أخبار المركز
  • سعيد عكاشة يكتب: (كوابح التصعيد: هل يصمد اتفاق وقف النار بين إسرائيل ولبنان بعد رحيل الأسد؟)
  • نشوى عبد النبي تكتب: (السفن التجارية "النووية": الجهود الصينية والكورية الجنوبية لتطوير سفن حاويات صديقة للبيئة)
  • د. أيمن سمير يكتب: (بين التوحد والتفكك: المسارات المُحتملة للانتقال السوري في مرحلة ما بعد الأسد)
  • د. رشا مصطفى عوض تكتب: (صعود قياسي: التأثيرات الاقتصادية لأجندة ترامب للعملات المشفرة في آسيا)
  • إيمان الشعراوي تكتب: (الفجوة الرقمية: حدود استفادة إفريقيا من قمة فرنسا للذكاء الاصطناعي 2025)

The Cautious Observer

23 نوفمبر، 2017


Israeli estimates vary over the repercussions of the resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his direct accusations to Iran and Hezbollah of attempting to assassinate him. Some estimates confirm that there are potential opportunities to be exploited, to exert pressure on Iran, and to curb Hezbollah’s political role. In contrast, other estimates warn against the growing Iranian role in the Middle East, the prospect of a military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, and the pressure on Israel to make concessions to revive the peace process.

Weighing Opportunities

Hariri’s resignation sparked multiple reactions in Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commented on the resignation in a brief statement issued during his visit to London. “The resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and his statements are a wake-up call for the international community to act against Iranian aggression”, Netanyahu said, adding that Iran was “trying to turn Syria into a second Lebanon. This aggression not only endangers Israel, but the entire Middle East”.

In this context, some Israeli analysts argue that the Lebanese crisis provides Israel with opportunities to eradicate Hezbollah and counter Iran’s threats, which can be explained as follows:

1-Exerting pressures on Iran: the current crisis could ramp up international pressures on Iran to force it to enter negotiations aimed at putting restrictions on its missile tests. Israel is trying to capitalize on the current escalation against Iran and Hezbollah to address what it described as the mistakes of the major powers when they concluded an agreement with Iran, two years ago, to put restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. Israel believes that the agreement did not include imposing similar restrictions on Iranian missile tests, although they fall within the logistical elements of the Iranian nuclear program.

Israel used the Iranian-backed Houthi’s launch of a missile towards Saudi Arabia in conjunction with Hariri’s resignation, to highlight the need to put restrictions on the Iranian missile tests, saying they pose threats not only to Israel, but to the entire world. They further argued that Iran’s pursuit of establishing military bases in Syria and sophisticated military industries in Lebanon, demonstrate its desire to exploit the delicate security balances in the Middle East. In this regard, Israel prefers to resort to international cooperation to roll back the Iranian threats, rather than dealing with it on their own, which could lead to a large-scale regional war.

2- Isolating Hezbollah: Israel expects that the crisis will enable it to isolate Hezbollah internally in Lebanon to the point of denying it from participation in the government that will be formed after Hariri’s resignation. The accusations levelled against Hezbollah in the assassination attempt will lead the Sunni community to refuse Hezbollah’s participation in the government, whether under the leadership of Hariri or any other person of their community.

Risk Assessment

On the other hand, some analysts are concerned that the crisis may have an adverse effect and increase the influence of Hezbollah and Iran. It could lead to military strikes against Israel, and Israel might be forced to search for regional allies, compelling it to sit at the table the negotiations again, which can be explained as follows:

1-Enhance the Iranian influence: economic and political pressures on Lebanon to curb Hezbollah may offer an opportunity to increase Iran’s role under the pretext of compensating Lebanon economically, which would enhance the position of Hezbollah in the Lebanese equation rather than exclude or limit it, posing a serious threat to Israel and may push to it to launch a preemptive war against Hezbollah. 

2-Trigger military confrontation: Hezbollah may seize on this crisis and try to divert the attention away from the accusations made against it of launching a military strike against Israel. Hezbollah is seeking to regain its lost popularity in the Arab and Islamic countries due to its transformation from a resistance movement -allegedly-against Israel to a military wing of Iran in the sectarian clash between Sunnis and Shi'ites in the Muslim world. This was confirmed by the position paper written by Eldad Shavit, and Yoel Guzansky, two Israeli analysts at the Institute of Israeli National Security Studies. The authors argue that the attempt to pull Hezbollah out of the government in Lebanon by direct accusations -that it achieves Iran’s goal of destabilizing the region- could backfire and might lead to bolstering Aoun-Nasrallah alliance.

3- Mounting external pressures: Israel’s attempt to cooperate with some regional states to counter the Iranian threats will lead to a renewed talk of the need for Israel to deal positively with the Arab Peace Initiative, which requires Israel to withdraw fully to 1967 borders in return for peace and comprehensive normalization with the Arabs.

In light of Netanyahu government’s unwillingness to end its occupation of the Palestinian territories, in order to maintain its security, and the power of the settlement groups, the price that Israel will be asked to pay in return for concluding any understanding on how to counter the Iranian threat will not be less than reviving the Arab initiative first. This could jeopardize the stability of the current Israeli government and could also increase the U.S. pressures on Israel to respond to the Arab initiative as a necessary step to unite regional efforts against the Iranian threat.

4- Exacerbate regional complexities: Indirect developments in the region can coalesce with the current crisis, putting Israel into a political and military impasse. Noteworthy, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks in November 2017 that his country has not pledged to ensure the withdrawal of troops loyal to Iran from Syria, describing Iran’s presence in Syria as “legitimate”. Moreover, Yossi Melman, a security analyst in Ma'ariv newspaper described the Russian Foreign Minister’s remarks as a bombshell that was dropped on the Israeli political and military leadership.

5-Threats of reprisals: Palestinian Jihad Movement may take advantage of the tension in the region to strike a retaliatory blow to Israel amid the underground tunnel's bombing by the Israeli troops at the end of October, killing 12 people from its cadres. If this happens, Israel is expected to react violently against Gaza Strip. The situation may develop into a massive war with Hamas and even with the Palestinian Authority itself, drawing broad international condemnation against Israel. Thus, the pressure on Iran and Hezbollah will ease and the opportunity to confront the Iranian missile threats to Israel will be lost.

Costs without Returns

Israeli analyses did not outweigh a specific scenario for the development of the current crisis in Lebanon, but stressed the need to exercise restraint and avoid being involved in any official positions at present. Israeli leadership would rather focus on monitoring the Iranian moves in Syria and Hezbollah moves in Lebanon, to ensure that no Iranian military bases are established inside Syria or military industries for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In this respect, the Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman warned that the Israeli army would deal with the situation in Syria and Lebanon in line with its security estimates, and will not permit the Russian and Iranian presence in Syria to stop confronting what it considers as a threat to Israel’s security. Lieberman’s threats apply to the other parties too. This means that Israel will not allow Hezbollah to exploit the preoccupation with the Lebanese crisis to impose a fait accompli situation that threatens Israeli security.

Accordingly, Israel is clearly keen to avoid opening a confrontation front with Hezbollah or Iran in Syria now for fear of being implicated in a war that will appear to the Israeli public opinion as incurred costs with no returns.