Sudan has been suffering a complicated crisis; not only is it facing trouble with its transition to democracy, but it is also paying the price of being one of the closest neighbours to the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa.
The current crisis in Sudan has been further aggravated by a failed coup attempt on September 21. According to the official account, plotters were arrested and are being interrogated, including Major General Abdel-Baqi Al-Hassan Othman (Bakrawi), who is affiliated with ousted president Omar al-Bashir's regime, and who is believed to have staged the coup. Plotters, officers from the armored corps and Wadi Saidna and Omdurman military regions, planned to take over state radio and TV in Omdurman, and then arrest members of the ruling sovereign council and its leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as well as the members of Abdalla Hamdok's interim cabinet.
Intelligence provided the government with information about the coup. Consequently, measures were taken to thwart it. Army forces blocked the main bridge connecting Khartoum and Omdurman to prevent rebels from using it to reach the capital. All the areas, which were taken over were reassumed under the government's control. As both regular forces and rapid deployment forces are military forces after all, attempting a coup without the approval of both of them is considered to be a political suicide, and may even result in a civil war.
The coup nonsensically imitates coup attempts in Africa of the 1960s and 1970s. It strongly reflects the fragility of the transition period in Sudan. After the coup attempt, tensions have grown between the military and civilian groups sharing power. On one side, military leaders have been demanding reforms from the civil alliance, and calling for a cabinet reshuffle, while the civilians have accused the army leaders of attempting to fully cease control over Sudan.
This gives rise to many questions about the motives behind the coup attempt (push and pull factors), the crisis of the Sudanese ruling diarchy, and the features of the near future.
Push factors
1. The diarchy is fragile:
Some argue that it takes more than constitutions to achieve good governance; what matters most is the leader's responsibility. Ways of ruling are always influenced by the will of those who rule. Therefore, the most important element in any ruling system is the way leaders are chosen. As Africa suffered coups in 1960s and 1970s, diarchy was proposed. It was meant to serve as a pragmatic solution to the problem of chronic political instability in such countries as Nigeria and Sudan, through dividing the labor of governing between civilians and the military, so that the army should always be there. This form of government was known among Germanic tribes, and was also adopted in Sparta, Rome and Carthage. Perhaps the rationale behind this strange arrangement is that the army's participation may rid army men of their political ambitions.
Sudan's power-sharing deal was signed in 2019, but it is now obvious that the role of civilians is shrinking, whereas the army is getting more powerful. After the fall of al-Bashir, army generals and civilian fractions signed an agreement to form a civil government and a transitional legislative council to take charge. However, this council has not been formed yet. Besides, disagreements have occurred between the forces of Freedom and Change, and Hamdok's government lost much of the support it had at the beginning, the main reason being that the economic reforms it carried out had negative impacts on daily lives of citizens. In addition, people were highly critical of the government because of delayed justice, as far as al-Bashir's regime victims, and victims of the 2019 protests, are concerned. The military wing of the government is facing similar problems because of the existence of Rapid Support Forces and armed groups, and also because of the fact that military leaders are not quick to carry out security reforms. In short, Sudan's diarchy is weak and fragile.
2. It is difficult for civilians to have oversight of the army:
Civilians in Sudan do not seem to be able to successfully handle the transition period. They are not efficient or competent enough. Besides, there are deep divisions and ideological conflicts among them. According to the 2019 agreement, the transition period was supposed to be three years. However, this period was extended when a peace agreement was signed with a coalition of rebel groups in October 2021. It is obvious that the military component and the civilian component of the diarchy are working independently of each other; most of the time coordination is absent. Perhaps forming the transitional legislative council would mean more oversight of the army, but security and military forces, as well as traditional political parties, will be a stumbling block to reaching this decisive reform, for fear that they would lose their power.
