The state of polarization in the Middle East has tended to decrease relatively since the March 2023 meeting in Beijing between Saudi Arabia's Minister of State and National Security Advisor, Musaid Al-Aiban, and Iran's Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, and the rapid steps that followed. With repeated evidence of Iran's willingness to engage with a number of regional groups with whom it has tense or problematic relations, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Al-Sadiq met his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir Abdullahian, on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit hosted by Baku, Azerbaijan, last July. The meeting marked the beginning of the two countries discussing mechanisms for resuming diplomatic relations, which in fact occurred on October 9 when the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with Tehran following a series of high-level meets to strengthen common interests.
This action has a number of implications, some of which are related to the expanded course of bilateral relations between Sudan and Iran, while others are related to local, regional, and international factors surrounding the recent declaration of diplomatic relations being restored.
Unstable Relations
The current Sudanese-Iranian rapprochement is not precedent in the history of the two nations' ties, which have seen successive waves of ebbs and flows since Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979. Sudan, under the government of Yaafar al-Numeiry, initially supported Iraq militarily during the Iran-Iraq war, as did other Arab countries. However, following the 1986 elections that resulted in the return of civilian control in Sudan, the then-Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, took steps toward peace with Iran, including a visit to the capital, Tehran. Although the first years of Sudan's rescue regime did not see a resumption of the path of rapprochement with Iran, many indicators began to emerge over time, confirming the two sides' efforts to build strong relations. These were not only limited to the exchange of diplomatic relations, but also included particular security and military arrangements especially during the period of Iranian expansion on the Red Sea's western coast.
However, as the regional landscape shifted, Sudan announced in 2016 the end of diplomatic relations with Iran in response to the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Just as regional factors played a role in the complexities of Sudanese-Iranian relations seven years ago, they also contributed to the recent rapprochement that resulted in the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries following a remarkable decrease in the region's level of polarization in recent months.
This unstable course of Sudanese-Iranian relations, which has alternated between complete separation and accelerated integration, reflects the absence of the fundamental pillars ensuring the continuation of positive relations and their development into a sustainable relationship based on mutual benefit exchange. The two countries' foreign policies face numerous challenges, the most significant of which is a disparity in regional interests. Sudan is primarily concerned with the geographical location of the Red Sea region and its southern expansion in the Horn of Africa, as well as its northern and western neighbors connected to the Sahara and Sahel regions of Africa. The Gulf region and the Arab Levant, on the other hand, comprise a fundamental sector of Iranian foreign policy action. Given Sudan's limited impact on the Gulf region's existing balances, the rapprochement and divergence between Khartoum and Tehran remains dependent on the latter's temporary calculations regarding increased engagement in the Red Sea area.
The period of rapprochement between the two countries, which peaked during the rule of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, did not result in either country achieving exceptional political gains on priority issues. This is in light of Iran's lack of influence on the issue of Sudan's unity prior to the south's secession under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005, which was met with Sudan's limited influence in effectively enabling Iran to alleviate the burden of international isolation imposed on it.
Context of the Rapprochement
The most recent developments in the Sudanese situation imposed themselves on the scene of the recent Sudanese-Iranian rapprochement, bringing with them urgent challenges that set low expectations for what can be expected from resuming diplomatic relations between the two sides. The Sudanese internal situation imposes numerous constraints. These include the continuation of conflict interactions between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Khartoum, and the states of Darfur in particular, as well as the variety of international initiatives aimed at obtaining a fast resolution of Sudan's internal conflict between the mechanism of surrounding countries inaugurated in Cairo in July 2023, and the bilateral talks held by Jeddah with US support. These talks are expected to result not only in a consensus on ceasefire arrangements and the resolution of military issues, but also in the resumption of the political track and the beginning of the procedures for forming a new transitional government with civilian leadership. The new government will naturally conduct a comprehensive review of the various foreign policy files in light of the new reality.
The Sudanese-Iranian rapprochement comes in line with many Sudanese sides' willingness to engage with the outside world in order to discover new means to resolving the crisis, which has been ongoing for roughly six months. Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, has been on his first foreign tour since the start of the present crisis, visiting Egypt, South Sudan, Qatar, and Turkey since the end of August. The Forces of Freedom and Change, Sudan's broadest umbrella of partisan and civil forces, had previously begun an external tour in July, including Egypt, South Sudan, Chad, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and Uganda, before launching a new one at the end of August, including Qatar, Kuwait, and South Sudan.
