Through considering new sanctions against Iran, the members of the European Troika seek to send a strong message to Tehran that it cannot rely on a divergence in positions between the United States and the three states about how to deal with Iran, not on attempts to persuade Donald Trump of the importance of keeping the nuclear deal in place. But efforts by the three states run into the reality that, to date, there is no unified European position on imposing European sanctions, by Austria and Italy in particular, on Iran in the coming period. Additionally, such European moves would not succeed in dissuading the U.S. President from withdrawing from the nuclear deal. Based on this, it can be argued that the Troika members will not succeed in changing Iran’s policy.
The three European Troika members (Germany, France and Britain), seek to improve the chances of keeping the nuclear deal in place after May 12, 2018. They are doing so by sending a twofold message to the United States and Iran through new sanctions that they are trying to impose on Iran. But these Troika’s efforts face no easy hurdles, not only because it is difficult to rely on such sanctions to change Iran’s policy, but also because lack of a unified European position on dealing with recently gradually widening disagreements about the nuclear deal and the ballistic missile program and their role in crisis-hit countries and Syria and Yemen in particular.
Two Main Goals
Through new potential European sanctions on Iran, the European Troika seek to achieve two primary goals. The first is to send a strong message to Iran that, from now on, it cannot rely on the existence of divergence of positions between the United States and the three states about the appropriate mechanisms for dealing with it. That is, in the past period, Iran believed that the three states’ keenness on not identifying with the continued escalation by the United States against it will eventually reduce relevant pressures put on it. For Iran, this would also contribute towards widening its margin of maneuver and available freedom of movement so as it would not have to make changes to its policy to alleviate these pressures.
In other words, the three Troika members threatened to use the option of sanctions to send warnings to Iran that its insistence on pursuing its current policy, especially in light of its insistence on playing destructive roles in crisis-hit countries such as Syria and Yemen, will push these states to adopt a different policy toward it. This is especially so after it appeared to be insisting on threatening to walk out of the nuclear deal and violating international resolutions, as evidenced in continued smuggling of arms to the Houthi rebels.
What stood out in this context was that threatening to impose European sanctions coincided with the growing interest of the three states in the risks posed by Iran’s continued approach. This was reflected in a February 18, 2018 British-drafted UN Security Council Resolution condemning Iran for failing to stop smuggling arms to the Houthis, that Russia vetoed. It was also reflected in statements delivered by French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian on March 29, in which he stressed once again that "Saudi feels regularly attacked by the Houthis, who are themselves supplied with arms by Iran."
The second goal is to try to persuade U.S. President Donald Trump of the importance of keeping the nuclear deal in place and not taking procedural measures that would lead to the freezing of the deal after the May 12, 2018 deadline for the U.S. Administration to decide whether to extend U.S. sanctions waivers on Iran or re-impose them.
In other words, it could be safe to say that European states want to impose new European sanctions to prevent the nuclear deal from collapsing as a result of divergent U.S. and Iranian positions and failure of the three states to reach compromises despite the vigorous efforts they have made. The efforts which surfaced recently included new negotiations to reach a supplemental or follow-up agreement that addresses issues in the existing deal, and in particular "sunset clause" which allows the lifting of some restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities within eight years after the signing of the July 14, 2015 nuclear deal.
Potential Obstacles
Despite this, efforts being made by the Troika members may not succeed in meeting their goals, especially those regarding increasing the chances of keeping the nuclear deal in place, for two main reasons. The first is the continued lack of a unified European position on imposing European sanctions on Iran in the coming period. Some states, such as Italy and Austria, voiced reservations about the move and believe that the Troika states are trying to impose their own view ahead of a meeting of the European Union foreign ministers, to be held on April 16, 2018, less than one month before the deadline set by the U.S. Administration for fixing issues of the current deal.
Hence, it is perhaps safe to say that there are multiple European positions, that sometimes appear to be conflicting, on what appropriate mechanisms should be adopted to deal with the escalating disagreement with Iran. Italy and Austria believe that opting to impose sanctions against Iran will affect their interests with Iran in the coming period.
Within this context, there is a possibility that cannot be ruled out: Iran may have sought to create this disagreement to block any bids by the Troika to identify with the U.S. escalation against it, after it recognized that, on the long term, it cannot count on these states’ rejection of the policy pursued by the U.S. Administration. Remarkably, in the years that followed the signing of the nuclear deal and the lifting of international sanctions against it in mid-January 2016, Iran showed a keen interest in promoting its economic relations with Italy and Austria.
Italy was included in President Hassan Rouhani’s tour to Europe in January 2016 where the two states signed huge economic deals worth US$18.4 billion. Additionally, former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi visited Tehran on April 12, 2016. Leading a 25-strong delegation of business leaders and officials, he was the first EU leader to visit Iran since the nuclear deal was signed and the international sanctions were lifted. Moreover, Rouhani was preparing to visit Austria on March 29, 2016, but the visit was cancelled at the last minute because Iranian opposition forces planned to stage demonstrations in Vienna during the visit.
The second reason is that there are no signs that this approach would convince the U.S. Administration of ruling out the option of abandoning the deal or taking procedural measures that affect the option of keeping it in place in the coming period, especially because new sanctions would not change Iran’s position. In the past period, Iran dealt with the sanctions imposed by the United States by adopting a more hard-line policy, which was evidenced by its insistence on continuing to provide military support to armed and terrorist organizations in some regional countries, develop its missile program and interfere in the internal affairs of other states in the region.
Accordingly, it is possibly safe to say that the new policy pursued by the Troika’s states on Iran are not likely to achieve its goals. It is expected that the nuclear deal will face a difficult test in the coming period, because of a decline in the impact of new sanctions on positions taken by the United States and Iran, as well as an unprecedented widening of disagreement between parties involved in the deal.
