ISIS will not be definitely defeated as long as the Syrian-Iraqi border remains an ungoverned space: On December 11, the Iraqi Army started to reinforce border security with Syria, deploying more soldiers and border guards on the road linking al-Qaim (al-Anbar) to Rubia (Nineveh).[1] However, only the military and political inclusion of the Arab Sunni community into Iraq’s institutions, and in the future state of Syria, will consolidate these achievements, cleaning the last pockets of jihadi resistance. 

Patchwork Security

The so-called Caliphate has lost all its main cities in Syria and Iraq. However, jihadists have been relocating in the outskirts: The Syrian-Iraqi border represents the birthplace of ISIS, as previously was for al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Given the extreme adaptability demonstrated by the jihadi galaxy so far, it is anticipated that a new reconfiguration of ISIS could resurge, like a phoenix, in the medium-term, from this permeable border area.

Looking at current developments in Baghdad and Damascus, this appears to be one of the most probable scenarios. Notwithstanding different trajectories, Syria and Iraq, as state entities, experience a crisis of political legitimacy. After six years of civil war, Syria’s geographic sovereignty (the same of 2011 in terms of administrative boundaries) can’t be translated into real political sovereignty, since regional and international stakeholders with competing goals have agreed de facto on separated, although still interdependent, spheres of influence.

Both in Iraq and Syria, “patchwork security” has become the rule. As a matter of fact, sovereignty erosion and state fragmentation favor locally-based security agreements instead of comprehensive, national frameworks. Moreover, the coexistence, and sometimes cooperation, between regular security forces and armed non-state actors multiplies the variety of security providers on the same territory, leaving room for hybrid security experiences of combat. De-escalation zones in Syria, as well as the anti-ISIS military campaign in Iraq, are clear examples of the “patchwork security” trend.[2]

Imperative of Sunni Integration

This slippery reality affects the Syrian-Iraqi border, fostering the involvement of foreign and/or transnational players: The causes of the Sunni Arab insurgency have not been solved, whether in Iraq nor in Syria. Since 2014, the situation has only worsened along the border. A serious reconstruction plan can’t be delayed, as the number of internal displaced peoples (IDPs) skyrocketed due to war and unrest, while the provision of security services is not able to reach peripheral areas. Moreover, Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias are now present also in predominantly-Sunni provinces of Iraq, as well as the Bashar al-Assad’s army in Eastern Syria (Deir el-Zor).

Therefore, the risk of new insurgencies remains high on the Syrian-Iraqi border. Not to forget that the Arab Sunni protest movement against central Iraq’s institutions, started on December 2012 in al-Anbar[3], paved the way for ISIS’s territorial and military impressive escalation. Thus, before counter-terrorism, the stabilization of the border is firstly about devolution of powers and military integration, welfare and job opportunities.

The great interdependence between Eastern Syria and Western Iraq makes things even more complicated. Historically, Badia and Jazira represent a lone human space with high internal cohesion, almost an “ecosystem” with own patterns and rules: Tribes, most of Bedouin origins, are tied by cross-border linkages of blood and marriage, plus economic and commercial interests. During the Iraq war, fighters and weapons from Syria used to reach Iraq; then, due to the Syrian civil war, they have followed the opposite path, from Iraq to Syria.

Patronage Relations

From a geopolitical perspective, regional and international players have different, often conflicting ideas with regard to Syrian and Iraqi border provinces. Looking at this permeable frontier, external penetration is likely to ignite local tensions: Foreign powers’ involvement means “patronage” rather than “aid”, since external help is related to patron-client dynamics. This is especially true for the Arab Sunni community (or better “communities” given the internal fragmentation)[4], who has always seek for sponsorship in order to cope with political marginalization.

