Security and military institutions disintegrated and collapsed in a number of regional countries, paving the way for ISIS to seize control of large swathes of territory inside those states in the period from 2014 to 2017. Due to this situation, the role of armed organizations emerged and they became a reality and engaged in military action independently of states. 

For example, in Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces, also known as the Hashd al-Shaabi, were created after then-prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, in 2014, called for volunteers to take up arms against ISIS’ expanding influence in Iraq. Al-Maliki call was backed by a fatwa by the senior-most Shi’ite cleric Ali al-Sistani.

In Syria, the number of armed organizations is estimated to have grown to 1000, mostly fighting for different goals. Despite the defeat of ISIS, and increasing efforts to find political settlements to ongoing conflicts, no one can ignore the role of non-regular armed organizations, the influence they managed to impose and their gains. 

In addition, in Libya, various militias continue to expand, while in Yemen the Houthi militia is likely to stay in power for a long time. This trend imposes questions about the role of armed organizations in the post-ISIS era.

New Reality

States such as Syria and Iraq are facing a relatively new reality after the role of armed organizations in the war on ISIS came to an end, after the latter’s defeat. Moreover, there is a need to include these organizations in political settlements. Consequently, new, alternative and favorable roles are being considered for these organizations, as some of them managed to create their own-armed military forces and gain influence that cannot be ignored during conflicts. 

In Iraq, for instance, Shi’ite militias, and the Hashd al-Shaabi in particular, were able to maximize their military role during the war and show high combat capabilities emerging as a well-organized army, whose role cannot be reduced in later stages. Its success was enabled by its ability to create an image of itself as the most loyal fighters, who sacrificed themselves for Iraq.

Based on the current situation, resulting from new trends of conflicts in some states in the region, the future of armed organizations would be determined by either one of the following trajectories:

Being Under Control

1. Integration with State Structures: The option of integrating armed organizations into security institutions and regular armies is the most frequently and seriously proposed scenario in Iraq. That is because of challenges facing Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, including how to deal with armed groups and put the Hashd al-Shaabi in particular under control of the Iraqi government. Last December, al-Abadi said his government is working to integrate the Hashd al-Shaabi into the Iraqi armed forces, as per law, and put all arms under control of the government. 

In the same vein, Karim al-Nouri, a spokesperson of Hashd al-Shaabi, stated that the end of the war on ISIS does mean the end of terrorism, and that it is better to put the already-trained groups under the oversight of the government than leaving them at large. This is why, he added, we defend the idea of annexing these forces to the Iraqi national armed forces. 

However, the scenario of integration of armed organizations, and the Hashd al-Shaabi in particular, is facing the following challenges:

A- Increasing Burden on States. Al-Abadi’s decision in late 2016, to integrate a number of armed groups into the country’s regular armed forces, led to an increase in the government’s financial burden due to salaries and other commitments. It should be noted though that these armed groups operated individually and not as one homogenous force during the war.

B- Popular Rejection of Militias. Several segments of society believe that they were victims of crimes carried out by certain militias. This prevents the integration of involved militias into regular armies; especially due to sectarian violations committed by militias in liberated areas threaten the emergence of an internal sectarian crisis. 

C- Ideological differences and current conflicts between some armed organizations, or with ruling regimes, as is the case in Syria. A majority of these organizations in Syria unanimously refuse to leave the regime of Bashar Assad in power, which makes it difficult to integrate them into the Syrian regular army. 

Political Power

2. Transformation into Institutional Political Forces: More analyses have the view that transforming armed organizations into organized political forces is the optimal and likely option in the future. Signs of such options surfaced in Iraq, where the Hashd al-Shaabi is expected to run for the 2018 parliamentary elections and circumvent constitutional and legal caveats that prevent armed forces from running for elections and engaging in politics. 

Signs indicating this view include statements made by leaders of the Hashd al-Shaabi, including former spokesperson Ahmad al-Asadi who announced the formation of the “Coalition of the Mujahideen,” backed by former prime minister Nouri al-Malki. Head of the Hashd al-Shaabi, Faleh al-Fayyadh, also established a political party named “the Ataa Movement” that will run for the upcoming parliamentary elections. 

In this context, there are increasing concerns that the Shi’ite militias would block political transformation in Iraq, where they will be used by Iran as a center of influence after defeating ISIS. The political and military influence of the Hashd al-Shaabi is increasingly likely to grow, thanks to support from Iran. In addition, the militia has grown to become a 100,000-strong force, half the size of the Iraqi national army. Moreover, there is speculation that the militia would transform into a political force with a military wing, much like Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia. 

Merger of Militias

3. Merging into One Organization: No doubt, the scenario in which armed organizations fuse into one consistent entity is still possible, as was the case in conflict-hit Syria. The most prominent example in Syria is, the merging of Jaish al-Fatah, in 2015, with a group of the most powerful armed groups such as al-Nusra Front, Faylaq al-Sham and Ahrar ash-Sham. Soon after the merger, the new-armed entity was able to seize control of Idlib province, but quickly disintegrated and new attempt to unite again failed. 

The following factors make future mergers between armed organizations unlikely:

A- Ideological and faith-based differences between armed organizations make them more prone to conflict than unity. This is the case with groups adopting extremist religious ideology and revolution-oriented groups.

B- Seeking broader influence. Long-running conflicts push armed organizations, which already seized control of swathes of territory, to raise their expectations and ambitions.

C- Ensuring continuous foreign support. This drives some armed organizations in a certain state to reject mergers with others. The reason is that they fight to serve the interests of foreign states, which may conflict with the interests of other states supporting rival armed groups. 

Battlefield Flare-up 

4. Escalating Violence between Armed Organizations: In this scenario, conflict creates a new wave of internal instability in involved states, especially amid the armed organizations’ attempts to make gains and consolidate influence. In this sense, reasons behind failed merger attempts are also behind intensifying violence among armed organizations, especially in Syria due to their wide differences in terms of views and ideology. This is what makes their continued conflict over influence the most likely scenario. 

Conditional Shifts

Overall, there is no “one scenario fits all” for the future of armed organizations in conflicts in the Middle East. Potential trajectories for the Houthis in Yemen, armed organizations operating in Libya, the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and paramilitary organizations in Syria, do vary depending on the situations, options and developments. These include rivalry between armed organizations, their confrontations with regular armies, support received from regional and international powers, the ability of these organizations to cope with new situations and play alternative roles that can be imposed by the process of “ripening the conflict” in involved states.