem to contradict his assertions, suggesting that the response was aligned with a more cautious stance advocated by the United States for a limited engagement with Iran.
In terms of public opinion and analysts, there seems to be a lack of conviction regarding the impact of the recent mutual strikes between Israel and Iran. These strikes, however, have not significantly affected the delicate deterrence equation that has governed the relationship between the two countries for years. Consequently, this situation could potentially collapse at any moment in the future, particularly if we disregard the symbolic significance of the absence of direct clashes between the two nations in the past.
The Future of Shadow Wars
Wars, intelligence operations, and specific operations such as sabotage and assassination of political, military, and scientific figures in hostile countries are considered one of the pillars of the Israeli security doctrine. This approach has been practiced by the Hebrew state since its early inception in 1948. However, it has gained even greater prominence in the Israeli security defense system since 2002, with the appointment of Meir Dagan as the head of the Mossad.
During his tenure, Dagan advocated for a shift in strategy, moving away from the idea of launching a direct war against Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Instead, he believed in achieving the same goal through increased investment in a shadow war directed at Iran. Under his leadership, the Mossad has already carried out numerous assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and sabotage operations at Iranian nuclear facilities.
Although the Israeli shadow war has been escalating, Iran has chosen a different strategy. Instead of directly engaging with Israel, Iran has opted to support armed organizations that are hostile to Israel. These organizations include Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, and Jihad groups in Gaza and the West Bank. Iran has also been working tirelessly to establish a presence of the Revolutionary Guard in Syria. However, this policy has had several negative consequences, the most significant of which was the erosion of popular support for Iran's involvement in Lebanon and Syria. As a result, Lebanon and Syria have borne the security, economic, and political costs of Israeli attacks in the shadow war against Iran. Meanwhile, Iran has benefited from this policy without incurring any direct costs.
Due to the continuation of the Gaza war and the almost daily clashes between Hezbollah and Israel, Iran has been forced to abandon its policy of non-direct engagement. In early April, the killing of a large number of Revolutionary Guard commanders in Syria served as justification for Iran to launch a direct attack on Israel. This attack was carried out from Iranian territory on the thirteenth of the same month.
The Israeli shadow war against Iran shows no signs of stopping and may even escalate in the near future. If Iran decides to change its policy towards Israel in response to the killing of several Revolutionary Guard commanders in Syria, it may feel compelled to launch a direct attack on Israel. This possibility was acknowledged by Iranian Foreign Minister, Amir Abdullahian, who stated, "If Israel chooses to embark on another reckless adventure that goes against Iran's interests, our response will be swift and at the highest level."
The recent mutual attacks between Israel and Iran have created a new equation that will put the deterrence power of both parties to the test. If Israel continues to target the leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and Iran fails to fulfill its promise made by its Foreign Minister, then the credibility of Iran's deterrence will diminish. On the other hand, if Israel refrains from striking the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard in the future, Iran can claim that its attacks on Israel have successfully deterred them. This hypothetical situation puts pressure on both parties and increases the likelihood of future direct confrontations. The question that arises here is: Can the two parties now manage to restrain these confrontations and prevent them from escalating into a full-scale war? Or will the situation worsen?
Effects of the Gaza War
Before Israel launched its attack on Isfahan, there were several international and Arab reports suggesting that the United States had agreed to let Israel carry out its postponed military operation in Rafah. In return, Israel promised not to launch a major attack on Iran that could potentially trigger a comprehensive regional war, which is something that Washington wanted to avoid. While the veracity of these reports is uncertain, if Israel were to launch its attack in Rafah, Iran would face double pressure. The Iranian regime has already been unable to maintain its policy of avoiding confrontation with Israel, especially after the assassinations of the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard in Syria and Lebanon. By abandoning its two allies, Hamas and Jihad, in exchange for a guarantee of protection from direct Israeli attacks, Iran has already weakened its position in both Iran and Arab countries.
The prevailing impression that Iran has abandoned its allies and compromised its principles would undermine what Iran refers to as the "axis of resistance." It would also expose the hollowness of the slogan of "unity of the arenas" that Iran has been promoting.
At A Crossroads
The direct confrontations between Israel and Iran have significant implications on multiple levels. Firstly, they impact the balance of mutual deterrence between the two nations. Secondly, they have implications for Iran's policy known as the "axis of resistance." These points can be further as follows:
It appears that Iran made a mistake in launching a massive attack, consisting of approximately 350 drones and ballistic missiles. Due to the distance between the two countries, the Israeli side was certain to detect and respond to the attack, especially with effective assistance from the United States and Britain. However, the attack resulted in minimal losses for Israel, which weakened the credibility of Iranian deterrence and raised doubts about Iran's military capabilities as a whole.
The passage of Iranian marches and missiles into Arab territories or near their borders has heightened concerns about Iranian regional ambitions. It has also brought Israel closer to its goal of establishing a regional axis with these countries to counter Iranian aspirations.
The limited impact of the Iranian strike on Israel can be attributed to the distance between the two countries. Iranian marches and missiles were unable to cause significant damage due to this distance. As a result, Iran will likely rely more on its military presence in neighboring countries, such as Lebanon and Syria. The close proximity of these countries to Israel allows Iran to pose greater risks by launching missiles and drones from these locations. Consequently, the Iranian leadership's approach to the so-called Axis of Resistance will shift from achieving a balance of power with Israel through Iranian arms to using these arms primarily for self-defense.
Israel's potential battle in Rafah poses a difficult test for both Israel and Iran. While Israel claims that this battle will determine the outcome of the war, it is important to acknowledge that it may instead turn into a prolonged war of attrition. Such a scenario would benefit Iran, as it would relieve them from the need to directly strike Israel in order to maintain the unity of what they refer to as the "axis of resistance." However, if Israel manages to eliminate the remaining Hamas forces and establish temporary military rule in the Gaza Strip, as proposed by Netanyahu last February, without any intervention from Iran to support its ally, this would significantly weaken Iran's regional influence. It would also raise doubts about the sustainability of the "axis of resistance," particularly if Hezbollah, due to specific reasons related to the ongoing economic and political crisis in Lebanon, chooses not to escalate its conflict with Israel and provide support to Hamas during the battle.
