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Neighbours Come First

China’s messages from Central Asia to Russia and the West

28 سبتمبر، 2022


Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan between 14 – 16 September, in what would be his first trip abroad since the early days of the coronavirus pandemic. Coinciding with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in the Uzbek city of Samarkand, President Xi met with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and security organisation that was founded by China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in 2001; Iran is currently looking to join the group, though other states are members to the organisation either as observers, dialogue partners, or guest attendees.

 

President Xi’s trip signifies China’s strategic ties with Central Asia (CA) states and come in amid high global geopolitical uncertainty, sparked by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Notable, also, is President Xi’s presence at the summit, who since 2020 joined international summits only via remote video owing to draconian lock down measures that have been imposed China-wide.

 

Possible Indications

President Xi’s choice to visit Central Asia in his first trip abroad carries significant meaning, which could be outlined as follows:

 

1.    Relaxing severe lock down measures:

Xi’s trip signals China’s decision to loosen up its stringent lock down measures that served as the corner stone to China’s approach to dealing with the pandemic. His trip might also indicate further ease of international travel from China.

 

China’s reopening is not entirely due to shrinking numbers of Covid cases; it signals President Xi’s confidence in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) support in the months leading up to his third and exceptional 5-year term, which is expected to be voted on this coming October. President Xi, moreover, is aiming to contain increasing disapproval of the harsh and long lock down measures, which has had a negative consequence on the everyday life of the majority of China’s population.  

 

2.    The centrality of CA to China:

More than half a million Muslim Uyghurs live at the border of CA states, mostly concentrated in the region of Xinjiang. By strengthening its relations with CA countries, the CPP ensures any separatist attempt by the Uyghur are not supported.

 

President Xi’s visit come on the heels of accusations by the United Nations of committing crimes against humanity and possibly genocide against the Uyghur population and other mostly-Muslim ethnic groups in the north-western region of Xinjiang. China understands that CA states may be pressured to cut their security cooperation and wants to pre-empt the West’s efforts by offering assurances.

 

Economically, CA countries sit on vast reserves of hydrocarbon fuel. More than 500 trillion cubic metres is estimated to be under Central Asian countries, which offer a vital and strategic source of diversifying energy for China under the ongoing global energy crisis.

 

CA states increasingly have played a key role in China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. The region’s strategic location, linking China to the Middle East and Europe, plays a crucial role for trade via the Initiative.

 

3.    Strengthening China’s influence in CA:

President Xi’s visit could be seen as China’s way of asserting its influence over the region. The ex-soviet countries with large Russian minority populations are being reassured of China’s support. In Kazakhstan, for instance, nearly 18% of the population are of Russian descent. CA country leaders fear Russia might mobilise Russian populations in their countries in the context of the ongoing Ukrainian war.

 

In a letter published in Kazakhstan’s Kazakhstanskaya Pravda newspaper before his visit, President Xi noted that China and Kazakhstan “are good neighbours, good friends, and good partners.” His message was also intended to Russia; CA states are strong allies of Beijing, and Putin would have to consider twice before pulling the region into the Ukrainian war. While the situation is boiling on the side of Ukraine, China wants to instigate stability on its borders.

 

4.   Kazakhstan’s strategic importance:

China and Kazakhstan share more than 1000 miles of border. This extraordinarily long strip of land, which is adjacent to Xinjiang region, home to the Uyghur people, makes Kazakh a key strategic partner to China for security.

 

Energy plays another important role in the Sino-Kazakh relations. Since 2019, China has invested more than $14 billion in the Kazakh oil and gas sectors, and has become more interested in building a robust connection given the ongoing crisis in global energy market due to the Russo-Ukrainian war.

 

Uranium is another precious source of energy that has the interest of China. And Kazakhstan owns 40% of it. As the world rapidly move to alternative and renewable energy, China is interested to retain a strong relation with Kazakh to secure much needed energy, both in fossil and renewable forms.

 

5.    Mobilising support in facing the West:

One of the most significant messages carried by President Xi’s presence at the SCO summit was that for China, the international community and the West are not interchangeable terms. Beijing has allies in the Third World, including Kazakhstan – one of China’s most important partners. In his Article in the Pravda newspaper, President Xi enunciated that China and Kazakhstan are “friends to tryst and partners to count on for each other, and our peoples always stand shoulder to shoulder with each other.”

 

Some of the main goals of the SCO are to facilitate multilateral cooperation in areas of security, counterterrorism, anti-extremism, and anti-insurgency, and these are strategic priorities for China. As tensions rise with Washington who has accused China of grave human rights breaches in Xinjiang, Beijing seeks to secure enough allies in facing to increasing Western pressure, especially as China tightens its grip on Taiwan.

 

6.   China’s worry over a prolonging war in Ukraine:

Ahead of a closed meeting between Russian and Chinese presidents, Putin, in a rare occasion publicly addressing China’s concerns over the war, said that his country “highly appreciate[s] the well-balanced position of our Chinese friends in connection with the Ukrainian crisis,” adding that “we understand your questions and your concerns in this regard, and we certainly will offer a detailed explanation of our stand on this issue during today’s meeting, even though we already talked about it earlier.” President Xi’s statement was reserved by comparison to his Russian counterpart, saying that “in the face of changes in the world, in our times and of history, China is willing to work with Russia to play a leading role in demonstrating the responsibility of major powers, and to instil stability and positive energy into a world in turmoil.”

 

Putin was more direct, stating that “Moscow and Beijing play a key role in global and regional stability,” adding that both countries “defend the shaping of a multipolar, just, and a democratic world system, based on international laws and the central role of the United Nations, and not according to rules conjured up by other players without caring to explain what these rules are.”

 

President Xi’s careful tone, however, reveals a balancing act, for a prolonged war in Ukraine is not in China’s interest.

 

China’s Gains

While analysts are still mulling over the outcomes of President Xi’s first overseas visit and his presence at the SCO summit, some early signs of Beijing’s gains could be told, summarised as follows:

 

1.    Added support to China’s policy on Taiwan:

The joint statement issued by Kazakh and Chinese presidents summarised Kazakhstan’s support to China on the issue of Taiwan. In the statement, Kazakhstan opposes “Taiwan independence” in all forms, and supports the peaceful development of cross-straits relations as well as all efforts by the Chinese government to realize the peaceful reunification of China. The statement also aligned SCO member state leaders with Beijing’s “One China” policy, reiterating the importance of respecting sovereignty, independence, non-intervention, and mutual respect and interest. The member states also renewed their commitment to counterterrorism, extremism, and separatism. The joint statement signals SCO unison on China’s approach to the Taiwan question and rejecting Washington’s pressure on the Uyghur issue.

 

2.    Expanding SCO:

At the margins of the summit Iran signed, a memorandum of understanding outlining the prospects of Iran joining the organisation. Since 2005, Iran has been an observing member but now is looking more likely to join the organisation; Belarus might follow suit. The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Myanmar, and the Maldives, among others, have joined the organisation as new dialogue partners, in addition to Egypt and Qatar who are the latest joiners.

 

Expanding the SCO stems from China’s vision of itself as major power in a multipolar international system with an extensive line of allies who value diplomacy and dialogue,

 

It may be concluded that China would press on more than ever with its strategy in engaging with Central Asia states in the coming period. While Russia is busy with its operation in the Ukraine, China would take advantage of the current situation to strengthen its partnership with its Central Asian neighbours in areas of security, energy, and foreign policy, in ways that benefit Beijing in the short- and long-run.