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How are Iran’s Conservatives Preparing for Presidential Elections?

01 مايو، 2017


Iranian fundamental conservatives seek to enhance the chances of one of their candidates in winning the 12th presidential elections, due on May 19, 2017. Apparently, this political current learned much from the previous election when the moderates led by incumbent president Hassan Rouhani overwhelmingly defeated it. This occurred after the conservatives’ main political forces failed to agree on one candidate and to form a political framework with clear binding rules. Eventually, four of the candidates - Saeed Jalili, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Ali Akbar Velayati and Mohsen Rezaee- ran in the 2013 elections refusing to withdraw in favor of each other. Their insistence to stay until the end was one of the main reasons why Rouhani was able to settle the race in his favor winning more than 50 per cent of votes.

New Framework

Hence, some fundamental conservative forces formed the so-called Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces (known by its Persian acronym JAMNA). They agreed to develop a list of five candidates and that four of the candidates should withdraw from the presidential race a few days before it starts in favor of the fifth unity candidate. This is primarily to increase his chances in winning the election, and attract the Front’s popular support base while neutralizing the moderate’ ability to take advantage of internal division among its political forces, as they did in the previous elections.

On April 6, 2017, JAMNA, through internal elections involving more than 4000 members, selected five figures as prospective presidential nominees. Conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi, the leader of the Asran-e Quds Razavi charity and the custodian of the holy shrine of the eighth Shiite imam, won the internal elections with 2147 votes. On the other hand, Alireza Zakani, a former lawmaker, received 1546 votes. Mehrdad Bazrpash, a former parliamentarian, received 1404 votes, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (1373 votes) and Parviz Fattah, a former Minister of Energy, won the third, fourth and fifth places, respectively. 

Filtering by the Guardian Council of the Constitution

However, what stood out in this context is that three nominees could not pass the rigorous qualification procedures at the Guardian Council of the Constitution. This Council is the body that is tasked with vetting hopefuls, deciding who can run in the elections and overseeing legislation and laws enacted by the Consultative Assembly (parliament or Majlis) and decide their compliance to the constitution. On April 20, 2017, the Council qualified only six candidates of which two were nominated by JAMNA: Ebrahim Raisi and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

This move in particular indicates that the Guardian Council of the Constitution had several reservations about the activities and political orientations of the fundamental conservative current, and even had deliberately made the move to avoid being accused of siding with it. This was evidenced by the Council’s decision to disqualify some moderate candidates including Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani, a brother of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president who died on January 8, 2017. Moreover, the Council rejected the candidacy of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his former Vice President for Executive Affairs Hamid Baghaei.  

Polarization

Based on the above, it can be said that the candidate mapping positions for those qualified by the Guardian Council of the Constitution indicate polarization between the two currents, each of which had three candidates who managed to pass through the “filtering process” of the Council. Nevertheless, these positions may not be final because some candidates may possibly withdraw from the elections shortly before the race begins.

For instance, Eshaq Jahangiri Kouhshahi, the first Vice President of Hassan Rouhani's government, may withdraw to enhance Rouhani’s chances in winning a second term. Moreover, one of JAMNA’s nominees would withdraw in favor of another. Several reports indicate that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the conservative politician, former military officer, current Mayor of Tehran and former Iran's Chief of police from 2000 to 2005 and commander of Revolutionary Guards' Air Force from 1997 to 2000, may decide not to stay in the race to increase the chances of Ebrahim Raisi. Ghalibaf’s could do that despite that this would not negate the fact that there are views inside the conservative current that voice fears over possible disagreements among their political factions before elections kick off. This is especially evidenced by the fact that Ghalibaf refused to withdraw from the previous 2013 presidential elections in favor of Ali Akbar Velayati who in turn refused to leave the race in favor of Ghalibaf. Their mutual refusal was a main reason why they were defeated by Rouhani from the first round.

Furthermore, some fundamental conservative political forces are putting pressure on Mostafa Mir-Salim, of the Islamic Coalition Party, to withdraw in favor of JAMNA’s candidates. However, it appears that the former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance has not yet yielded to pressure, especially after he was ousted from JAMNA’s preliminary list of candidates. 

Opportunity for Conservatives

Without a doubt, the Guardian Council of the Constitution deliberately disqualified  Ahmadinejad from the elections because, in the view of clerics and the conservatives, he had made a “grave mistake” when he defied the will of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei "advised" the former president not run in the election and this mistake can potentially play into the hands of the conservative current. 

Ahmadinejad’s foray into the competition would have possibly contributed towards widening disagreements among the conservative political forces that appear to be adamant on setting aside these disagreements to be able to restore the presidency from the moderates and compensate their huge loss in the previous presidential elections. 

Accordingly, these forces will make diligent efforts in a bid to block any attempts by some figures to call Khamenei to interfere at the Guardian Council of the Constitution to allow Ahmadinejad to run in the elections. This is based on their belief that qualifying Ahmadinejad, if it was to happen, would serve the interests of the moderate current which is closely monitoring “the shifting balances” within the opposing current. 

The Trump Effect

In conclusion, it can possibly be said that the current president Hassan Rouhani still has a chance to win a second four-year term. This would be based on his argument that carrying out his political and economic program needs more time but currently faces several obstacles. That is because fundamental conservatives are keen on coping with the results of the previous elections while taking advantage of the continuous tensions with the US administration of President Donald Trump, as well as the obstacles that block Iran from receiving more economic benefits from the 2015 nuclear deal, to enhance their candidate’s chances in winning the elections. 

However, this would not, at the same time, negate the fact that there are significant variables that can have direct impact on the results of the elections. Most importantly is the policy that Ali Khamenei would pursue to deal with the measures that are expected to be taken by the US after the 90-day deadline set by President Trump for reviewing the nuclear agreement. That is, Khamenei would, maybe, make early preparations in anticipation of any additional US escalatory measures in the coming period that can play a role in identifying the next president of Iran.