All this makes it difficult to interpret the Sudanese decision to repair relations with Iran apart from the extensive external action of Sudan's varied most powerful groups. This lessens the likelihood that the current rapprochement is a definitive indicator of Sudanese alignment with Iran, and the long-term ramifications it could have with strategic consequences at the regional level.
Regional Challenges
The announcement of the restoration of Sudanese-Iranian relations on October 9 greatly decreased the significance of this move, reducing it to a symbolic one in the first place. At the regional level, the announcement was accompanied by an unprecedented escalation of security tensions in the Gaza Strip and its environs, necessitating an exceptional level of attention and engagement from regional and international powers concerned with preventing the current confrontation from escalating into a large-scale regional conflict. This is in addition to the start of significant international pressure on Iran to ensure that it does not pursue an escalatory policy that expands the ongoing conflicts into a large-scale regional war.
On the other hand, a tense environment has re-emerged in the western Red Sea, heightening the sensitivity of the region's governments to any call-up of new actors with experience impacting the regional security equation in the Red Sea region, such as Iran. Since the signing of the peace agreement in Pretoria in November 2022 between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray Liberation Front, and the subsequent intensification of confrontations between the federal government and the National Movement of Amhara, there have been repeated indications of an instability in the Ethiopian-Eritrean alliance. The impact of the Ethiopian federal government's shift extended to the exterior domain, as Eritrean doubts resurfaced about the future of outstanding issues, most notably the disputed border areas between Eritrea and the Tigray region. In addition, the recent statements of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in which he restarted talk about his country's right to reach the Red Sea, heightened its intensity, and conveyed significant indications about the potential of growing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the future.
An economic Priority
Many concerns surround the chances of Sudanese-Iranian rapprochement moving to the security and military spheres, the most important of which is the level of high American alert in the Red Sea region, which has previously hindered accumulated Russian efforts to gain a foothold on Sudanese coasts. This situation highlights the differences between the present round of rapprochement between Sudan and Iran and the wave of rapprochement that preceded their separation in 2016.
Despite the limited opportunities for expanding military cooperation and the numerous constraints that may impede the strengthening of political rapprochement between Khartoum and Tehran, it can be expected that relations between the two countries will accelerate in the coming period, particularly in the economic field, as the two countries appear to have a strong desire to exchange economic benefits. This is in light of the This is in light of the Iranian economy experiencing the effects of extended international sanctions, which Tehran is attempting to mitigate, as well as the Sudanese economy's steady deterioration since 2019, the country's entry into the cycle of international economic sanctions since Al-Burhan’s decisions in October 2021, and the negative consequences of the internal conflict since April 2023.
Some international and regional factors, most notably the nature of the two countries' trade and development partners, provide opportunities to strengthen economic cooperation between Sudan and Iran. This is particularly so as China emerges as each of their primary trading partner, in addition to the improving trend in economic relations with Russia. Furthermore, the recent move to expand BRICS membership may have additional favorable consequences. Similar to Iran's membership in this group, Sudan's two neighbors joined as well; Egypt and Ethiopia, in addition to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who are among Khartoum's main economic partners. This ultimately contributes to providing a multilateral framework that enhances the opportunities for growing economic cooperation between Sudan and Iran in the near future.
Given the primacy of regional drivers in their ties, the recent Sudanese-Iranian rapprochement represented a new chapter in the ongoing phases of rapprochement and divergence in relations between the two countries. Many reasons related to Khartoum and Tehran's immediate calculations may have aided in completing the symbolic step of restoring diplomatic relations between them, in view of the significant external pressures to which the two nations are currently facing. The latest step does not appear to be capable of constituting a strategic turning point in the course of bilateral relations between Sudan and Iran, and the ramifications that may be associated with it at the broader regional level, as much as it reflects an immediate consensus of interests that carries significant symbolic value for both sides, and can provide a basis for developing relations in the future if the need persists, but only if both sides make a significant effort.