Iran aims to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state, an objective shared by Turkey: Al-Hasaka (on the Turkish-Syrian border) and Nineveh (on the Iraqi-Syrian border) governorates are the linchpin of Kurds’ independence ambitions. Yet, Teheran is also interested in downplaying Arab Sunni governance’s attempts along the Syrian-Iraqi border. It is willing to maintain the “Shi’ite corridor” open, connecting Iran to the Mediterranean Sea through Southern Iraq (Basra), Damascus and the Hezbollah-controlled Southern Lebanon. As a matter of fact, the “Shi’ite corridor” encompasses the previous “useful Syria” concept (al-Suriya al-mufida, i.e. the triangle Damascus-Homs-Latakia), thus consolidating the Iranian influence on the Levant.

With regard to Syria and Iraq, the key Turkish goal is to impede the establishment of a Kurdish nation-state. Beyond tight economic relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara tried to impose its military presence in Nineveh: In the first half of 2017, this provoked frictions between Iraq and Turkey, especially when Baghdad blamed the former Mosul governor Athil al-Nujaifi’s militia (the Ankara-trained Hashd al-Watani, then rebranded Haras Ninawa) of having allowed Turkish troops to enter and station at the Bashiqa base.[5] Turkey also justifies its actions in Iraq due to the protection of the Sunni Turkmen minority.

Turkey and the Arab Gulf states compete for outreach vis-à-vis Sunni communities in Syria and mostly Iraq, even though Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been stressing Arab nationalism’s role into Iraqi politics, for instance opening also to Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shi’ite leader who opposes the Iranian expansion in Iraq. However, unlike Ankara, Riyadh can claim ancient, transnational tribal linkages with Euphrates’ clans[6] (Shammar, Dulaimi, Jibbouri, Oubaid, Zubaid): Restoring reliable connections with Jazira and Badia’s shuyyukh would be relatively easy for the Saudis. However, inter-tribal and, most of all, intra-tribal balances have deeply changed. Several Iraqi and Syrian Sunni tribes supported ISIS, as well as some Syrian Sunni tribes cooperated with the al-Assad’s army against jihadists (Deir el-Zor).[7] These events contributed to furtherly widen the legitimacy gap between many shuyyukh and their tribal bases, already eroded by decades of cooptation and patronage operated by central governments.

Since Baghdad declared ISIS defeated (as territorial entity), Russia and the United States’ strategic interests amid Syria and Iraq are going to become more and more conflicting, waiting for 2018 Iraq’s general elections. Moscow, who has just announced a troop drawdown in Syria, aims to consolidate influence on the Eastern Mediterranean coast: Notwithstanding differences, Russians and Iranians both focus on Western Syria (see Moscow’s new air base in Hmeimim, Homs and the naval one in Tartus). Looking at the American strategy, not only Washington was unable to challenge the Astana framework (Russia, Iran and Turkey), but the Trump administration decided to end covert support for Syrian opposition groups. This opens a new security vacuum. The US renounce to contain the Iranian influence on the ground, as well as to counter the ascendance of al-Qa‘ida’s affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) along the de-escalation zone of the Syrian-Jordanian border,[8] while tensions are likely to grow in Raqqa's Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) between Arabs and Kurds, not for the ethnic cleavage (see People's Protection Units-YPG and Shammar tribe cooperation), but rather for the struggle on energy resources.[9]

Military integration remains an unavoidable step in order to build stability between Syria and Iraq. In Iraq, the National Guard act (Qanoon al-Haras al-Watani) didn’t pass, mirroring competing regional views of military reform.[10].. But this project would be a useful way to include the Arab Sunnis into the regular military, counterbalancing the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, Hashd al-Shaabi). What would be the future for local Sunni fighters who joined ISIS for salary and protection, especially on the border, or for the small number of Sunnis who enrolled in the PMF to fight ISIS? This point gains new prominence now that Iranian proxies are increasing their positioning along the border, thus in predominantly Sunni areas, favoring potential clashes.[11] As a result, the Syrian-Iraqi border will be decisive for the fate of Iraq and Syria’s stabilization, or it could turn into a highway for the resurgence of violence.

The author thanks Dr. Andrea Plebani for commenting on the article.