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Governing Parameters

Will the New Governments in Israel and Iran Affect the Ongoing Tensions Between Them?

27 يونيو، 2021


Israel and Iran are witnessing significant political changes that affected the ruling elites. The developments came in the wake of early legislative elections held in Israel in March leading to the formation of a new coalition government headed by Naftali Benett, leader of the right-wing party Yamina. In Iran, presidential elections held on June 18, were won by hardline chief justice Ebrahim Raisi.


The internal political dynamics in Tel Aviv and Tehran cast a shadow on the whole political landscape in both countries, and are projected to have an impact on the trajectory of the non-traditional conflict between the two sides, which escalated over the past few months. 


Concurrent Changes 

Both Israel and Iran have undergone political government changes. The results of the elections held in the two countries are consistent with the earlier developments as follows: 


1- Israel’s Benett-Lapid coalition cabinet: Prior to the latest legislative elections, Tel Aviv witnessed a months-long political stalemate due to former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s failure to bring together political factions and restore right-wing parties’ alliance. This has have splintered off his party, Likud, allowing it to fall short of a decisive majority that enables it to form a new government. On the other hand, Bennett, who leads the hardline right-wing party Yamina, succeeded in forming a government coalition after winning 60 votes in favor and 59 against, from the oppositions which now includes religious and right-wing parties, namely, Likud, Shas, Religious Zionist, Yahadut HaTorah (the United Torah Judaism). 


The new government includes disparate parties, namely Yesh Atid (There Is a Future), led by Yair Lapid, parties from the left and center, as well as the United Arab List. It will be headed by Benett to September 2023. After Benett’s two-year stint, Lapid will serve as prime minister for the following two years.


2- Raisi’s rise in Iran: Results of the latest presidential elections held in Iran were seen by some as inevitable where the clear frontrunner, Chief Justice Ebrahim Raisi, ran virtually uncontested to win 62 per cent of the votes. Prior to the elections, there was much controversy about the policies adopted by the Council of Guardians to deal with the presidential candidates, where the constitutional watchdog excluded reformists and a number of conservative figures. As a result, the race was limited to only seven candidates, which drew criticism that somehow affected political participation, taking it down to only 48.8 per cent. In light of the results, Raisi is now set to officially take up his duties in August succeeding Hassan Rouhani. The new president-elect will be facing multiple internal and external challenges, namely the economic crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, the nuclear issue and the mutual escalation with Israel.

 

Mutual Concern

Israel and Iran had an exchanged reactions about the results of each other’s elections. Tehran was quick to express relief at the departure of Israel’s former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh, on June 14, said “Iran’s enemies are gone”, but at the same time said that Iran does not expect Israeli foreign and security policy to change and also ruled out the possibility of a change in Tehran’s attitude towards its “traditional enemy”, Israel. 



On the Israeli side, various circles showed interest in Raisi’s landslide victory in Iran’s presidential election. Israeli foreign ministry labelled Raisi as Iran’s most extreme president yet and that he is committed to quickly advancing Tehran's nuclear programme. Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Lior Hayat, on June 19, wrote on Twitter that Raisi’s election should "prompt grave concern among the international community." Additionally, the Israeli ministry of defense, at a meeting  held on June 17, discussed  Raisi’s orientations,  their impact on the future of the nuclear issue, his potential way of managing the conflict with Israel and Iran’s extraterritorial activities.


Think tanks in Tel Aviv, however, do not expect Raisi to bring about any major change in Iran’s foreign policy. Sima Shine, the head of the Iran programme at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) said that the supreme leader has the final say on Iran’s internal and foreign policies and that facilitating Raisi’s rise to presidency is in fact aimed at preparing a successor to Khamenie himself. 


