Following Iran's extensive missile attack on three Israeli military bases on October 1st, 2024, Israel's carefully calibrated response, coordinated with Washington to prevent a wider conflict, arrived 26 days later. This response, launched in the early morning of October 26th, 2024, aimed to balance multiple objectives: saving face for all involved parties—from Iran and Israel to the Democratic Party ahead of the November 5th US presidential election—while demonstrating resolve. The Israeli strikes targeted 20 Iranian military sites, including air defense bases (especially those equipped with four Russian-made S-300 systems) and solid rocket fuel production lines. Prime Minister Netanyahu framed this limited response as "painful and precise," satisfying his far-right coalition by punishing Tehran for the unprecedented October 1st attack (approximately 200 Iranian ballistic missiles). Simultaneously, Iran was able to portray the damage as minimal, reporting only four soldier deaths and highlighting the effectiveness of its air defenses, despite Israel's claims of their destruction.
The limited nature of the Israeli attack served the interests of the current US administration and the Democratic presidential candidate, as a large-scale Middle Eastern war would have been highly detrimental in the run-up to the election. Washington further implicitly claimed credit for persuading Tel Aviv to avoid targeting Iranian nuclear facilities and oil wells.
However, several key questions remain unanswered, and the factors driving Israel's restrained response require further examination. Will Iran retaliate, as suggested by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi? What new strategic dynamics and calculations have this attack introduced, and how might these reshape the future of the Middle East?
1- Limited Capabilities Compared to Targets
Speculation preceded the Israeli attack on Iran that Tel Aviv might target Iran's four major nuclear reactors (Bushehr, Natanz, Arak, and Fordow). However, several factors prevented such a drastic action:
a. A lack of necessary capabilities:
Israel lacked the necessary 32,000-pound bombs to destroy Iran's deeply buried underground nuclear facilities. This deficiency, coupled with a reported U.S. refusal to provide such weapons (as cited by Axios), prevented a more forceful response. These heavier bombs are significantly different from the 2,000-pound munitions used in previous Israeli operations, such as the assassinations of Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine. Furthermore, Israel's lack of long-range strategic bombers, unlike the U.S. B-52s used in Yemen, further limited its options.
b. Geographical factors:
Geographical factors significantly favored Iran. The 1,800+ kilometer distance between Israel and Iran forced Israeli F-35s to carry lighter bomb loads in favor of increased fuel capacity for the return journey. An Israeli military statement indicated the use of approximately 100 cruise missiles, mainly launched from F-35s operating near Iran's western border; these aircraft did not penetrate Iranian airspace. This explains the concentration of Israeli strikes in western and southwestern Iran, excluding central, eastern, and northeastern regions. The location of the Arak, Natanz, and Fordow reactors deep within Iran's vast 1.6 million square kilometer territory, made penetrating further into Iranian airspace too risky for Israeli aircraft.
c. Avoiding significant repercussions:
The decision to avoid targeting the Bushehr nuclear plant was driven by concerns about significant repercussions. Attacking the plant risked harming neighboring Gulf countries and the 30,000+ U.S. military personnel in the region through potential nuclear fallout. Furthermore, Israel aimed to prevent Iran from escalating its nuclear program. U.S. intelligence assessments indicated that such an attack could trigger a shift from Iran's seemingly peaceful nuclear program to weapons development, potentially involving an increase in uranium enrichment from 60% to the 90% needed for a nuclear weapon.
2- Avoiding the Targeting of Oil Facilities
Israel heeded U.S. advice and refrained from targeting Iranian oil infrastructure, including oil fields, storage tanks in Abadan, and refineries near the Arabian Gulf. Several U.S. newspapers, such as The Washington Post, reported on this decision, citing the following reasons:
a. Fear of soaring oil prices:
The decision to avoid targeting Iranian oil facilities was partly motivated by the fear of soaring oil prices. An attack could have driven prices to record highs, impacting fuel costs in the U.S. just before the election, potentially harming Kamala Harris' political standing.
b. Iranian targeting of Israeli gas fields:
Iran's pre-emptive threat to target Israeli gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean influenced the decision. Israeli assessments indicated that Iran's geographically dispersed oil facilities could absorb the impact of strikes more effectively than Israel's concentrated gas fields and oil facilities (spanning an area of only 120 kilometers).
