A Russian business delegation visited Lebanon in late June 2021 to offer support to the country by cultivating projects in the oil sector, development plans for the energy industry as well as the ports in Beirut and Tripoli. For the past two years, Lebanon, which is going through the worst economic and financial crisis in its history, and has been trying to secure international aid to survive, is now facing the attractive Russian economic bailout offer.
Although such an offer is welcomed by Lebanon, the Russian initiative raises concerns across the West, and particularly in the United States, which is in control of Lebanon’s banking system and still has significant influence on the state’s politics and financial sector. The United States believes that it is not possible to dissociate this Russian offer from Moscow’s desire to expand its influence in a region, in which it already established military presence and gained access to the Eastern Mediterranean, where a conflict is underway over investment of newly-discovered gas fields.
Significant signs
Signs of Russia’s growing role in Lebanon can be outlined as follows:
1- Lebanon’s several pleas to Russia: Lebanon’s Prime Minister designate Saad al-Hariri, during a visit to Moscow in April, asked Russia for economic assistance to build power plants and rebuild Beirut’s seaport. Additionally, Gibran Bassil, former foreign minister and head of the Free Patriotic Movement, during a visit to Moscow in April, welcomed any role Russia plays in Lebanon, especially regarding the repatriation of the Syrian refugees. Lebanon's Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who was the first to propose ‘turning to the east’, revealed, on June 25, that some Eastern countries expressed readiness to build small oil refineries in Zahrani and Tripoli, to reduce the cost of oil derivatives.
2- Significant moves by Moscow: Russia took several steps including the signing of a $1 billion arms deal in February 2018 for the Lebanese army, the promotion of an initiative to repatriate Syrian refugees in Lebanon, as well announcing preparedness to mediate between the Syrian government and Lebanese businesses to facilitate their role in reconstruction in Syria. Additionally, Russian companies gained access into Lebanon’s oil and gas industry through a contract with Lebanon’s ministry of energy to rehabilitate oil storage facilities in the port of Tripoli, as well as to launch oil exploration in both blocks 4 and 9.
3- Russian Business Delegation: a Russian team of experts led by Director of (Hydro engineering and construction) Andrei Metzger, visited Beirut on June 28 and met Lebanese Energy Minister Raymond Ghajar and Minister of Public Works Michel Najjar. In the meeting attended by Russian Ambassador to Lebanon Alexander Zasypkin, the two sides discussed projects that would support Lebanon’s economy such as the rebuilding of new grain silos in Tripoli port and two oil refineries: one in Tripoli to supply regional markets and another, a smaller one, in Zahrani to supply Lebanon’s domestic markets.
Motives behind Moscow’s moves
1- Promoting Russia as an economic saviour: the Russians explain that the business delegation’s visit to Lebanon in June comes in the context of a Russian rescue mission in Lebanon. This prerogative is not new and discussions of the said projects were launched a year ago. The related efforts were accelerated four months ago when the Russians requested data from the Lenanese authorities to carry out the plans and feasibility studies.
While the European Union threatened to impose sanctions against Lebanese officials, according to statements made by the EU's foreign policy chief Josep Borrel during a visit to Beirut on June 19, Russia is setting forth to save Lebanon. The oil refinery to be built by Russian companies in Zahrani in southern Lebanon, will be ready to supply oil derivatives to local markets within six months. Additionally, the Lebanese have been waiting for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to come forward and save their country. Any delay in putting solutions in place can exacerbate the crisis in Lebanon, where, due to the energy crisis, unusually long queues of cars waiting at gas stations stretch for kilometers.
3- Striking balance between the East and the West: the Russian propaganda is based on the assumption that Lebanon can only be saved through cooperation between the East and the West, and that any other plans set by the West or any third party to save the country will be welcomed by Moscow. On several occasions, Moscow expressed support for a plan by French President Emmanual Macron to bail Lebanon out of its economic crisis. However, ten months later, the French initiative has not materialized yet, and the situation in Lebanon is worsening. Explanations of the failure of the initiative were so many, that Paris had to embrace a new approach to deal with Lebanese leaders, which is basically imposing threats.This was evidenced by an announcement by French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian that France began imposing entry restrictions on certain Lebanese figures for alleged corruption or hampering efforts to find a solution to Lebanon’s political crisis.
3- Wooing Lebanon’s public opinion: Russia’s rhetoric is trying to woo public opinion in Lebanon by highlighting that the aim of Russian businesses’ access to Lebanon is rational, and that although commercial gains drive their quest, these gains remain reasonable compared to those involved in projects proposed by the French initiative and the IMF’s plan for Lebanon. The IMF’s plan offers a $10 billion in exchange for Lebanon’s assets in the telecom and electricity sectors and Beirut port, estimated by Moscow at $30 billion. This approach to woo public opinion comes in the context of Russia’s efforts to reach consensus in Lebanon around back plans for “’turning to the east’ away from the West.