Last year, Sudan announced plans of normalizing its relationship with Israel, and in return the US agreed to remove Sudan from terrorism sponsor list. Undoubtedly, the deal with Israel will not be put into effect without the consent of the transitional legislative council which has not been formed yet. What is important here is that these steps were taken by the army alone, and the army also played the main role in bringing about the peace agreement with the rebel groups, as it was deputy head of sovereignty council General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemeti) who signed it. In addition, top military figures participated in talks with a rebel group, which means that civilian participation in the talks was limited; they almost left the matter in the army's hands. Most important is that the army still has control over key companies in various sectors, ranging from agriculture to infrastructure projects. Hamdok stressed that last year as he said that 80% of the state's resources are "beyond finance ministry's control'.
3. Security reform remains a problem:
Civilian leaders, as well as leaders of former rebel groups, are pushing for decisive reforms including integrating semi-military groups and armed groups into the state's regular armed forces. However, military leaders still feel that civilian interference in military affairs is unwelcomed, and so they continue to turn a deaf ear when civilians demand that the security sector be reformed, which makes such reforms unlikely.
It is interesting that the 2019 power-sharing agreement failed to decide who would supervise security reforms. It is true that according to this agreement, civilians would "eventually have oversight of the army", but it seems that army men are by no means willing to loosen their grip on Sudan, or at least give up their gains as part of the ruling diarchy.
4. Debt relief will have consequences:
Because of the continuous economic reforms, Sudan is now qualified to receive debt relief under the IDA's and IMF's enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. From an economic perspective, this is a good step on the road of Sudan's transition to democracy, as it would secure financial resources necessary for enhancing economy, addressing poverty problems, and improving living conditions. However, due to inflation, prices of necessity goods keep rising beyond the underprivileged people's reach. Inflation has also caused protests all over the country. As a result, seven states declared a state of emergency, imposed a curfew, closed schools and restricted access to markets. In addition, Sudan is prone to natural hazards. Slow disasters, such as drought, affect agriculture and, consequently, food security. Sudan is also susceptible to sudden disasters, such as floods. In 2020, Sudan saw the worst flood in one hundred years, which affected almost 900000 people, destroying houses and agricultural land, causing damage to infrastructure and hindering humanitarian aid. Besides, about 418000 people have been displaced following fighting and armed attacks, especially in Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Sudan is also hosting more than 1.1 million refugees, including 763000 from South Sudan and more than 61000 from Ethiopia. Sudan is acting as a transit country for immigrants from the Horn of Africa heading for Europe.
5. Sudan's East is facing a crisis:
Protests have escalated in the east as a reaction to the Juba Peace Agreement, because the High Council of Beja Nazirs closed ports and markets, suspended revenues, and continued its blockages of main roads in the region. Once again, the tribal nature of the country seems to affect the already struggling transition in Sudan. The Beja mainly demand that the Eastern peace track (which is part of the 2020 Juba peace agreement) be cancelled and a different negotiation platform be adopted. The supreme council of Beja is also demanding the formation of a government of technocrats to replace Hamdok's cabinet. Nevertheless, certain movements denounced violence (ie. Butana platform and resistance in the Red Sea, Kassala and El-Gadarif states, the Gadarif Rescue Initiative). Leaders of El-Butana National Movement accused so- called 'former regime loyalists' of blocking the roads. They also said that a conference should be held as soon as possible in which all forces will consult about ways of handling weak points in the Eastern Track. These disagreements bear witness to the fact that the path of the transitional government is anything but paved.
Pull Factors
1. Coups are contagious:
Since the first successful African coup (which took place in Togo in 1960), Africa has seen more than 200 coup attempts, half of which succeeded to achieve their purposes. Sudan has the lion share of these; it saw more than 15 coups, 5 of which were successful. The coup attempt we are discussing is the latest in Africa. Undoubtedly, the success of the coups which have lately taken place in Mali, Chad and Guinea will continue to tempt army officers to interfere all over Africa, under the pretext of combatting corruption and fulfilling people's ambition.