3- U.S. “Red Lines”
The Israeli adherence to U.S. "red lines," a first since October 7, 2023, reflects President Biden's repeated public statements opposing strikes on Iranian nuclear reactors or oil facilities. Israel likely sought to avoid embarrassing the White House, which cautioned against expanding targets to prevent a wider regional conflict that could jeopardize Kamala Harris' election prospects. This concern stemmed from a desire to avoid repeating the 2016 "Bernie Sanders scenario," where divisions within the Democratic Party lowered voter turnout and contributed to Trump's victory. Democrats feared a similar outcome; a wider Middle Eastern conflict could alienate progressive voters supporting Sanders and Warren, potentially damaging their chances in the 2024 election.
4- Neutralizing Air Defense
According to The Wall Street Journal, the Israeli response included strikes on four Russian-made S-300 air defense systems acquired by Iran in 2016. This followed a prior Israeli drone strike on April 19th targeting the command-and-control center of these systems in Isfahan, retaliating for an Iranian attack on April 13th. Verification of Israel's claim that these systems were destroyed would indicate a significant weakening of Iranian air defenses, potentially facilitating future Israeli operations.
5- Neutrality of Regional Players
Arab states presented a united front, refusing to allow either Israel or Iran to utilize their airspace, especially those nations along potential Israeli flight paths to Iran. Maintaining strict neutrality, they prioritized peace and stability, actively rejecting any escalation. Their refusal to allow their territory or airspace to be used for attacks was clearly demonstrated by Iraq's October 28th, 2024, formal protest to the UN, condemning Israel's use of Iraqi airspace. This sent a strong message to both Israel and Iran: the region desired de-escalation and wished to avoid entanglement in wider, unpredictable conflicts.
6- Messages to Russia
Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi's claim of U.S. complicity in the Israeli attack, through airspace facilitation, is supported by reports from numerous U.S. media outlets. These reports indicate Iran was preparing to supply Russia with thousands of ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine. The destruction of Iranian ballistic missile fuel production lines thus served a dual purpose: weakening Iran's capabilities while simultaneously hindering the potential arms deal with Russia. The targeting of drone storage facilities further underscored this message to Russia, a recipient of thousands of Iranian drones according to officials like Jake Sullivan. The subsequent U.S. media leak regarding Russian intelligence sharing with Iran about Israeli and U.S. movements shortly before the attack adds another layer to this complex scenario.
7- Weakening Iran's Allies
The targeting of Iranian ballistic missile and drone production facilities is likely to disrupt the flow of these weapons to various regional allies and proxies. Groups such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza could experience shortages. Similarly, Iranian partners in Iraq and Syria may also face disruptions in arms supply. The full impact on these supply lines will be clearer in the coming weeks.
8- A Window for Diplomacy
The Iranian attacks on Israel (April 13th and October 1st, 2024), along with Israel's response, appear to have created a shared understanding among all parties—including Tehran, its allies, Tel Aviv, and Washington—that an end to the ongoing conflict is necessary. This situation presents a significant opportunity for diplomacy, specifically focusing on achieving short-term ceasefires in Gaza (currently under discussion in Cairo and Doha) and initiating talks to resolve the conflict in southern Lebanon. This latter effort is particularly promising due to the unanimous acceptance by all Lebanese parties of UN Resolution 1701 without any amendments.
9- Iran's Non-Response
Iran's public narrative surrounding the Israeli attack emphasizes the limited nature and ultimate failure of the strikes, highlighting the effectiveness of Iranian defense systems. This suggests a potential strategy of non-retaliation, particularly given that the Israeli attack avoided key targets such as high-profile individuals, nuclear facilities, and oil fields.
10- A New Approach for the Day After
The mutual strikes between Tel Aviv and Tehran revealed the fragility of regional security, signaling the need to seek a new approach to prevent future conflicts in the region. Existing strategies have clearly proven inadequate to ensure the safety and security of the region's nations and populations.
