With the rising global tensions and potential use of different types of nuclear, it is imperative that each region takes measures to prevent the proliferation of these weapons. This is particularly critical in the already polarized Middle East, where serious nuclear concerns are looming.
There is a security imbalance within the region accompanied with a discrepancy in the legal commitments taken by the states of the region regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. While some countries have joined international treaties, others have chosen not to do so, exacerbating the situation.
All North African States are non-nuclear weapon parties to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At the same time, only Algeria and Egypt have or plan substantive peaceful nuclear programs that are subject to the full scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In the Levant, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq today have no recognizable nuclear programs and are non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT. Jordan has considered pursuing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and has some accessible uranium resources, but it remains a non-nuclear weapon party to the NPT with safeguarded facilities.
In the Gulf, the UAE currently operates a nuclear power plant and has accepted all the relevant safeguard agreements pursuant to the NPT safeguard requirements and Section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act. Saudi Arabia is a non-nuclear weapon party to the NPT and has no substantial nuclear power program, while Bahrain and Oman are also non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT with no significant programs.
Therefore, all Arab countries are parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. However, the situation of non-Arab states in the traditional Middle East is quite different
Israel is known to have several nuclear reactors and facilities that are part of an unsafeguarded nuclear program, which has been referred to as an undeclared nuclear weapons program. Israel's decision not to join the NPT in the past was based on the claim that it faced existential threats. However, the peace arrangements with Egypt and Jordan and the defeat of Iraqi forces after Saddam Hussein have essentially eliminated any possibility of an all-out Arab-Israeli war and any potential existential threat.
The occasional sabre-rattling that we hear from Iran towards Israel is nothing more than domestic posturing. The threats posed to Israel primarily stem from the occupation of Palestinian territories and the lack of a political resolution. This issue cannot be addressed with nuclear weapons.
Iran's Nuclear Program and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
There have been recurring indications that Iran has contemplated pursuing nuclear weapons since the rule of Shah Pahlevi as leverage to gain Western support in the Cold War. After the Iranian revolution, Iranian studies of possible weaponization raised serious concerns about its intentions.
In 2015, the P5+1 concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which placed caps on Iranian uranium enrichment (3.67%), 10- and 15-year restrictions on modified centrifuge operation, reconfiguration of its heavy water reactor, verification procedures for its nuclear complex and accepted adherence to IAEA additional protocols. In exchange, Iran received sanctions relief.
Very few countries in the Middle East truly welcomed the JCPOA. One major concern was the agreement's sunset clauses, which limit its duration rather than making it indefinite. Another concern was that the agreement would release substantial impounded funds to Iran without addressing its aggressive role in regional conflicts.
I previously raised these issues with former US Secretary of State John Kerry when I was Foreign Minister of Egypt in 2013–14. His response then was that the JCPOA was the best achievable deal at the time as a first step to be complemented by other agreements that would cover the concerns I mentioned. Yet, when Donald Trump assumed office, he withdrew from the JCPOA.
A Balanced Approach to Nuclear Disarmament in the Middle East
International concerns about the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East seem to be consistently increasing. It is crucial to deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues in the region with a balanced security approach, without any prejudice or preferential treatment.
However, the current approach is leading to failure, with global ramifications that will not be limited to the Middle East. In recent years, the international community has not given enough attention to nuclear proliferation or disarmament issues. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was not expected, and nuclear disarmament steps were not prioritized. The recent Russian withdrawal from the New Start agreement is another example of regression.
In the Middle East, Egypt and Israel have not ratified the CTBT, as failures to address Israeli exceptionalism in this regard have hindered the process.
Egypt has shown no interest in a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that does not address existing stockpiles, as this would further exacerbate nuclear imbalances that exist in the Middle East. A complete prohibition of these materials for weapons purposes, including existing stockpiles, is necessary instead of just a cut-off treaty. Iran and India have been reluctant participants in the FMCT, while Pakistan and China have been vocal and resistant. Israel has remained silent on the matter. Without addressing existing nuclear stockpiles, Israel and Iran could retain their nuclear material, which would be completely unacceptable to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia
Reviving the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Over the years, various attempts have been made to address nuclear issues, and one such proposal was the creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ). The idea was first suggested by Iran at the 1974 General Assembly of the United Nations, and Egypt quickly joined as a co-sponsor after the resolution was amended to focus on creating a ‘Nuclear Weapons Free Region’ without excluding the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Egypt has since played a prominent role in promoting this idea.
