2017 was a watershed in the evolution of the prolonged Syrian conflict, as Russia has led vigorous moves to garner the support of both Iran and Turkey, the two most influential parties in the internal Syrian equation from its point of view. However, Moscow’s relations with these countries are based on the balance of threat, that’s why the fate of Syria in 2018 is arguably tied to keeping such balance between these powers.
This analysis discusses the expected moves by Russia, Iran and Turkey over the next year to safeguard their interests in the political settlement in Syria. It first presents the dimensions of Astana negotiations as an essential step in shaping the future of Syria, and then examines the impact of these determinants on formulating a political settlement by reviewing a range of issues related to this balance on the Syrian map.
Settlement fundamentals
Russia has called for negotiations in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, to bring together the Syrian regime and the Syrian opposition groups under its auspices, as well as Iran and Turkey. The objectives of these negotiations, which took place on 24 January 2017, were crystallized in the final statement by the Foreign minister of Kazakhstan, Kairat Abdrakhmanov, as follows:
1- There is no military solution to the Syrian crisis: Although negotiations have so far focused on military and technical issues, they are primarily aimed at freezing military operations in favour of initiating a political settlement process. This has been pointed out by the spokesman for Kazakhstan in the Security Council, Kairat Umarov. “The talks are an integral part of the Geneva process. Geneva is the main venue for negotiations on a Syrian settlement under the aegis of the United Nations, where the political part of the agenda is discussed”, Umarov said. “The success of the Geneva process is linked to the outcome of the negotiations in Astana”, he added.
2- A tripartite ceasefire monitoring mechanism aimed at halting violence, improving the humanitarian situation and creating conditions conducive to the promotion of a political settlement. The negotiating parties have already signed an agreement during the fourth round of negotiations on the establishment of “de-escalation zones” in Idlib, Homs, eastern Ghouta and southern Syria. The agreement entered into force on 6 May 2017 and Lt General Sergei Rudskoi, head of the Russian General Staff’s main operations directorate, stressed that the armistice-sponsor states ensure that barriers and checkpoints are in operation and can involve forces from other states provided that there is a consensus among them.
The sixth round of negotiations, held in mid-September, resulted in an agreement announced by the three guarantor states to deploy observers in Idlib, located in north-western Syria on the borders with Turkey, mostly under the control of a coalition of opposition factions led by Jabhat al-Nusra, the former wing of al-Qaeda, which changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. Negotiations are still underway to reach understandings on the demarcation of the checkpoints among the three states to stabilize the ceasefire in Syria.
3- The fight against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and separating them from other opposition parties. Several Syrian armed opposition factions announced their participation in the first rounds of the negotiations, in the aftermath of their defeat in the Battle for Aleppo, north of Syria, during which Syrian regime forces regained control of the city on 22 December 2016 with the help of Russian air strikes and 'armed Iranians'.
Although the opposition groups did not participate in all the rounds of negotiations -they boycotted some of rounds- the guarantors of negotiations were keen to involve the opposition. For example, when the Syrian opposition delegation in the third round was delayed, Russian special presidential envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev, stated in March 16, 2017, that the guarantor states decided to keep part of their delegations “for possible consultations” with the opposition delegation as they arrived, noting that “It is necessary to continue negotiations between the guarantor states and the Syrian armed opposition delegation in Astana”.
Determinants of balance
Astana negotiations are an attempt to shape the future of Syria on the ground, each of the parties involved in the Syrian conflict, including the guarantor states, seek to expand its spheres of influence in the battlefield through negotiations. It is inconceivable that a political settlement would deviate from the context of the recent balance of the threat that governs the relations of the Middle East region.
The moves of the sponsors of negotiations and the guarantors of implementing the outcome, fall within the above-mentioned balance. In this regard, let us discuss a number of issues related to this balance in Syria:
1- President Bashar al-Assad staying in power is a controversial issue among the sponsors of the conference, as well as among the Syrian opposition parties. Concerning the former, Russia and Iran support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while Turkey backs the opposition factions. Although in some of its positions during the crisis, Moscow has expressed its acceptance of negotiations on the fate of President al-Assad in power, and Ankara has sometimes turned a blind eye to the issue of his departure, Iran insists that al-Assad should stay in power, considering him its closest Arab ally.
Although Russia is the most influential power backing al-Assad regime to stay in power, its statements about withdrawing part of its forces, which helped change the balance of power in favour of the Syrian regime on the ground, demonstrate that its support for al-Assad is not absolute, which allows it to exert pressure on the Syrian regime. The arrangements spearheaded by Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold a conference to revive the political process in Syria reflect the Russian vision regarding President Assad as part of the diplomatic game. Putin hosted Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on November 22, 2017, a day after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad greeted him in the same place on November 20.
2- The Kurdish influence: Both Turkey and Iran have Kurdish minorities and they perceive the growing Kurdish influence in the region as a threat to their national security. The statements by Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Bagheri, during his three-day visit to Ankara on August 15, 2017, reveal the two countries see eye to eye on the issue.
It is reported that Syrian Kurdish groups and affiliated armed factions now control about a quarter of the Syrian territories. They announced in March 2013 the establishment of a federal system in the areas under their control, which they divided into three regions: Al Jazeera (al-Hasakah governorate, north-east), Afrin (Aleppo countryside, north-west), and Kobani (Ein al-Arab, central- north), these areas were named Rojava, meaning “Western Kurdistan” in Kurdish. They hope that a new phase of negotiations will be launched that would support their autonomy in northern Syria.
