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How Does the GCC View Biden’s visit ?

16 يوليو، 2022


US President Joe Biden’s visit to the Middle East has become the centre of media’s attention since it was announced in May. Biden made the trip July 13-16, where he met Israeli and Palestinian presidents, before meeting leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Riyad. As much speculation surrounded the visit’s agenda and outcomes, experts saw the trip as a sensitive test for Biden’s ability to reset relations with the region.

 

Shifting Relations

Biden’s visit stirred a key question for the region: What could the GCC expect from his visit, and what change was it going to bring to the US-Gulf relations? In other words, what GCC demands would navigate the relation moving forward? 

 

The visit came at critical moment in the US-Gulf relations. Whilst the above questions are topical and indeed timely, they reflect a deeper shift in the way Arab Gulf states view their relations towards the US. Historically, the US-Gulf relation has been characterised by trust, alignment, shared interests, and mutual benefit. Yet, this has changed over the last few years; the GCC states have been able to forge foreign strategy far much independently than before. The GCC’s strategic compass now points to new priorities that take precedence over America’s decade-old preferences. As such, the US-Gulf relations are changing based on what the GCC leaders believe is strategically important to their countries, keeping a delicate balance of mutual interest, while appreciating Washington’s global influence.

The pretext to the GCC’s recalculations had been the muddled approach of Obama’s administration to the region. The disjoint continued under Biden who on several occasions made statements over Saudi Arabia. Disillusioned by America’s inconsistency and its failure to appreciate the change in region’s strategic priorities, the Arab Gulf states began building new partnerships with other major global powers to fill this gap. Granted, this has casted doubts over the future of the US-Gulf relations.

 

Therefore, notably the GCC’s shift in strategy is informed by their evolving security needs and strategic interests and is not just a diplomatic manoeuvre. The US has become the unreliable ally that on many occasions neglected the GCC’s security interests: during the Arab Spring for example, and more recently as it attempts to revive the Iranian nuclear deal. The Arab Gulf states have adopted a more pragmatic approach as a result which has enabled them to overcome regional and global challenges. In doing so, the GCC have demonstrated their ability to form their foreign strategy independent to Washington.

Thus, Biden’s visit to the GCC, meeting its leaders, and signalling a change in America’s position, reflects a shift in US foreign policy towards the region. This change is not hinged on persons; rather, it reflects an institutional shift in how it views the country’s relations to the GCC following recent global events. Most notably, it highlights a desire by US domestic policymakers to restore the US-GCC relations to an even keel.

 

Restoring Balance to US-GCC Relations

There are two key positions that could be noted in this context:

 

1.   GCC’s position on the Russo-Ukrainian war, which Washington has took it to be closer to Moscow. The decision by the Arab Gulf states not to substitute Russia’s oil supplies in global markets is seen as a clear sign of acting out of harmony with the US, despite being aware of the economic damage this decision may have had on European and US economies. The goal of this position taken by the GCC was to pressure the US into revising its policy towards the region. Neglecting these factors would weaken the America’s ability to pressure Russia.

 

2.   An impatience with America’s docile reaction to increased terrorist activity by Iran-backed militias, wreaking havoc on the region, most recently the Houthis’ repeated attacks on oil infrastructure in Saudi and the UAE.

The GCC’s disillusionment could be characterised in a number of ways, most notable is the region’s growing relations to US adversary powers, significantly China and Russia. Many GCC countries signed new arm deals with Russia and China, a trade relation that historically had been made exclusive to the US. Expectedly, such development would alarm Washington; hence Biden’s visit to meet the region’s leaders and attempt to set straight the US-Gulf relations.

 

Opportunity for Trade-off

The GCC leaders would have set a host of key issues on the US-GCC meeting agenda: Iran nuclear negotiations; the intensifying activity of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the region who have utilised ballistic missiles and militias to shake the region’s stability and security Also, Biden would hope to convince the GCC increase their production capacity in the face of soaring oil prices globally owing to the Russian operation in Ukraine.

Following on the above, Biden had realised that any concessions given by the GCC would depend on two key factors:

 

1.   Any change in GCC’s approach has a political price tag attached to it, for the Arab Gulf states have had to endure the heavy tolls of their ally’s passive stand on the region, particularly at significant moments that shocked the entire Middle East, not just the GCC.

 

2.  Intervention in Arab affairs as a steppingstone for interfering in Arab Gulf states, under pretexts such as human and individual rights or democracy, are no longer welcome in the region. Those interventions brought disastrous results to Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Other countries would have fallen victim to America’s interventionism, had it not been for their standing up to infantilising US foreign policy.

 

Taking in to account the above context, the Gulf states have reaped the fruits of their efforts. The GCC is flourishing, enjoying security and rapid economic development that are the result of decade-long planning and strategizing.

Political Pragmatism reflects a certain maturity in managing the GCC relation with a powerful global actor such as the US and was the dominant feature  characterising the visit. In an increasingly volatile world, the US have little choice but to reconsider its past approach and assume responsibility based on established agreements and alignments that secure mutual interests, particularly when facing political and security turmoil in the region.

 

Biden should concede the negative repercussions of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which was the onset of Iran’s unrestrained activity in the region, causing instability. As the risk of Iran acquiring nuclear arms on top of existing ballistic arsenal, Biden’s administration must give serious thought to his country’s contribution to peacebuilding in the Middle East. Otherwise, his visit would be rendered plain protocols.

America’s parochial self-interest has had detrimental consequence on the region: the sudden withdrawal from Iraq in 2014, creating the conditions for ISIS to emerge, and to similar effect the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, are just two examples, all the meanwhile not reacting to acts of terrorism committed by Iran-backed militias.

The US president would need to pay attention to concerns voiced by the GCC. If he is to succeed in what he was set out to achieve, Biden would have to prove a commitment beyond paying a lip service to protect the region’s interests.

 

Time for Change

There is no denying that Biden’s visit reflected the long and strategic relation his country has enjoyed with the region. He would attempt to break the ice and set straight what the past two Democratic administrations failed to achieve. Also, there is no denying the fact that shared interests are deep; reaching a mutual agreement will be in everyone’s interest.

 

What is new about this visit, however, is that it serves as a turning point for the US-Gulf relations and sets a more pragmatic approach in dealing with the region’s demands and interests. From now on, mutual interests shall form the basis of this strategic partnership. Focusing on their autonomous strategy, the GCC’s flexibility and new relations with other major global powers is a remarkable shift in foreign diplomacy.

 

The US president’s visit had to be more than just ceremonial, for it would take more than just formal proceedings to convince the region’s leaders to shift their strategy. Biden recognises that he needs to re-establish trust in the region, given his country’s disengagement with the war-ridden Middle East.

The outcomes of Biden’s visit would shape the future of the American-Gulf relations. Certainly, how the US responds to GCC’s concerns would have a strong influence on the nature of this relation in future. Biden’s administration must display good faith, meaning tangible steps must be taken to restore the diplomatic balance.

It would not be wise of the US president to visit the region expecting to set demands and expect the Arab Gulf states to jump in at his request to save the global market from soaring oil prices. He needs to listen intently to their demands and be prepared to take steps beyond media statements to repatch relations by building trust, engagement, and mutual respect.

 

To conclude, permanent and unilateral relations are a thing of the past. Pragmatism and realism are the motifs of the GCC’s foreign policy moving forward. Priority to secure the region’s economic and social interests shall take precedent over any historical alliances. What is said of not keeping all one’s eggs in one basket could be said of international relations, too: the GCC shall not have just the one ally to rely on.