Despite hopes that the end of the Cold War and the peace between Egypt, Jordan, and Israel would lead to global and regional progress on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, this was not to be. However, the MENWFZ proposal gained wider acceptance globally, with zones or zone proposals existing in different parts of the world. The proposal has been adopted by consensus every year at the United Nations General Assembly for over a decade, providing numerous occasions for discussions within the United Nations, the IAEA, and various official and track II processes. As a result, the MENWFZ has become a mature proposal in the region and has had a significant impact on the global stage.
In 1990, just before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there were threats between Prime Minister Shamir of Israel and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq to use weapons of mass destruction against each other. In response, President Mubarak of Egypt proposed the establishment of a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, which included nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Later on, after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 of 1991, which stated that the measures against Iraq's WMD program were steps towards the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was also significant in this effort. Israel's foreign minister Shimon Perez made a commitment to his Egyptian counterpart, Amr Moussa, that Israel would adhere to the NPT within a year after comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. However, this commitment was not confirmed by the Israeli government.
Egypt and a number of Arab countries took a clear position at the extension conference that they would not agree to the indefinite extension of the treaty if non-proliferation concerns in the Middle East were ignored. After negotiations with the United States, Russia, and the UK, the three treaty depositories sponsored a resolution calling for all states in the Middle East to join the NPT and take practical steps towards freeing the region from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
However, despite efforts, the 2005 and 2010 NPT review conferences failed as this issue was not given appropriate attention. Attempts to organize a regional conference on the subject also did not materialize.
Challenges to Regional Non-Proliferation Initiatives in the Middle East and Africa
The absence of regional parity on non-proliferation obligations has hindered the ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty creating an African Nuclear Free Zone and ensuring adherence to the CWC and BWC with Egypt and Israel remaining non-members. Interestingly enough, every one of the five nuclear weapon states has supported the establishment of a MENWFZ through its UN voting patterns. Every state in the Middle East, including Israel and Iran, has come out in support of a NWFZ and a large number as well in favour of a WMDFZ in the region. Initially, Israel supported such a zone, calling only to consider the conventional weapons imbalance in favour of Arab countries. Subsequently, it added that such a zone was possible only when “peace” and then “reconciliation” existed with the Arab world. Afterwards, it added a caveat regarding its neighbours’ capability to produce WMDs. Israel seems to be less interested in discussing its nuclear program and is instead attempting to shift the focus of Middle East proliferation to the noncompliance of Iran and Syria.
Iran has supported the establishment of a NWFZ and is also a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. However, its initial temerity in response to IAEA recent queries about its nuclear program and in conjunction with the short-lived adherence to the JCPOA have raised doubts about whether Iran was still supportive of a regional approach. A Middle East NWFZ is a longstanding objective that has gained international and regional support and has been the subject of several attempts to initiate a negotiation process.
Towards a Nuclear-Free Middle East: Steps to Consider
The effort towards creating a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East peaked during the 1991 Madrid Peace Process multilateral working group on Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS). All Arab states were in favour of a NWFZ, but Israel only agreed to discuss nuclear verification measures, resulting in limited success. Informal track II Israeli-Egyptian contacts also made progress before coming to a sudden stop when Israel felt they had gone too far. Given the region's volatile political and controversial proliferation history, there is a risk of changes in regional nuclear security policies. However, despite difficulties and past failures, it is imperative for the Middle East to establish a roadmap towards a region free of nuclear weapons.
The negative implications of a weapons of a mass destruction arms race in the region far outweigh any assumed security deterrent value. Although it will be a challenging and arduous task, there are two parallel tracks that should be undertaken towards achieving this objective.
Firstly, all the regional states, along with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), should submit formal letters to the Security Council reaffirming their support for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.
Secondly, when international politics allow, the UNSC should take several steps, including the adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII (thus legally binding) prohibiting nuclear attacks or threats of attacks against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT or a NWFZ.
Additionally, a task force should be established, consisting of Middle Eastern states and the five permanent members as observers, to consider concrete steps towards dealing with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the Middle East and the creation of a NWFZ.
Furthermore, a group of unofficial experts should be instructed to draft possible provisions of such a zone treaty which ultimately would be placed for negotiations by the concerned parties.
The international community must take nuclear disarmament and proliferation seriously in the Middle East and act with urgency. Failure to do so may result in severe consequences for everyone.