Turkey views the Kurdish People’s Protection Units as its biggest security concern. These units are part of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Alliance in the fight against ISIS in eastern Syria, which Ankara opposes and repeatedly deplores. Ankara asserts that these units constitute an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been fighting the Turkish state for decades, which is listed as a terrorist group by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU.
Syria’s Kurds constitute a troublesome leverage in Turkey and in formulating the balance of threat at the negotiating table. For example, during the diplomatic crisis between Moscow and Ankara, following the shooting down of a Russian fighter aircraft over the Syrian border in November 2015, opening a representative office for Syrian Kurds in Russia was announced on 10 February 2016, and the head of the representative office, Rodi Osman, stated that the Syrian Kurds continue to cooperate with Russia.
Meanwhile, a Russian proposal to draft the constitution of Syria was leaked in May 2016, which was later denied, suggesting a vision to form a federal state based on sectarian and ethnic quotas. This explains Turkey’s support for the concept of Syrian territorial integrity, which conforms to Iran’s objectives, as the latter regards Syria as a major transit point for Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
It further explains why Turkey welcomes the Russian initiative on the Syrian National Dialogue Conference in Sochi, having succeeded in reaching an agreement on the deployment of observers in Idlib, which allows it to preclude the declaration of Kurdish self-rule in neighboring Afrin and prevent the Kurds from approaching the Mediterranean Sea. Erdogan stressed on November 17, 2017 that “We need to cleanse Arin of the terrorist organization which calls itself the People’s Protection Units”.
3- Armed groups: Many armed groups are operating on the Syrian territories, most of which are supported by states with a vested interest in the Syrian conflict. Armed Sunni groups pose a common threat to the three sponsors, albeit in varying forms. While Russia and Iran view these groups as a major threat, spreading chaos and have repercussions on Russia in the Caucasus, and Tehran in Iraq, Ankara regards the Kurdish armed groups in Syria as the main threat to its internal security. Ahead of the first round of Astana talks, the Turkish foreign minister said that if the U.S. wants to invite the Syrian Kurdish militants to Astana talks, it should also invite ISIS.
The presence of command centers of some Syrian armed opposition groups in Turkey gives the latter leverage. Sometimes, Turkey uses it to exert pressure on these groups since it controls their vital supply lines, and sometimes exploits it when negotiating with Russia and Iran, to expand its influence.
On the other hand, Shiite armed groups are one of Iran’s tools to build solid “bases” at the core of political, security, military and social structures and in many countries of the region, such as Hezbollah, but Russia and Turkey do not consider these groups a direct threat to their interests. Therefore, Russian cooperation with Hezbollah in the Syrian war has largely contributed to the development of the latter’s capabilities.
4- Arms trade returns: Russia and Iran are subject to Western economic sanctions targeting their energy sectors. Turkey imports 56% of the gas from Russia and 18% from Iran.
Returns from arms sales constitute one of the indispensable sources of Russian revenue, especially in light of the fall of oil prices and the decline in its trade with Western countries after its annexation of Crimea.
Syria is a testing ground for the capabilities of weapons in actual battles. Russia Today (RT) stated on May 26, 2017 that the Chairman of the Military Scientific Committee of the Russian Armed Forces Lt Gen. Igor Makushev confirmed that Russian military researchers studied the use of more than 200 types of weapons that were used in actual combat in Syria, focusing on the latest types of weapons, including those in the testing phase, such as warplanes, missiles and tanks, which allowed for the modification of Russian weapon systems in terms of design and modernization.
Moreover, Putin’s military defense advisor, Vladimir Kojin, revealed during an interview with the Meninia channel that aircraft sales, including helicopters and planes are ranked first, accounting for 50% share of Russia’s total military exports.
Meanwhile, on September 12, 2017, Erdogan announced the signing of a contract with Russia for the purchase of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, a matter Russia later confirmed. This reflects Ankara’s desire to defy the NATO, despite being a member of it, amid its dissatisfaction with the U.S. stance in support of the Kurdish People’s protection Units.
In this vein, the Turkish government has allowed Washington to use NATO’s Incirlik base, since July 2015, to fight ISIS in Syria, three days after the extremist organization launched attack in Turkey which killed 33 people. On August 16, 2016, Russia announced its use of the Iranian air base in Hamaden, in its air campaign in Syria, which illustrates the level of Russian-Iranian coordination on the one hand and Turkish-U.S. coordination on the other hand.
The impacts of conflict resolution
The internal and regional political variables of the Syrian crisis demonstrate that reaching a peaceful and sustainable settlement in Syria reflects the extent to which the sponsors of the negotiations are aware of the threat of the Syrian conflict and the possibility that one of them might be able to shape the fate of Syria.
Thus, by exercising their influence on the parties of the Syrian crisis, the three sponsors seek to entrench their presence and raise the stakes of any attempts to take unilateral decision. According to a joint statement on December 22, 2017, officials from the three countries are slated to meet in Sochi on 19 and 20 January 2018 to prepare for an expanded meeting between the Syrian regime and the opposition on 29 and 30 of the same month.
