Iran has moved towards upgrading its bilateral relations with some neighboring countries, such as Pakistan, Turkey and the Caspian states, as preemptive measures ahead of the second batch of US sanctions on November 4, which will extend to oil exports. This is crucial to Tehran and the Iranian regime given that these sanctions will exacerbate the internal economic crisis facing the government, which has not succeeded in reducing their repercussions during the past period.

Nevertheless, there are many obstacles that may stand in the way of these efforts and limit the possible results that may be achieved in the coming period. These are linked to the possible changes Iran may make to its policy on some of the key issues of interest to those states.

Multiple Indicators

Iran has sought to improve its relations with Pakistan, Turkey and the Caspian States, which is evident in the three following indicators: 

1- Rushing to open communication channels with the Government of Imran Khan: Iran was one of the first countries to welcome the arrival of Imran Khan to Pakistan's leadership. Tehran was quick to send its Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to Islamabad for talks with Khan and the Pakistani officials on August 30, 2018. Remarkably, the talks focused on issues inseparable from Iran’s efforts to contain the fallout from the US sanctions, such as bilateral banking and energy transfer projects from Iran to Pakistan, particularly gas, the security dossier, and participation in the development of ports, principally Chabahar and Gwadar.

2- Rallying Ankara’s support to confront US sanctions: This is evident in its assertion to stand by Ankara and its demand that the US stop “its addiction to sanctions”. Notably, Foreign Minister Zarif visited Ankara and held a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on August 29, ahead of the tripartite summit that will bring together Erdogan, Iranian presidents Hassan Rouhani and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Iran on 7 September. 

3- Signing a new convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and sharing its resources: At the Fifth Caspian Summit held in Kazakhstan on 12 August, the five Caspian states agreed that the main area of the Caspian Sea surface would be available for “shared usage”, dividing the lower layers (seabed) into adjacent sections among the five states, based on the international law. The Convention sets out the provision on the prevention of the presence of military forces of foreign international or regional powers at sea. 

Numerous Obstacles 

Over the coming period, Iran’s efforts may encounter numerous hurdles. Tehran realizes that it cannot currently count on the ability of the government of Imran Khan in Pakistan to continue implementing bilateral projects on energy transfer and bilateral banking during post-US sanctions, set to be imposed on 4 November.

The Pakistani government may come under strong US pressure to prevent it from backing the Iranian efforts to counter the fallout from Washington’s sanctions, given the latter’s eagerness to close any loopholes that Iran may try to exploit to circumvent the sanctions and reduce their impact. This is evident, for example, in the decision taken by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on August 16, to appoint Brian Hook as Special Representative for Iran, who will lead the Action Group on Iran, which was created on the same day to coordinate anti-Iran efforts and sanctions.

Therefore, several estimates have come to the view that Iran cannot count on Imran Khan’s previous criticisms of the tracks of Pakistan-US relations, because his new position will restrain his options, given the current realities on the ground, such as the problems facing the Pakistani economy and the tension between Islamabad and Washington over security and political developments in Afghanistan.

In addition, Iran’s attempts to take advantage of the current escalating tension between Turkey and the US are facing mounting disagreement over the situation in Idlib, as Ankara warns of the consequences of the military intervention by Russia, Iran and the Syrian regime, especially with regard to its ongoing security understandings with Moscow and Tehran.

Moreover, signing the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea has sparked a heated debate in Iran that might undercut the ability of Rouhani government to improve its relations with the Caspian Sea states, foremost among them is Russia. Numerous nationalist estimates in Iran say that the remarkable flexibility that characterized the Iranian policy during the talks at the Kazakhstan summit has reduced the country share of the Caspian sea’s resources from 50%, according to their claims, to only 13%. Further, they claim that since Iran avoided to engage in discussing the demarcation of the maritime boundaries, the sea should be divided according to agreements, such as the 1921 and 1940 conventions, meaning that Iran should have 50% of its resources, considering that the other four countries were among the second party to those agreements, the former Soviet Union. 

In response, the government was quick to assert that the talks held at the Kazakhstan summit did not address the issue of dividing up the resources of the Caspian Sea, and that there were four to five issues that were left undiscussed during the signing of the latest convention, due to lack of consensus among the five states. Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Qassemi indicated that the two mentioned conventions did not include clauses on equal quotas or common usage at the Caspian Sea.

Having said that, Iran’s quest to upgrade its bilateral relations with some neighboring countries do not seem to yield the desired positive results that could enhance its ability to contain the repercussions of the new US sanctions. The US seems intent on preventing Iran from utilizing the same mechanisms that it has previously adopted to cope with US and international sanctions, which were imposed and lifted under the nuclear agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers on July 14, 2015.

Finally, the above-mentioned Iranian efforts suggest that it may not easily make changes to its policy, which has caused domestic, regional, and international pressure to pile up. Seemingly, Iran is sending messages that the new sanctions will not push it to cave in to US demands, namely to cease supporting terrorism, interfering in the internal affairs of regional countries and developing the nuclear and missile programs. Instead, it will try to contain the fallout from those sanctions by maintaining strong relations with some neighboring countries, which does not seem to be a viable option for Tehran.