The declaration made on March 2, 2017 by the Sahara branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Mourabitoon, Ansar Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front regarding the establishment of a new terrorist alliance Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) indicates that Al-Qaeda is strengthening its presence in West Africa. The appointment of Iyad Ag Ghaly, Ansar Dine’s previous Emir, as the new leader, reveals Al-Qaeda’s new strategy. It seeks to gain influence and carry out attacks in the Sahel and Sahara regions. This move is mainly to strike against ISIS, Al-Qaeda’s main competitor, and the forces involved in the war on terror. At the forefront of these forces is France, which launched a military operation to oust elements of these organizations from northern Mali in the beginning of 2013.
This new terrorist alliance moved quickly to implement a surprise attack on a military site in Mali close to the border with Burkina Faso on March 5, 2017. This has resulted in the death of 11 soldiers from Mali and terrorists seizing military equipment.
Striking Timing
It appears that for some time, Al-Qaeda has been seeking an opportunity to form broader alliances between terrorist organizations loyal to it. The group wants to enhance its ability to combat the rising pressures given the military operations launched by various international and regional forces involved in the war on terrorism.
It is important to note that these sub-groups have been eager to enhance coordination and cooperation among themselves recently. The Macina Liberation Front and Ansar Dine are two evident examples. Leaders of these groups, such as Amadou Kouffa and Iyad Ag Ghaly controlled broad areas in northern Mali in 2012 before French forces launched a military operation to remove terrorist organizations from those zones in 2013.
However, this step was only taken following the recent developments witnessed by the region. It is worth noting that Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen was formed less than a month after five West African countries (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso) took new steps to establish a joint military force in order to combat terrorism due to an escalation in terrorist activities and their proliferation in the area.
This also coincided with France’s efforts to strengthen its military presence on the border between Mali and Niger, following the occurrence of various terrorist attacks that targeted the Niger Armed Forces. Most recently, there was an attack on a military patrol on February 24, 2017, which led to the death of 15 soldiers.
Moreover, this new step comes as part of efforts by terrorist organizations, especially those loyal to Al-Qaeda, to jumpstart their role to ensure a declining ISIS sphere of influence in various countries of the region. This is indicated in statements made by a member of the Shura Council of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Abu Hisham Abu Akram, in January 2017 in which he noted “it is safe to say that ISIS has lost its brand value and structure in Algeria.”
Several Challenges
Nevertheless, the new, recently formed terrorist alliance faces several challenges, most notably:
1. Sharing Influence: The terrorist organizations that formed this alliance did not agree on a method for internal influence sharing, which may expand the scope of disputes among them in the coming period. It appears at first glance that Ansar Dine will have a prominent role within the alliance due to their large number of fighters and their ability to attract tribal support. However, the group is particularly effective in the cities of northern Mali, thus they may not be accepted by other Al-Qaeda organizations that aim to widen their own roles and influence. In addition, some of the sub-groups claim to have significant combat and organizational expertise. This applies especially to Al Mourabitoon which, according to several reports, has groups of fighters that have successfully carried out previous attacks, such as the In Amenas attack in Algeria in January 2013.
Moreover, the new alliance includes prominent terrorists who took on leadership roles within organizations, such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of Al Mourabitoon, who insists on adopting a policy of flexible alliances between terrorist organizations. This has raised doubts within various organizations that joined Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin regarding its ability to adhere to the alliance and not split from it.
2. Al-Qaeda Rift: Several reports indicate the reluctance of other Al-Qaeda organizations to participate in the announcement of the new alliance. This reveals a lack of unified support within Al-Qaeda regarding this new step, especially on part of organizations such as the Uqba bin Nafi Battalion. This rift could result in hampering any efforts made to expand understandings and coordination among these organizations in the coming phase.
3. Ag Ghaly’s Aspirations: The choice of Iyad Ag Ghaly to lead the new alliance may escalate the severity of conflicts within the group, especially in light of his tendency for consolidating power or establishing new spheres of influence. This could represent a new point of contention with various other Al-Qaeda leaders, such as Abdelmalek Droukdel, also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, commander of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Accordingly, the new alliance’s survival could be threatened during the next phase.
4. Ideological Contradictions: It is notable that the new alliance includes various organizations with ideologies that vary significantly. Both Al Mourabitoon and the Sahara Emirate lean toward a cross-border Al-Qaeda, whereas Ansar Dine, despite their proximity to Al-Qaeda, has granted priority to its local agenda and goals and aim to establish an Islamic Emirate for the Tuareg in northern Mali. On the other hand, the Macina Liberation Front is an ethnic tribal movement that aims to exploit the crisis faced by the Fulani people in order to expand the front’s scope of influence, but with jihadist overtones.
These challenges cannot be easily neutralized in order to diminish the new alliance’s ability to persist and remain cohesive during the next phase, especially in light of the notable disparity in ideologies within these organizations. This reality could escalate because of the continuing military operations these organizations have been subjected to.
