Terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda, such as the “Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM / Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslmeen)”, and those affiliated with ISIS such as the “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)”, have expanded and escalated their attacks on international and coastal forces, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This mission is in charge of maintaining the peace agreement in Algeria and supporting the Malian authorities’ efforts of stabilization within the country. Furthermore, the various types of illicit trade - particularly drug and arms smuggling, and human trafficking - as well as the tensions between the local communities and the repercussions of climate change over the accessibility of resources are all factors, inevitably resulting in disrupting the region's human stability and security. Accordingly, the French presence in the Sahel has in itself become a problem, which is difficult to deal with in light of the transformations of the terrorist phenomenon in the region on one hand, and the divergent international and regional approaches in combating terrorism on the other hand.

The geography of terrorism

In January 2013, France launched Operation ‘Serval’ in Mali to confront extremist terrorist groups that nearly overthrew the government in Bamako. In August 2014, Operation ‘Serval’ became Operation ‘Barkhane’, which includes about 4,500 soldiers in the Sahel, with an annual budget of USD 797 million. There are three main bases for the French military presence in the region: the command center in N'Djamena (Chad), and two others in Gao (Mali) and Niamey (Niger). However, over the past three years, despite the French military presence and the joint forces of the five Sahelian member states -which suffer from inadequate preparation and apparatus, lack of funding and absence of a combat doctrine-, France failed to withstand terrorist groups. Such groups have actually succeeded in organizing and coordinating their ranks operationally and created social incubators amidst the local population.

New terrorist groups have emerged using various tactics, expanding South and West to include Central Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Liptako Gourma - a border strip extending along all three countries - has particularly become the center of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the region. This place has witnessed terrorist attacks since September 2019, killing about a hundred Malian soldiers. It also witnessed the death of more than seventy Nigerien soldiers on December 12, 2019 in what is considered to be the worst disaster in the history of Niger. Undoubtedly, illicit activities - such as: arms and drug trade, smuggling, cattle rustling, illegal exploitation of minerals, and illegal animal hunting - represent the lifeline of extremist groups in the vast deserts, particularly on both sides of the border. 

The French predicament

Despite the establishment of the Sahel states’ joint forces, and the presence of over 14,000 UN peacekeepers, along with the French troops, the year 2019 witnessed a serious escalation by extremist jihadist groups in Mali and other countries in the region, including Niger and Burkina Faso. In November 2019, 13 French soldiers were killed in Mali due to the collision of two helicopters during an operation against jihadists there. This extremely complex security dilemma is pushing France towards the expanding swamp of terrorism on the African Sahel. Its departure, on account of the expansion of terrorist hotbeds to include the Lake Chad region moving West to the West Africa Coast, will endanger its international image and make it appear as incapable of conquering terrorist forces in the Sahel. On the other hand, this incapability will reinforce the hatred of the local population, who have grown sick of the foreign presence in the region. Thus, the Sahel has already begun to turn into a trap for France. 

Despite France remaining to be the only Western state with a significant military presence in the Sahel, and its establishment of the Sahel Alliance Initiative in 2017, the tensions of its relationship with its former African colonies have escalated in the past year. This led to a clear reinforcement of anti-French sentiment. That dilemma has prompted President Macron to call upon the leaders of the five Sahel states to address these hostile sentiments if they want France to pursue its military operations against terrorism. Macron states, “I can’t have French troops on the ground in the Sahel when there is ambiguity toward anti-French movements and sometimes comments made by politicians and ministers.” Faced with this dilemma, the French President does not rule out any future scenario related to his country's military presence in the Sahel. Nevertheless, the best scenario remains to be capitalizing on the support of the European allies in confronting terrorist groups. However, some allies, such as Germany, do not want to lend a helping hand, while they remain to be the back-seat driver in fighting terrorism in the Sahel. Therefore, there is only one way out for President Macron, namely resorting to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Russian "Kalashnikov" Diplomacy

In light of the French and Western failure to contain the hotbeds of extremism and terrorism in the Sahel and West Africa, all eyes turn to the Russian alternative, particularly after the prominent role played by Moscow in the Syrian crisis. Campaigns launched by civil society organizations calling for Russian intervention to combat terrorists in the Sahel. On April 18, 2019, Alexei Dulyan, the Russian Ambassador to Mali, attended a meeting of the Patriot Group of Mali, a political party that is openly pro-Russia, in Bamako. ‏ Bamako is also witnessing public demonstrations and campaigns to sign petitions demanding Russian intervention. It seems that resorting to Russia has moved to the official level in the Sahel countries, where Bamako signed an agreement for military cooperation with Russia in June 2019. On the other hand, Russia is trying hard to provide a ‘balanced’ alternative to French domination in the Francophone ‘sphere of influence’ by demonstrating its ability to combat terrorism. Moscow has recently succeeded in establishing an ‘African Influence Centre’ connecting the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea through the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Sudan.

Undoubtedly, the continuation of the uncontrollable situation in the Sahel, with the increasing number of terrorist centers, has forced the Sahel states to seek Moscow's security services. The Russian approach to overcoming hybrid war threats is called ‘Kalashnikov Diplomacy’, and in Africa, it is about selling military equipment, sending security advisors, and employing security personnel from ‘mercenary’ private companies that have proven effective in the Central African Republic. According to the statements of Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Russian-African summit in Sochi, Africa broadly needs Russia's support in various fields, in addition to its readiness to provide the Sahel countries with assistance in combating terrorism. The Sahel countries today firmly believe that Moscow has extensive experience in this field.‎ For example, 90% of the weapons and military equipment used by the Chadian army come from Russia. In view of this, Africa has become extremely strategic in Russia's foreign policy due to at least two main factors: for the economic benefits of its mineral wealth, and for providing Russia with a market for exports of arms and military aid. These two factors are often combined in a weapons-for-resources approach.

Will the Sahel become a global concern?

On the strategic level, the summit commemorating the 70th anniversary of the NATO establishment in Watford pointed to the rise of China as a challenge, as well as to the ‘threat’ posed by ‘hostilities’ conducted by Russia. This means that the NATO's neglect of the Sahel will be an open invitation for the growing Russian influence in the region, which would lead to NATO countries falling into the clutches of a frightening strategic trap. And as previously demonstrated, Russia will try to secure a firm footing in the Sahel all the way to the coasts of West Africa, and then the Atlantic Ocean. In light of the US plans to reduce its military presence in Africa by 10% and the possibilities of France revisiting its military presence in the Sahel, a gap in power may occur, which gives other emerging powers a chance to interfere. Russia is actually involved in security cooperation with 19 countries in Africa. This includes the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, Gambia, Ghana, Ethiopia and others. Undoubtedly, some of Moscow’s motives in its African movement are currently associated with Putin's desire to revive his country’s position as a superpower.‎ These seem to be the features of a new Cold War building up on the highly complex and interlinked front of the African Sahel.