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How Would Iran Deal with Trump’s Nuclear Deal Review?

08 مايو، 2017


Despite the continued escalation between Iran and the United States, the situation has not forced Iran to rush into hasty decisions to respond to President Donald Trump’s latest directives. As per the April 19, 2017 directives, the US National Security Council will undertake a full review of the Iran nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and assess whether the removal of sanctions is in the US national interest. 

Iran’s stance was obviously reflected by statements delivered by Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, in which he stated, “do not pay much attention to Trump’s words.” This indicates that Tehran prefers to postpone taking any new decisions that might affect the implementation of the nuclear agreement until the end of the three-month deadline set by Trump. 

Multiple Considerations

Perhaps, it can be said that due to several factors, Iran refrained from rushing into responding to the recent escalation, despite the fact that there are indications that President Trump might very well pursue choices other than Washington staying in the deal. This was evidenced in Trump’s statement on April 29, 2017, in which he stressed that the nuclear deal was bad for US interests because it negatively affects the US economy. This means he prejudged the assessment that the national security agencies are due to present within the 90-day deadline 

The first factor is that decision-making circles in Iran believe that the US President still faces several difficulties in passing his executive orders, contrary to expectations before he assumed office. This could mean that his threats may not be materialized, especially because of the negative consequences that such moves can impose on US interests. 

For instance, his threats to pull out of the nuclear deal will not be easy to carry out, due to its potential impacts that would include, but are not be limited to, straining Washington’s relations with the involved world powers, that have an interest in continued compliance with the nuclear deal. The impacts can also include an increasing possibility that Iran would continue to revive development of its nuclear program. This possibility can impose no easy dangers, especially because Washington’s withdrawal from the deal would mean revival of threats of military action against Iran. Such threats would push Iran once again to reactivaate the military aspect of its nuclear program.

Iranian decision-making circles appear to be relying on the fact that an assessment of the first 100 days of the Trump presidency indicates that the president was able to carry out only a few of his orders due to the obvious existing gap between his ambitions and obstacles on the ground. 

Open-ended Conflicts

A second factor is that the US Administration was involved into open-ended disagreements with world powers, such as North Korea, especially after the Asian country had made several escalatory powerful moves. These moves, according to the Iranian view, forced Washington to refrain from the risk of taking firm and critical decisions on some issues, such as the nuclear deal with Iran, at least for the time being. 

In light of the above, the most likely possibility could be that the US Administration would opt for ratcheting up US sanctions against Iran to target more influential entities to impact the Iranian economy. Such escalated sanctions would be unlike the current sanctions in place that focus on individuals and international entities that are focused on transferring sensitive technology to Iran. 

Unclear Policies

The third factor revolves around the uncertainty and lack of clarity of the US policy on certain regional issues such as the crisis in Syria. That is, the US Administration has not yet decided a definitive position on the future of the regime and on the current talks between the regime and the opposition that were launched in early May. This would mean that the US vision for the conflict in Syria continues to be incomplete, which is evidenced, according to several views, in recent contradictory statements delivered by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley.

Critical Timing

It is understood that the internal circumstances that had pushed Iran into embracing this stance revolve around Tehran’s preoccupation with the upcoming presidential elections due on May 19, 2017. Competition between candidates was heightened in the first TV debate between the six rivals. Severe disagreements and heated discussions occurred, in particular between Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf - the nominee of the so-called Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces (also known as JAMNA) and current Mayor of Tehran - and incumbent President Hassan Rouhani and Eshaq Jahangiri Kouhshahi, the first Vice President of Hassan Rouhani’s government.

In light of the above, making a definitive decision in response to the recent US escalation will hinge on the identity of the next Iranian president, whether it is Rouhani, who is seeking a second presidential term, or his rival from JAMNA, Ebrahim Raisi – the conservative leader of the Asran-e Quds Razavi charity and the custodian of the holy shrine of the eighth Shiite imam, or Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The results of the elections will be a powerful indicator to the trajectory that Iran will pursue to deal with the recent US escalation. That is, if Rouhani emerges as winner - which remains a possibility- Iran would continue to be keen on continuing the implementation of the nuclear deal even if the United States continues its escalation. However, if another candidate - particularly one from the fundamentalist conservatives of the JAMNA - wins the elections and becomes a president, Iran would have to brace for tougher options in the coming period, and even have to make more severe escalatory decisions to counter pressures from the United States. 

Pending Results

Nevertheless, what stands out in this context is that there are views in Iran that the US Administration decision to extend the 90-day review of the nuclear deal was aimed at assessing the policy that Iran would pursue after a new Iranian president is elected. In other words, these views believe that the Trump Administration's calculations include the identity of the next Iranian president as a variable that would influence Washington’s policies on the nuclear agreement and other issues with Iran, such as Iran’s role in the crises in both Yemen and Syria. 

Hence, the keen interest of some Iranian media organizations to publish reports suggesting that there are views inside the United States denying the Iranian fundamentalist conservatives a chance to win the elections might contribute to pressuring the reformist camp led by President Hassan Rouhani to block his efforts to secure a second presidential term.