Determinants of Influence

With the rise of new ruling elites in Israel and Iran, the question posed itself about the future of tense relations- are they set for de-escalation or further escalation? The answer to this question rests upon the following dkey factors governing relations between Tel Aviv and Tehran. These are: 


1- Established political parameters: It is evident that both Israel and Iran have consistent political and strategic parameters that should not be jeopardized regardless of whatever orientations the ruling elites in either country have. In Iran, the president is the head of the executive authority and his responsibilities are limited to carrying out the state’s strategic policies outlined by the supreme leader. This is best evidenced by impediments imposed upon the outgoing president Hassan Rouhani dealing with several domestic issues. The result was that his economic and social plans that he announced as part of his election manifesto have faltered. Rouhani’s presidential tenure witnessed expansion of Iran’s extraterritorial expansionist policies where Tehran’s activities in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon picked up.


The space of influence granted to the Iranian president remains fixed and can get narrower or wider depending on his closeness to the supreme leader and the circles under his control. This sphere of influence is further affected by the president’s commitment to executing the outlines of the preset policies in a way that preserves the prestige of the Iranian regime and the slogans it promotes for domestic and international use. 


In Israel, the doctrine on which the state and its institutions were built, is firmly based on imposing influence and creating “lobbies” to protect Israel’s interests, weaken adversaries while also trying to woo those who are impartial and potential stakeholders. 


2- Persistent contentious issues: Relations between Israel and Iran are based on “public enmity” proclaimed by statements from both countries, in light of a number of contentious issues between them. These issues can be outlined as follows:

 

A- Iran’s nuclear issue: Israel rejects any international agreement that would legitimize Iran’s nuclear program. In this context, Israel leads efforts to pressure the United States to maintain its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal framework, from which the United States withdrew in 2018 under the administration of former president Donald Trump.


Israel declared its rejection of negotiations with Tehran and underlined that signing a nuclear deal with it would be a grave mistake. Israel also announced that it will not allow Iran to execute its nuclear program. This was further reiterated by the new Israeli prime minister Naftali Benett, during a vote of confidence on the new government at the Knesset, before he decided to lift a ban on discussing the nuclear deal with US officials that was imposed by former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Bennett’s move aims to take the last opportunity, that would last for a month, before Raisi is officially inaugurated as the new president of Iran, to influence the US Administration and dissuade it from engaging once again with the nuclear deal, or at least to get better terms based as negotiations with Raisi governments are expected to be harder and less flexible. 


On the other hand, Iran is working on completing the Vienna talks with the global powers that are being held along with indirect talks with the United States to reach a deal that includes the United States and meets Tehran’s conditions. 


Statements from Iran and western countries indicate that most of the controversial terms have been agreed on at a time when all concerned parties seek to accelerate a final draft of the new agreement before the new Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi is inaugurated in August. Raisi earlier on June 21, backed the negotiations in Vienna but said they must fulfill Iran’s demands while also no issue would be discussed outside the framework of the nuclear deal. Raisi was hinting that Iran’s missile program and its interference in the region should not be included in any new agreement.


B- Iran’s support to Hamas: Tehran spares no opportunity to reiterate its support to the Palestinians in their standoff with Israel. The Iranian regime designated a day to chant anti-Israeli slogans. In this context, it is probable that the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, has turned into a leverage against Israel, something that the latter state cannot ignore. 


3- Maneuverability: With the ongoing contentious issues between Israel and Iran, and the two countries’ consistent visions and effective policies, their dealing with each other remains hinged to their maneuverability. That is to say, while Israel reportedly proved its ability to penetrate Iran at home and have access to the equipment used to operate its nuclear plants and infrastructure, Tehran find itself forced to use its leverage in the countries neighboring Israel and even expand its margin of maneuver by targeting American and Israeli interests in the capitals of Arab countries, where Tehran has proxies. However, both Israel and Iran, at this time, don't need new open fronts for a direct conflict. This stand is therefore unlikely to overwhelmingly change because of the rise of new politicians to power in both countries.  


In conclusion, the fate of Iran’s nuclear deal, in light of the outcome of the Vienna talks, continues to be a major determinant of policies pursued by Israel and Iran towards each other. This is especially so with the coming of new governments to rule in both countries, where they will either return to “controlled hostile relations”, so to speak, or mutually escalate tensions to a new level.