Potential implications
The potential consequences of Russia’s role in Lebanon can be explained within the following contexts:
1- Reaching a consensus: Russia views its dominance of Syria as enabling it to further its interests in Lebanon, because Syria and Lebanon territories are interconnected, especially in terms of security and economy. That is why, Moscow believes that with the passage of time, the US will recognize its role in Lebanon, which encouraged it to propose a plan to rebuild Beirut port, thus joining other proposals from Turkey, China, France and Germany.
Some view the timing of the Russian business delegation’s visit to Lebanon, following a summit meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Joe Biden in June 2021, comes in the context of international consensus on the need to cooperate to prevent the collapse of Lebanon. Additionally, Russia’s growing role in Lebanon can push Israel to stop putting all its diplomatic and security cards concerning Lebanon in the US basket. That is, Tel Aviv can possibly seek to diversify its options and make Moscow a mediator to send across some messages, especially because it can keep Hezbollah’s behavior under control. The military standoff in Gaza Strip in May proved that expanding frontlines has become even more difficult.
2- Stand-off between Russia and the United States: tensions are growing over Russia’s endeavor to expand its role in Lebanon, as well as attempts to contain it, especially as Moscow introduces this role as part of efforts to fill a gap created by the West’s failure to help the country, which is historically a satellite state of the West. Especially because of Moscow’s insistence on challenging the United State’s plans for Lebanon, these tensions can eventually trigger a stand-off between Russia and the United States. For example, Moscow received a delegation of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc in an official visit to legitimize and promote the militia group at the international level, at a time when Washington is seeking to designate Hezbollah’s military and political wrong, as a terrorist organization in several other countries. Receiving former Lebanese foreign minister Gibran Bassil in Moscow in April is also among Russia’s effort to break his international isolation after Washington designated him under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
3- Expanding Russia’s influence in Eastern Mediterranean: Russia will do its best to block transportation of natural gas from Eastern Mediterranean to Europe, because, in its view, will impact its gas exports, accounting for 40 per cent of Europe’s needs. Subsequently, Moscow will seek to influence importers of the Mediterranean gas by diverting as much exports as possible to Asian markets.
Russian’s expanding influence in Lebanon will allow it to compete with plans laid by the Cairo-based East Mediterranean Gas Forum which is seeking to find solutions to market gas from Eastern Mediterranean. It will also enable Moscow to hold two pressure cards pertaining to natural gas in both Syria and Lebanon, both countries in Eastern Mediterranean. This will give Moscow a chance to resolve a dispute between Syria and Lebanon over maritime borders where Lebanon’s blocks 1 and 2 overlap with Syria’s block 1. Additionally, Moscow will be able to increase its influence on Eastern Mediterranean gas and offsetting the French-Greek-Cypriot alliance through cooperating with Turkey which also seeks to block the East Med pipeline because it does not run through Turkish territory.
Hurdles
Doubts surround what can be described as Russia’s “attempts to rescue” Lebanon, regarding both its desire and capacity. In terms of the desire, Russia’s reieration of Lebanon’s right to its maritime sovereignty in its dispute with Israel over its own economic zone is at odds with views upheld by Russian political analyst and strategist Aleksandr Dugin who believes that power is the foundation of sovereignty, that without power sovereignty ceases to exists, and that small or weak states are nothing but assets to be exploited in favor of strong states.
In terms of the ability to rescue Lebanon, there are several factors that can block Russia’s ability to execute its economic offers to Lebanon. Among these factors is the Lebanese caretaker government which lacks sufficient power, and the failure to form a new government that can decide on offers put forward to Lebanon. Added to that are concerns over U.S. sanctions that may target Lebanese officials involved in cooperation with Russian projects, on the pretext that such cooperaiton falls under the jurisdiction of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.
In light of the above, efforts by some Lebanese to get help from Russia can be considered as part of efforts to persuade the West to release aid pledged for Lebanon. On the other hand, Russia wants to use its offers to Lebanon to get a share of the country’s energy industry.
To conclude, Russian intervention in the Middle East is expanding, especially in Syria and Libya. Lebanon seems to become important for Russia’s Eastern Mediterranean strategy. However, the question remains- will Lebanon benefit from being part of the great powers’ interest in, and competition for the region? or will this intervention only contribute towards diversifying and increasing its international mandates?