2. Former regime's remnants are supporting coup attempts in Sudan:
The coup attempt we are discussing here is not the first to take place in post-Bashir Sudan, it is the most dangerous, though. Blame is always laid at former regime loyalists' door. PM Hamdok talked to the Sudanese people after the coup was foiled, saying that “remnants from the previous regime were intent on aborting the civilian democratic transition,” and that this coup attempt was “carefully orchestrated”. It was obvious that he was pointing a finger at former regime loyalists in the armed corps, who are afraid that Bashir may be brought before the international criminal court because this may lead to a domino effect as far as other leaders are concerned. This means that there are many deep-state players who are keen on changing the current situation, or at least impeding the transition to democracy in Sudan.
3. Plotters are making use of the regional and international instability:
The Horn of Africa is experiencing a state of instability, and violence there is endangering the security of the region and its neighbors. Both Ethiopia and South Sudan are suffering civil war and a volatile border dispute, not to mention public discontent on account of the violent conflicts and the consequences of the Covid-19 crisis. This is actually a perfect environment for those aspiring to change the situation for their own benefit in order to seize power while everyone is busy dealing with more important questions (ie. will the West withdraw from Africa just like it did in Afghanistan's case? Will the Anglophone alliance between the USA, Britain and Australia be revived? etc.
The disadvantages of diarchy in African experience
1. It is a pragmatic arrangement:
Diarchy is simply a pragmatic arrangement, meant to serve the ends of certain players. Unlike what its supporters may believe, it would not magically bring about stability in post-colonial Africa, nor would it help it move forward. We must ask ourselves this question: Did countries that adopted diarchy, such as Nigeria, achieve their goals of stability? The answer is 'no'. Diarchy may relieve problems, but only temporarily. If the army, which is one of any country's institutions, has the right to rule, why cannot other institutions enjoy the same right? The situation in Sudan shows that diarchy creates, rather than solves, problems. If an army man desires to be a politician, he has to give up his post and be just an ordinary citizen. This was the case in several African countries which succeeded in achieving democratic transition, such as Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, etc., and is better than trying to rule the country from the backdoor.
2. It stimulates counter-coups:
If 'some' army men can rule through diarchy, why cannot 'other' army men try their luck? Many military governments in Africa have faced counter-coups, Sudan's coup being the latest case in point. Such coups are usually bloodier than revolutions against non-military governments. Military men are always ruthless in their attempts to seize power. There is always a stark contrast between the military component and the civilian component of the government, as each represents a completely different culture. Military men tend to impose discipline by force, and never believe in political solutions to problems (their undeclared slogan is 'obey, and then complain). Civilians are different; they try to compromise, and seek to reconcile clashing attitudes. Given these essential differences between military men and 'civilian' politicians, it is only natural that diarchy does not work well most of the time.
3. The military elite may not enjoy integrity:
Proponents of diarchy insist that, whether it will share power directly or not, the army will 'have oversight of political life and public life', which is a good thing in their opinion. This viewpoint supposes that army men are incorruptible, whereas the military rule in many countries (such as Sudan, Nigeria, Guinea and Gambia) has proven this wrong; if there is something to learn from the experiences of these countries, it is that military rulers may become corrupt in the absence of civilian control and oversight.
4. Diarchy denies Africans the opportunity to learn democratic lessons:
Though democratic transition is far from happening smoothly in many African countries, this does not mean giving up democracy. People need to learn from their failure, and try hard to succeed. The political history of Europe, US and Asia teaches us that trial and error is the best approach as far as achieving democracy is concerned. Diarchy, in any form, will deprive countries from the opportunity to learn. Transition to democracy may not always follow an ideal path, but this does not mean that diarchy can be an alternative to democracy.
In the final analysis, in order for Sudan's democratic transition to take place successfully, peace processes should be supported, future peace agreement should be put into effect, civilians should be protected and law should be respected in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, economic aid should be enhanced, and humanitarian aid should be better coordinated, all of which cannot be achieved without the cooperation of regional and international players. This cooperation is particularly important in dealing with the challenges of the transition from the African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur to Unitams. Finally, there will be an urgent need to coordinate efforts in case security in Darfur deteriorates, or a chaotic situation occurs in marginalized regions.
