Former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues his strong campaign against current president Hassan Rouhani’s government and other leading officials in the regime. But although he has been careful not to directly criticize supreme leader Ali Khamenei, Ahmadinejad’s February 19 letter to him is fraught with negative views of the regime. In particular, he made note of the impact of Khamenei's policies on the internal situation, the powerful interference by the institutions of the regime in choosing candidates for various elections.
This will push the regime to adopt new mechanisms to deal with Ahmadinejad’s attempts to make a comeback to the Iranian political arena which he left after his 2013 second term after he failed to escape restrictions set by the Guardian Council of the Constitution in the 2017 presidential elections.
Various Hurdles
Post-revolution Iran, in the period from 1980 to 1990, witnessed early presidential elections as a result of fast-paced political and security developments domestically. For instance, the Shura Council held a vote of confidence on the government of the first president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr after which he left Iran in June 1981. In August in the same year, the second president Mohammad-Ali Rajai was assassinated. Later, the third president Ali Khamenei was promoted to Supreme Leader when Ayatollah Khomeini died in June 1989.
However, this does not negate that repeating the same experience today faces no easy obstacles of which the following stand out:
1- Rouhani’s Loyalty. To date, President Rouhani remains keen to show his loyalty to the regime and its top leader Ali Khamenei. Most recently, he even deliberately adopted the regime’s same hard-line policy on the internal and foreign developments, ordering the start of building nuclear marine propulsion reactors, in reaction to the sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran.
What should be noted is that Rouhani was the only one to adopt this pro-regime position. Most key reformist and moderate figures showed reluctance to support the protests that broke out on December 28, 2017 and were keen to affirm their loyalty to the regime.
2- New Crisis. The regime's tendency to pursue such scenario may increase the chances of an outbreak of a new political crisis, which the regime needs to avoid at least at the current stage. This is especially so because holding early presidential elections will weaken the influence of the moderates inside the ruling regime, and even push them to gradually leave power. This is what the moderate movement suffered from, especially after former president Mohammad Khatami’s second term came to an end in 2005.
Hence, the regime may take risks to face a new crisis larger than that of 2009 when opposition candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi rejected the presidential election results that led to Ahmadinejad’s second term in office. The opposition cast doubt on the the impartiality of the Guardian Council, which vets elections.
3- Simultaneous Pressures. Iran currently is under regional and international pressures that could leave limited choices for the regime to deal with a new reality produced by an escalating conflict between internal political forces. The nuclear deal is now at a critical junction as the May 2018 deadline, set by U.S. President Donald Trump for making major changes to the nuclear deal, is approaching with no signs that such changes will be introduced.
Additionally, agreement between the United States and European states on how to deal with Iran has become ever wider, whether regarding the nuclear deal itself, the missile program or Iran’s interference in various regional crises. This reflected more evidently in the draft Security Council resolution, drafted by Britain in consultation with France and the United States on February 18, that condemned Iran’s failure to stop smuggling missiles to the Houthi rebels.
Although Russia, at the Council’s February 26 session, vetoed such condemnation, the drafting of the resolution by the three powers, sends out a strong message to Iran that its insistence to continue its current policies would entail consequences. This coincided with escalating tensions in relations between Iran and many regional countries over its support for terrorist organizations, interference in the internal affairs of other states and continuous threats to their security and stability.
4- Shaken Legitimacy. Any response to such initiatives will, maybe, impact the essence of Iran’s political regime. The reason is that it would give more significance and momentum to accusations of Iran’s insistence on using the what is called “engineering of elections”. As was the case in previous elections, the regime asks the Guardian Council to choose its preferable candidates while disapproving others who embrace views not in line with its policies.
It is noteworthy in this context that Ahmadinejad deliberately indicated this very mechanism in his open letter to the supreme leader in which he called for “free and fair elections without the 'engineering' of the Guardian Council, so the people have the right to choose.”
This is why the initiative faces a major dilemma because Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 2009 elections was questionable. Protesters disputed election, demanded a recount of all votes claiming they were rigged to enable the ex-president to win a second term.
The legitimacy of Ahmadinejad’s victory was questioned again by Abbas Kadkhodaei in response to the former president letter. His assertion that Ahmadinejad attempted to engineer the 2009 elections gives more significance to the accusations made by the Green Movement against the Iranian regime in the same year.
5- Political Interests. According to some views, the former president, through his ongoing attack on key figures in the regime, and the Larijani brothers Ali and Sadegh as well as President Rouhani in particular, seek to gain political ground in preparation of coming elections for the presidency and the Shura Council in 2020 and 2021.
Apparently, this would force the regime to use, once again, the Guardian Council’s way of the selective vetting process to prevent Ahmadinejad’s team from capitalizing on the current political developments and consolidate his influence again, after he used up all opportunities offered by the regime to prevent rebellion against its own political rules.
In light of this, it can possibly be said that the 2009 crisis and the 2017 protests continue to impose direct repercussions on interactions among Iranian political powers. This means that the regime has failed to deal with protests despite using all security and economic mechanisms, thus reducing its ability to render their recurrence less likely.
